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ABSTRACT

This

dissertation

examined

the

antecedents

and

consequences of strategic change in the commercial banking
industry between 1980 and 1987.

Based on a review of the

literature, a conceptual model was developed that predicted
change would be influenced by two factors, adaptive forces
and inertial forces.

Adaptive forces include two factors

that have been hypothesized to encourage change,
performance and slack resources.

prior

Inertial forces include two

factors sometimes thought to inhibit change, organizational
size

and

age.

Change

outcomes

were

predicted

to

be

influenced by degree of change and moderated by adaptive and
inertial

forces.

Guided

by

previous

theoretical

and

empirical research, cluster analysis was used to measure
strategic change and degree of change.
The

conceptual

model

proved

to

be

useful

in

understanding the relationship between certain firm level
factors

and

strategies.

the

propensity of

organizations

to

change

Some evidence was found to support the notion

that prior performance, slack resources, and age are all
important antecedents to change.

Specifically, declining

performance and slack resources in the form of excess capital
were found to encourage change as predicted.

Contrary to

predictions, age was found to be a positive force for change.

xi
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Change was found to have positive consequences for the
banks

in this study; i.e.

performance and survival.

it was positively related to
The relationship between change

and performance became more clear when degree of change was
considered.

Those banks that underwent moderate levels of

change outperformed those that did not change as well as
those

that underwent more drastic

changes,

suggesting a

curvilinear relationship. Age and slack resources were found
to moderate the change performance relationship as well.
Specifically, for firms that changed strategies, age and
slack resources in the form of liquidity were found to be
negatively related to performance.

The findings concerning

slack were surprising, however, high levels of liquidity may
suggest risk aversion on the part of banks.

Overall, the

findings provide some evidence

to support the conceptual

model

to the major assumptions

and

they lend credence

underlying the strategic management perspective.

xii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Major changes in technology, shifts in socioeconomic
conditions, and regulatory changes can and often do result
in the restructuring of entire industries (Meyer, Brooks,
and Goes, 1990).

Such discontinuous environmental changes

can render certain strategies and organizational
competencies obsolete and change the basis of competition
within industries (Tushman and Anderson, 1986) . The
strategic management literature suggests that managers have
considerable latitude in altering their firm's competitive
strategies and reconfiguring resources in response to these
environmental changes (Porter, 1991; Hofer and Schendel,
1978) . In many cases such alterations are seen as necessary
to maintain performance and ensure continued survival of
the organization.
Despite its emphasis in the strategic management
literature, the extent to which managers are able to
successfully alter their competitive strategies in response
to environmental discont- inuities remains a source of
debate (Boeker, 1989; Romanelli and Tushman, 1986).
Population ecologists emphasize the role of inertial forces
that largely preclude major organizational change (Hannan
1
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and Freeman, 1977; 1984).

Furthermore, when changes are

attempted they tend to be disruptive and increase the
organizations risk of failure (Hannan and Freeman, 1984).
This viewpoint suggests that environmental selection more
accurately explains changes in strategies within an
industry over time.

Organizations whose strategies fit the

environment survive and others are "selected out."

Thus

changes in strategy within a given population are said to
occur due to selection and replacement rather than
strategic adaptation (Singh, House, and Tucker, 1986).
Although the strategic management and selection
perspectives are usually seen as conflicting (Astley and
Van de Ven, 1983), it has been argued that a richer
understanding of strategic adaptation may be obtained by
considering them simultaneously (Mascarenhas, 1989; Cook,
Shortell, Conrad, and Morrisey, 1983; Ginzberg and
Bucholtz, 1990).

That is, the extent to which either view

is salient may depend on factors peculiar to the situation
or the organization.

For example, it has been suggested

that the selection arguments may be more salient when
focusing on changes in the core features of the
organization (Singh, House, and Tucker, 1986; Scott, 1987),
changes that fail to build on established routines and
competencies (Haveman, 1992), and when predicting the
outcomes of change for older, larger, and more complex
organizations (Hannan and Freeman, 1984).

Similarly,
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strategic management theorists have argued that the
relationship between strategic adaptation and performance
is likely to depend on factors such as the degree or type
of change attempted (Snow and Hambrick, 1980; Nadler, 1988;
Shortell, Morrison, and Friedman, 1990), the need for
change (Beer, 1988; Shortell et. al, 1990), and the
resources available to implement change (Ginsberg and
Bucholtz, 1990).

In other words, predictions concerning

the propensity of organizations to engage in strategic
change and the outcomes of that change may be influenced by
various organizational and contextual factors.
To date surprisingly little progress has been made in
understanding the degree to which strategic change at the
business level can be successfully managed (Ginsberg, 1988;
Zajac and Shortell, 1989) . Relatively few empirical
studies have attempted to test the basic proposition that
strategic change enhances organizational effectiveness, and
those that have report mixed results.

The difficulty

associated with doing large scale longitudinal research and
the relative ease of access to large scale 'static' data
bases is no doubt one reason for this situation (Ginsberg,
1988).

However, confusion and controversy over basic

conceptual issues such as how strategy is defined and what
constitutes a strategic change have also hampered research
(Ginsberg, 1988).

Consequently, traditional strategic

management prescriptions regarding the need to respond to
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environmental threats and opportunities by altering
strategies are only thinly supported by empirical evidence
at present (Ginsberg, 1988; Guarino, 1991).
This study is driven by three basic research
questions, two of which have been the focus of much of the
strategic change research performed to date.

The first two

questions are:
1. Do organizations engage in strategic change following
environmental discontinuities?
2. Do those organizations that change strategies following
major environmental discontinuities improve their
performance and survival chances?
The research results suggest that strategic change is
not uncommon following environmental discontinuities.
Nevertheless, more research is needed to explore the first
question.

First, the evidence is far from overwhelming.

The question lends itself to single industry studies,
leading to questions of generalizability. Also, the answer
to this question may depend on how strategy and strategic
change are conceptualized and measured.

These issues

suggest the need for replication in different settings,
using different measures and methods.

Second, the question

of why some organizations change and others do not needs to
be addressed.

A growing number of studies have begun

exploring this issue, but many questions remain.
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The answer to the second question has proven much more
elusive.

Few studies have examined change outcomes, and

those have produced mostly conflicting or inconclusive
results.

This indicates the need for closer examination of

strategic change and change outcomes.

As noted, the

conceptual literature has begun to focus on reconciling the
divergent views by considering different contexts that may
alter change and change outcomes.

Factors such as the type

or degree of change, age, size, prior performance, and
slack resources have all been hypothesized to impact the
propensity to change, and a few studies have suggested that
such variables may moderate change outcomes. In short,
both the theoretical and empirical literature suggest that
the answer to the above questions may be, "it all depends."
Therefore, while examining the first two questions, this
study will focus on a third, less explored, question:
3. To what extent is the relationship between change in
strategy, performance, and survival influenced by firm
and situation specific factors?
Specifically, it will be argued that the outcomes of
strategic change can best be understood and predicted by
simultaneously considering three important categories of
variables; adaptive forces that encourage and enable
change, inertial forces that retard change (Ginsberg and
Bucholtz, 1990), and the degree of change sought (Singh et
al., 1986; Haveman, 1992).
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The answers to these questions have a great deal of
significance for both academicians and practitioners.
Ginsberg (1988) notes that no generalizable conclusions can
be drawn from the current research concerning the
performance outcomes of strategic change.

One reason for

this is that relatively few studies have attempted to
examine the contextual factors that may determine whether
changes are adaptive or disruptive (Singh et al., 1986) .
If the answer to the first two questions is "it all
depends", then finding the circumstances under which
strategic change is more likely to be adaptive has a great
deal of significance for future researchers examining the
topic and managers contemplating change.
The Study
Site
This dissertation examines the antecedents and
consequences of strategic change in the commercial banking
industry between 1980 and 1987.

The commercial banking

industry provides an interesting and appropriate setting
for examining the outcome of strategic change.

The

industry underwent a major change in its competitive
environment following the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980, and
the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 . These regulatory
changes placed extreme pressure on bank profit margins by
removing interest rate ceilings on the deposit side and

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

7

removing artificial entry barriers, thus increasing
competition on the lending side.

In addition, during the

early 1980's banks were faced with changing technological
and general economic environments that further impacted the
competitive structure of the industry (Ballarin, 1986).

As

a result, commercial banks were forced to reconsider their
basic competitive strategies, and make decisions concerning
the markets in which they would operate and the products
and services they would offer (Storrs, 1988; Tregoe, Tobia,
and Zimmerman, 1988).
Scope of the Study
This study concerns itself with changes in the content
of business level competitive strategy and the outcomes of
those changes. Three components are said to describe an
organization's competitive strategy at the business level;
scope, competitive weapons, and segment differentiation
(Chrisman, Hofer, and Boulton, 1988).

Scope, the component

of interest in this study, refers to the basic choices an
organization must make regarding products or services
offered to customers, geographic markets served, and
technologies (Abell, 1980).

Although the use of narrow

definitions of strategy are said to increase the risk of
specification error (Ginsberg, 1988), its use is justified
in this study for several reasons.

First, the majority of

the studies examining strategic groups or strategic change
in the strategic management literature have primarily

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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relied on some aspect of product or market scope to measure
strategy (Bauerschmidt and Chrisman, 1993).

Second, the

population ecology literature has commonly focused on the
breadth of product offerings (niche-width) to differentiate
organization forms (Freeman and Hannan, 1983; Carroll,
1987) . In fact, Havemann (1992) has argued that products
offered, markets served, and technology are the most
important factors in defining organization form.

Finally,

it has been noted that the range of products offered and
markets served have become increasingly important strategic
considerations for commercial banks in a deregulated
environment (Storrs, 1988; Austin and Mandula, 1985) .
Thus, product/market scope appears to be an appropriate
strategic component on which to differentiate commercial
banks.
Most strategic management studies that have examined
the outcomes of strategic change have focused on some
aspect of financial performance to gauge success.
Population ecologists, however, have argued that these
studies may be biased because they fail to consider
organizational failure as an outcome (Hannan and Freeman,
1989; Freeman and Boeker, 1984) . In other words, they are
biased to the extent that they only examine surviving
organizations.

If, in fact, organizational mortality is a

common event and is associated with organizational change
as the population ecologists argue, samples that exclude
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failed firms can be argued to be biased.

Thus, this study

will include failed firms in the sample and, in addition to
examining performance, will specifically examine the impact
of change on organizational survival.
Organization of the Study
This dissertation contains seven chapters.

Following

this introductory chapter, the second chapter will briefly
summarize the events occurring in the banking industry
during the time frame of the study.

The third chapter

summarizes the conceptual and empirical literature relevant
for this study.

Chapter four further develops the

theoretical framework and proposes specific hypotheses to
be tested.

Chapter five outlines the research methodology

used in this study.

This will include a discussion of data

sources, empirical measures, and methods of statistical
analysis.

Chapter six discusses the results of the

statistical analysis and the final chapter provides an
overall discussion of the conclusions and implications of
the findings.
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CHAPTER 2
BANKING IN THE 1980'S: AN INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION

Regulators have sought to control the activities of
commercial banks on the federal and/or state level in three
basic ways: limiting the range of products and services
offered, restricting geographic expansion, and regulating
interest rates.

Commercial banks have traditionally been

prohibited from offering certain services, such as
investment and insurance underwriting, primarily due to the
Glass-Steagall Act of 1932.

The primary legislation in the

area of geographic expansion is the McFadden Act, which
gave each state the right to make decisions regarding
branch banking.

Subsequent rulings have placed the issue

of interstate banking in the hands of individual states as
well.

Prior to 1980, interest rates on the liability side

were regulated through the Federal Reserve System's
"Regulation Q."

This placed ceilings on interest rates

paid on deposits and in effect gave commercial banks a
monopoly on demand deposits.

Interest rates on loans have

been controlled on the state level, but are typically not a
factor in banking activities.
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980, and the Garn-St. Germain Act
10
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of 1982 are widely acclaimed to represent the biggest
change for commercial banks since the 1930's.

The direct

implication for commercial banks was a lifting of most
interest rate restrictions imposed by regulation Q.

Among

other things, the DIDMCA phased out interest rate ceilings
on time deposits, and allowed the payment of interest on
checking accounts, while Garn-St Germain allowed the
establishment of interest bearing Money Market Demand
Accounts.

These actions were designed to help banks stem

the outflow of deposits to higher paying money market
funds.

While accomplishing this task, price deregulation

created a problem by narrowing interest rate spreads; i.e.,
the difference between the interest rates banks pay
depositors and collect from borrowers.

Thus, banks were

pressured to lend more money at higher rates.
Another indirect but highly significant implication of
the DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain, is that they removed most
of the barriers that separated other financial
intermediaries from commercial banks.

Savings and Loans,

Mutual Savings Banks, and Credit Unions were given greatly
expanded product domains, including the right to provide
checking accounts and offer a variety of loans and services
that were traditionally the primary domain of commercial
banks.

Thus, commercial banks lost their legal monopoly on

checking accounts (a very important competitive advantage),
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and experienced significantly increased competition in the
lending arena.
At this point, commercial banks remain rather highly
regulated in the product/service and geographic domains,
though strides toward deregulation have occurred over the
last decade.

The Glass-Steagall Act remains in force, but

individual banks have managed to win court cases allowing
them to engage in activities normally reserved for the
brokerage business.

Thus the door has been opened for

product diversification into new areas.

As noted,

geographic regulation remains largely the purview of
individual states, and states have varied considerably in
the rate and extent to which they have allowed branching
and interstate banking (Reger et al, 1992) . Thus,
deregulation in these areas has proceeded in a rather
sporadic basis over the last decade.
It is important to note, that during this same time
period the commercial banking industry was also subjected
to competitive pressures only indirectly related to
deregulation.

First, there was increased competition from

non-traditional sources, including insurance companies,
retailers, security dealers, and foreign banks (Roussakis,
1989).

The reason for this incursion is rather complex and

not completely understood (Ballarin, 1986) though it is
partially the result of regulatory, economic, and
technological changes that occurred during the 1970s and
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80s. It is notable that these competitors were able to
extend practically all of the services offered by
commercial banks, while not being subject to product and
geographic constraints still imposed on the industry.
Though more recent legislation has been designed to
eliminate this disparity by imposing constraints on
entrants, for most of the decade banks were (and to a large
extent still are) faced with a considerable competitive
disadvantage.
A second trend noted was that large U.S. corporations
began reducing their cost of debt during the 1970's and
80's by circumventing intermediaries and going directly to
capital markets (Ballarin, 1986).

This has been

accomplished primarily through the use of commercial paper
(short term unsecured promissory notes). As a result,
commercial banks have seen a portion of their market
considered to be the most attractive severely diminished.
The point of the above discussion is to note that the
environment for the commercial banking industry became
decidedly more hostile during the 1980's.

In terms of

Porter's (1980) five forces model the banking industry
experienced significant changes in barriers to entry,
substitute products, and bargaining power of buyers and
suppliers. As noted above regulatory and other
environmental changes permitted entry by thrifts and nontraditional competitors into the traditional domains of

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

14

commercial banking.

This, along with the proliferation of

substitute products on both the supply and demand sides led
to increased power on behalf of both suppliers and users of
funds.

The net effect on commercial banks was an increase

in cost of funds, coupled with a less munificent lending
environment.
Evidence of the difficulties experienced in the
industry lies in the record number of bank closures that
occurred during the last decade (see Figures 1 and 2).

To

get an idea of the severity of this problem, over 844 banks
failed between 1982 and 1988, compared to 190 failures
during the entire 30 year prior to 1980 (Roussakis, 1989) .
Bank failures in 1987 and 1988 each totaled more than the
aggregate number occurring during the period 1950-1979.
Given the above scenario, the banking industry would
seem to be a very appropriate setting in which to examine
change in strategic content.

There can be little doubt

that deregulation represents a major environmental change
for the industry, and the change would appear to be
significantly threatening to cause firms to consider
changing strategy.

Also, the nature and timing of

regulatory changes can be identified objectively.

Finally,

the industry contains a large number of comparable firms
for which archival data is available.
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CHAPTER 3
CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

The purpose of this chapter is to review the relevant
theoretical and empirical perspectives on strategic change.
First, the various theoretical perspectives on strategic
change will be addressed, then the empirical research will
be reviewed.
Perspectives on Organizational Adaptation
Theories of organizational adaptation can be
classified into three basic categories; natural selection
theories, rational adaptation theories, and random
transformation theories (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Singh,
House, and Tucker, 1986). The following section briefly
summarizes the major points associated with each of these
approaches.
Natural Selection
The essence of the natural selection view is summed up
by Hannan and Freeman (1989) as follows:
..most of the variability in the core structures
of organizations comes about through the creation
of new organizations and organization forms and
the demise of old ones. These perspectives argue
that existing organizations, especially the
largest and most powerful, rarely change strategy
and structure quickly enough to keep up with the
demands of uncertain, changing environments.
They emphasize that major innovations in
organizational strategy and structure occur early
17

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

18

in the life histories of individual organizations
and of organizational populations (p. 11).
Selection arguments are premised on the notion that
strong inertial forces constrain organizations from
initiating and implementing changes to the core features of
the organization (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; 1984; 1989) .
Inertial forces arise from both internal arrangements
(investments in assets, information constraints, internal
politics, and history) and the environment (legal barriers,
information constraints, and legitimacy constraints).
These inertial forces serve to reduce the frequency and
speed of organizational change and the degree to which it
can be planned and controlled (Hannan and Freeman, 1984;
1989) . Thus, selection occurs through an interaction of
relatively immutable organizational characteristics and
changing environmental circumstances (Carroll, 1987) . When
organizational strategy and structure fit the environment,
selection is favorable; when they do not, selection is
unfavorable.
It is important to note that the selection argument
does not require that inertial forces preclude
organizational change; merely that they render attempts at
changing ineffective or dysfunctional.

The selection

theorists argue that one way they do this is by slowing
down the change process.

Organizations that fail to learn

about their environments and modify strategies at a faster
rate than the environment will remain in a constant state
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of misalignment and are apt to reduce their odds of
survival (Hannan and Freeman, 1984).

Thus, to the extent

that organizations remain relatively inert, i.e., their
strategies and structures change at a slower rate than the
environment, the selection perspective can be argued to be
salient.
Selection theorists have further asserted that changes
to the core aspects of the organization; i.e., goals, forms
of authority, technology, and marketing strategy, rob the
organization of survival value (Hannan and Freeman, 1984).
Changes of a strategic nature typically upset established
work routines, require the hiring of new employees or
retraining of existing employees, disrupt communication
patterns, and force the organization to forge new
relationships with customers and suppliers (Haveman, 1992;
Singh, House, and Tucker, 1986; Hannan and Freeman, 1984;
1989).

This process of dismantling and rebuilding internal

routines and external relationships also leaves the
organization vulnerable to increased conflict as rival
constituents seek to influence the outcome in a manner that
benefits their own interest (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) .
Thus, during reorganization resources are diverted away
from the production of goods and services and toward the
reorganization effort and other non-productive uses.

This

redirection of resources reduces the organization's
reliability of performance to that of a new organization,
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thus subjecting the firm to "liability of newness"
(Stinchcombe, 1965; Hannan and Freeman, 1984) . In short,
according to the selection perspective, efforts devoted to
reorganization severely reduce efficiency, which leads to
poor performance and increased risk of failure (Haveman,
1992) .
Rational Adaptation
The rational adaptation view asserts that managers
and/or dominant coalitions are able to influence
organizational change, and that adaptation in response to
changed environmental circumstances is likely to have a
positive influence on organizational performance and
probability of survival.

Various theoretical approaches

revolve around this central theme, though they tend to
differ in their explanations of what drives change and the
degree of choice available to managers.

Some of the

theoretical perspectives that fall under this general
category are contingency theory (Burns and Stalker, 1961;
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), resource dependency (Aldrich
and Pfeffer, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978),
institutional theory (Scott and Meyer, 1983), and the
strategic management perspective (Andrews, 1971; Schendel
and Hofer, 1979) .
Contingency Theory
The underlying premises of contingency theory are: 1)
there is no one best way to organize; and 2) all ways of
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organizing are not equally effective (Galbraith, 1973) .
Contingency theorists also assume a strong causal
relationship between the environment, internal structures,
and performance (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).

The general

notion is that organizations who best match their internal
structural features to external demands of the environment
will achieve the best performance (Scott, 1987).
The above premises are actually common to some degree in
all the

rational adaptation views, however, contingency

theory is different in several aspects.

First, the general

emphasis is on matching internal structural features to
various environmental demands.

For example, Lawrence and

Lorsch (1967) found evidence to suggest that higher levels
of environmental complexity and uncertainty require a
greater degree of structural differentiation and
integration.

Second, contingency theorists stress the

environment as the driving force, with organizations
confined to a reactionary role.

Thus, this approach is

perceived to be more deterministic than some of the other
rational adaptation perspectives.

Finally, the ability of

firms to adapt their structures to changing environments is
implied, but not a central concern.

In fact, some have

argued that contingency theory can be seen as being
consistent with either a rational adaptation or natural
selection view (Scott, 1987) . The overriding concern seems
to be in understanding the structural contingencies
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required by various environments, and not in understanding
how those features were obtained.
Resource Dependency
Resource dependency theorists take a less
deterministic view, suggesting managers often act upon as
well as adapt to their environments in order to reduce
dependencies and control critical resources (Aldrich and
Pfeffer, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).

The notion

here is that firms must acquire and hold on to scarce
environmental resources to prosper and survive.

Because

organizations are not internally self sufficient, they must
rely on resources from their environment, and thus become
interdependent with outside organizations.

The degree of

dependence varies, depending on the importance and scarcity
of the resources.

Underlying this perspective is Emerson's

(1963) idea that power and dependency are related.

If a

firm becomes dependent on another for acquiring scarce
resources, then the other firm has power over the first.
Interorganizational dependency offers the opportunity for
political and economic influence, thus increasing
uncertainty for the dependent firm.
To reduce dependencies and acquire scarce resources,
firms engage in a number of "bridging" strategies to deal
with their environments. Such strategies include
bargaining, contracting, co-optation, joining trade
associations, lobbying, engaging in joint ventures,
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diversification, and merging with other firms (Scott,
1987) . From this perspective, effective managers are seen
as those that can both react to changing environmental
circumstances and act in ways to alter their environments
so as to reduce uncertainties and dependencies.

Thus, the

ability to adapt is central to the resource dependency
view.
Institutional Theory
Like contingency theorists, institutional theorists
also emphasize the need for achieving a fit between formal
structure and the environment, but the focus here is on the
institutional environment and the need for legitimacy
(Scott and Meyer, 1983).

Institutional environments

consists of various rules and requirements to which
individual organizations must conform to receive legitimacy
and support.

For some organizations, such environments

demands may be more crucial for survival than competitive,
or technical demands, e.g. schools, hospitals, and mental
health clinics (Scott, 1987).
Institutional theorists stress the need for
organizations to adapt to changing institutional rules in
order to insure survival.

Such adaptation may take the

form of adopting both formal and informal structural
requirements, incorporating procedures, and hiring
personnel (Scott, 1987).

Examples include conforming to

certain structures and procedures to meet standards for
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accreditation, incorporating popular structures or
management tools, and obtaining personnel on the basis of
meeting certain licensing requirements.

Institutional

theorists stress that such adaptation may be required by
strong institutional pressures, regardless of technical
requirements.

Thus, institutional theorists also stress

the need for and ability to adapt to environmental
pressures, but for different reasons than suggested by the
contingency and resource dependency theorists.
Strategic Management
The strategic management perspective, perhaps the most
dominant of the adaptation theories, is distinct from the
other perspectives due to its greater emphasis on
managerial behavior and choice, and its explicit focus on
formulation and implementation of organizational strategies
(Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) . Strategic management can be
viewed as an adaptive process, whereby managers seek to
achieve a match between an organization's resources and
skills and its external environment, with strategy being
the basic alignment mechanism (Andrews, 1971; Schendel and
Hofer, 1979; Chakravarthy, 1982; Miles and Snow, 1984) .
The quality of a firms adaptation can be judged by the
degree to which current strategic decisions build on the
existing stock of organizational resources and skills and
the degree to which these resources are utilized to take
advantage of market opportunities (Cool and Schendel, 1988;
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Chakravarthy, 1986).

Strategies that are not appropriate

given the current competitive environment or that are not
congruent with the organization's resources are less likely
to be effective than those that exhibit a good "fit" along
both these dimensions.

In the language of traditional

strategic analysis, organizations obtain superior
performance by implementing strategies that exploit
internal strengths and avoid weaknesses, while responding
to market threats and opportunities.

Thus, strategic

choice and adaptation are central to the strategic
management process.
Although the strategic management perspective
emphasizes strategic choice and adaptation, it is important
to note that most theorists recognize difficulties
associated with changes in strategic positions.

Choosing

an appropriate strategic response to changing environmental
circumstances requires the maintenance of an appropriate
resource configuration to support such a change.

Such

resources usually involve both tangibles and intangibles
that may or may not be readily available in factor markets
(Barney, 1986; 1991).

If resources are readily available

they may require large initial capital outlays. Resources
that are not readily available must be accumulated over
time, placing the organization in a position of operating
at a relative disadvantage to its competitors.

Such costs

and penalties associated with moving between strategic
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groups are commonly referred to as mobility barriers (Caves
and Porter, 1977).

The higher the costs and penalties

associated with switching strategic positions, the higher
the mobility barriers are said to be.
Mobility barriers have some similarities to the
inertial arguments proposed by the selection proponents.
However, such barriers are typically seen by strategic
management researchers as limiting, but not completely
constraining strategic choice.

For example, Porter (1991:

104) states:
Firms inherit positions that constrain and shape their
choices, but do not determine them. They have
considerable latitude in reconfiguring the value chain
with which they compete, expanding or contracting their
competitive scope, and influencing important dimensions
of their industry environment.
Others note that such barriers may be particularly
vulnerable during times of industry upheaval or
disequilibrium (Fiegenbaum, Sudharshan and Thomas, 1990) .
Random Transformation
Other theorists view organizations as loosely coupled
systems or "garbage cans" where streams of problems,
solutions, participants, and decision opportunities drift
around and meet to produce change only by chance (Cohen,
March, and Olsen, 1972; March and Olsen, 1976).

This

perspective sees organizations as ambiguous and complex
settings, where changes occur in response to irrational,
endogenous processes.

Thus changes have little to do with

the desires of management or environmental demands.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

27

This view is strikingly different from both the
selection and rational adaptation view in that it downplays
the importance of the strategy/environment linkage.

Under

this perspective, one would expect no relationship between
environmental change, organizational change, and
organizational performance.

Although change can occur

quite frequently, it is at best random with respect to
performance and survival value.
An important feature of this view, is that it is
limited in its application to particular circumstances.
Those advocating this view, note that it is applicable
under conditions of "inconsistent and ill-defined
preferences," "unclear technologies," and "fluid
participation" (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972).
conditions are labeled as "organized anarchy."

These
Although

there is room for argument as to the extent that business
organizations are characterized by organized anarchy, most
theorists agree that these circumstances are more
conspicuous in public and educational organizations.

This

is reinforced by the notion that this model was originated
based on observations of decision making in colleges and
universities (Scott, 1987).

In general, such anarchy can

be hypothesized to exist only in the face of extremely
munificent and non-competitive environments.

That is,

where the strategy/ environment linkage may in fact be
quite weak.

Given the fact that the banking industry
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represents a competitive environment, with scarce
resources, the random transformation model is not expected
to be applicable.
Discussion
Of the various positions on organization adaptation
described above, the population ecology and strategic
management perspectives stand out in their opposition over
basic assumptions.

The population ecology model assumes

that managers are helpless in the face of external and
internal inertial forces.

Inertial forces, combined with

the liability of newness hypothesis, suggest that
organizations will not often attempt changes to their core
features, and that such changes will usually harm
performance and increase the risk of failure. The
strategic management perspective also assumes rationality,
but suggests that managers have the discretion to change
internal strategies and structures and the ability to
effectively adapt to changing environmental demands.

It is

notable that both viewpoints stress the importance of
achieving consistency between environmental demands and
internal organizational states, and both assume a certain
amount of rationality on the part of managers.

Thus the

main point of disagreement concerns the ability of managers
to successfully initiate changes to the core features of
their organizations.
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Empirical Literature
Although the literature remains rather thin, a growing
number of empirical studies have appeared in recent years
that address the issues of strategic change.
for a summary)

(See Table 1

Perhaps the earliest research to examine

changes in strategy was Chandler's (1962) historical study
of Du Pont, General Motors, Standard Oil Company, and Sears
Roebuck and Company.

Chandler found that these firms

changed their structure to correspond to changes in
strategy, and noted that changes in strategy corresponded
with changes in environmental opportunities, i.e., changes
in technology, economic infrastructure, and demographics
(p. 15).

In other words, major strategic changes were

accomplished in response to environmental change.
Another frequently cited study is Miles's (1982) indepth examination of the adaptive behavior of the "Big Six"
tobacco companies as they reacted to the threats posed by
the smoking/cancer linkage and the 1970 ban on radio and TV
ads for cigarettes.

The general finding was that these

companies were able to survive and remain viable through
diversification efforts i.e., changes in strategy.
However, Hannan and Freeman (1989) pointed out that Miles
may have been misled by sample bias, since 37 of the 78
tobacco companies in existence in 1956 had ceased to exist
by 1986.
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Much of the strategic management research on strategic
change has grown out of the literature dealing with
strategic groups.

As noted above, the main stream

strategic management literature suggests that movement
between strategic groups (firms following similar
strategies) is difficult due to mobility barriers (Caves
and Porter, 1977; Porter, 1980).

Thus, much of this

literature has been directed at measuring the extent of
changes in group membership and the environmental
circumstances under which such changes are likely to occur.
Oster (1982), used advertising to sales ratios to
group firms from multiple industries into strategic groups.
She found that movement between groups occurred relatively
infrequently, and that change was impacted by the height of
mobility barriers.

Similarly, Mascarenhas (1989) found

mobility rates to be relatively low among off-shore
drilling firms, although change was more prevalent during
periods of decline and between similar groups.

One

important point to make about these studies concerns the
computation of mobility rates.
group changes to

all

Each study compares actual

possible changes, including the

possibilities that each firm could change strategies in
each year of the study.

Because this is quite unlikely,

the low mobility rates cited in these studies may be
considered to be extremely conservative.
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Table 1: Empirical Literature Reviewed
Authors/
Relevant
Industry____________________ Topic___

Findings

Strategic Gr o u p Studies

Oster (1982)
Multiple

Frequency of
Change

Group mobility is rare & change is
impacted by mobility barriers (degree of
change)

Mascarenhas (1989)
Off-shore drilling

Frequency of
Change

Mobility rates were relatively low.
Change was more prevalent during periods
of decline and between similar groups

Bauerschmidt &
Chrisman (1993)
Microcomputers

Group mobility
& Survival

Approximately 44% of survivors changed
groups. Changes were influenced by
mobility barriers and interdependence
of group members.

Cool & Schendel
(1987)
Pharmaceuticals

Strategic group
stability

Group structure underwent four major
alterations, coinciding with major
environmental jolts.

Fiegenbaum &
Thomas (1990)
Insurance

Strategic group
stability

Group structure underwent nine major
shift, coinciding with a period of
frequent regulatory changes.

Bogner £ Pandian
(1992)
Pharmaceuticals

Group stability
vs. individual
change

Strategic change often occurs indepen
dent of the activities of group members
and breaks in group stability.

(table con'd.)
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Authors/
Relevant
Industry___________________ Topic

Findings

Strategic Change Studies
Smith £e Grimm
(1987)
Railroads

Patterns of change
and performance

Firms changing strategies outperformed
those that failed to change. Change
patterns and outcomes were related.

Zajac & Shortell
(1989)
Hospitals

Patterns of change
and performance

Prior strategy was a good predictor of
change. No relation between change and
performance.

Shortell, Morrison &
Friedman (1990)
Hospitals

Various antecedents
& consequences of
change

Approximately half the sample changed, but
no significant performance improvements
were observed. Prior performance, degree
of change, and need for change were all
found to impact implementation.

Goes (1989)
Hospitals

Impact of prior
performance on
change/outcomes

Low relative performance was a significant
predictor of change. Change hurt the
performance of firms experiencing high or
increasing performance prior to the
change.

Fombrun St
Ginsberg (1990)
Multiple

Change antecedents

Size, prior performance, and sector
volatility were all significant pre
dictors of change.

Ginsberg &
Bucholtz (1990)
HMO's

Inertial & adaptive
antecedents to
change

Age, structure, slack, munificence, and
institutional forces all impacted
length of time to convert to for-profit
status.

(table con'd .)

L*J

M
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Relevant
Topic

Authors/
Industry

Findings

Population Ecology Studies
Singh, House,
& Tucker (1986)
Voluntary Services

Organizational
change & survival

Peripheral changes lowered the hazard
of death, whereas core changes increased
the hazard of death.

Haveman (1992)
Savings & Loans

Organizational
change, performance,
& survival

Changes that build on existing compet
encies positively impact performance,
but unrelated changes negatively impact
performance. Certain related changes
reduce the risk of failure.

Amel & Rhoades
(1988)
Banking

Strategic group
mobility

On average, 40% of banks changed strat
egic groups.

Guarino (1991)
Eanking

Strategic change
Sc performance

A statistically significant number of
banks changed strategies (40% - 80%)
Small banks experienced a moderate
increase in performance following the
change.

Banking Studies

Reger, Duhaime,
Sc Stimpert (1992)
Banking

Impact of dereg.
on risk taking
and performance

Regulatory change tended to promote
conservative behavior on the part of
banks

(table con'd.)
Ui

Ul
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Authors/
Industry_______

Relevant
____ Topic____

Rediker &
Middleton (1992)
Banking

Antecedents to
change

Changes in strategy were negatively
influenced by firms size and prior perf
ormance, and positively influenced by
age of the top management team.

Silverman &
Castaldi (1992)
Banking

Antecedents to
diversification

Perceived changes in competitive pressure
consumer preferences, size, and variation
in profitability were positively related
to diversification

Schendel & Patton
(1976)
Multiple

Succesful vs. unsuccesful turnarounds

Severe decline in performance seemed to
precipitate turnaround efforts. Succesful
turnarounds were characterize by strategic
and operating changes.

Grinyer & McKiernan
(1990)
Multiple

Antecedents to highly
succesful turnarounds

Changes were triggered by external events.
All types of change were noted to occur
simultaneously.

Hambrick & D'Aveni
(1988)
Multiple

Antecedents to
bankruptcy

Bankrupt firms experienced a long down
ward spiral. Strategic actions of failed
firms tended to be either too much or too
little.

D'Aveni (1989)
Multiple

Antecedents to
bankruptcy

Firms in decline tend to exhibit strategic
paralysis.

Findings

Turnaround Studies

(table con'd.)
i» J
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Authors/
Relevant
Industry____________________ Topic___________________________ Findings________________
Robbins & Pearce
(1992)
Textiles

Retrenchment efforts
and turnaround

Retrenchment is an integral part of turnaround. Strategic changes were only
effective when combined with cost cutting
and asset reduction.

U»
Ul
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Bauerschmidt and Chrisman (1993) examined strategic
group mobility and organizational survival in the
microcomputer industry in order to specifically test some
of the assumptions underlying the population ecology and
strategic management models.

They found a relatively high

degree of mobility, with over 44% of survivors changing
strategic groups.

They also presented evidence supporting

the notion that changes in strategy are influenced (but not
determined by) mobility barriers and strategic
interdependence of group members.
A number of strategy researchers have examined
patterns of strategic group stability and change over time
by looking for breaks in the overall stability of an
industry (Cool and Schendel, 1987; 1988; Fiegenbaum and
Thomas, 1990; Bogner and Pandian, 1992).

Cool and Schendel

(1987, 1988) found that the strategic group structure
within the pharmaceutical industry underwent four major
alterations over a twenty year period, roughly coinciding
with major environmental jolts.

Using a similar

methodology, Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) found the
insurance industry more volatile, with nine major shifts in
strategic variables and group structure recorded over a
fifteen year period.

The volatility of this industry was

associated with a period of frequent regulatory changes.
Bogner and Pandian (1992) extended this research stream by
comparing the impact of changes in overall group structure
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with individual strategic changes.

Their study suggests

that strategic change often occurs independently of the
activity of other group members and breaks in stable
strategic time periods associated with environmental
change.

Although group membership may aid somewhat in

predicting change, this research suggests the need to
examine firm level factors in order to understand strategic
change.
Other studies have sought to examine not only the
incidence of strategic change, but firm level contextual
factors impacting the change and change outcomes. Smith
and Grimm (1987) found that 56% of the railroads in their
sample changed strategies following deregulation in that
industry and that those changing strategies were marginally
more profitable than those not changing strategies.
Moreover, there were important differences in performance
associated with different types of strategic change, with
those changing from an unfocused follower to innovators
experiencing the greatest improvements.

Zajac and Shortell

(1989) examined 570 hospitals and also found that over half
their sample changed strategies following a major
environmental discontinuity, and that the prior strategy
was a good predictor of whether a change would be
attempted.

However, unlike Smith and Grimm, they found

that changes in strategy did not translate into performance
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improvements, even when the changes were in the direction
of a more preferable strategy for the changed environment.
In an extensive study, Shortell, Morrison, and
Friedman (1990) used both quantitative and qualitative
analysis to examine various aspects of strategic adaptation
among 370 hospitals.

Once again, approximately half the

sample switched strategies, with no significant performance
differences noted between those that changed and those that
did not change.

They attributed this to the notion that

many of the analyzers and prospectors in their study were
well suited to their environment and had no need for
change.

Among other things, Shortell et al. concluded that

poor performance in the immediate past should always result
in considering the need for fundamental strategic change in
a rapidly changing environment, that change efforts were
limited by both slack resources and managerial mindset, and
that changes within the "strategic comfort zone," i.e.,
less radical changes, were easier to implement.
Goes (1989) examined strategic change in the entire
population of California hospitals between 1976 (n=495) and
1987 (n=443). He recorded 203 changes out of 3611 change
opportunities.

As with Oster (1982) and Mascarenhas

(1989), change opportunities were computed under the
assumption that each firm in the study had the opportunity
to change strategies in each year of the study, resulting
in extremely conservative change rates.

Goes found that
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low relative performance (ROA), efficiency, and growth were
significant predictors of whether or not organizations
changed strategies, but that changes in these variables
(regardless of the relative position) was unrelated to the
propensity to change strategy.

Interestingly, the study

indicated that low performers that changed strategies did
not significantly improve their performance, but that
declining performers (regardless of their relative
profitability) did marginally improve their performance.
It was also found that strategic change tended to have a
negative impact on efficiency but positively influenced
growth rates for hospitals that had relatively low or
declining growth rates prior to the change.

Conversely,

those with high or increasing growth rates prior to the
change tended to experience low or declining growth
following the change.

Overall, the study provided limited

support for the proposition that strategic change
positively impacts firms experiencing low or declining
performance and rather strongly supported the proposition
that it negatively impacts firms experiencing high or
increasing performance.
Fombrun and Ginsberg (1990) examined the influence of
various "inhibitors" that create inertia and "inductors"
that stimulate changes in strategic posture, or in their
terms, corporate aggressiveness.

They found that size had

a significant negative relationship to change, and that
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prior performance and sector volatility were related to
change in a curvilinear fashion.

That is, firms

experiencing extreme levels of performance and volatility
were less likely to change than those experiencing
intermediate levels.
Ginsberg and Bucholtz (1990) examined the effects of
various inertial forces (size, age, and structure),
adaptive forces (slack, performance demands, competitive
pressures, and environmental munificence), and
institutional forces (chain affiliation, number of forprofit HMO's in market, and supportive state legislation)
on the transformation of HMO's from nonprofit to for-profit
orientations.

They found that age, structure, slack,

munificence, and institutional forces all impacted the
length of time it took these organizations to convert to
for-profit status following termination of federal
assistance.

Their model suggested the need for integrating

the inertial and adaptive perspectives to understand
organizational change.
Interestingly, the population ecology research to date
has tended to focus on the states of the environment that
give rise to particular adaptive forms (Scott, 1987) . For
example, these studies have sought to find evidence to
support ecological arguments that environments
characterized by certain levels of change (i.e., fine
grained vs. coarse grained) will better support
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organizations following certain strategies (i.e.,
generalists vs. specialists). Although inertia is an
underlying assumption behind these studies, population
ecologists have seldom directly tested this assumption.
Only two studies could be located that have directly
examined the issue of organizational change and survival
from the population ecology perspective.

Singh, House, and

Tucker (1986) measured the impact of various changes among
voluntary service organizations on organizational mortality
and found mixed results. Their study suggests that
"peripheral" changes (e.g., changes in location and chief
executive) lowered the hazard of death and was consistent
with the adaptation perspective.

"Core" changes (e.g.,

changes in goals, service areas, and structure) increased
the chance of death, which is consistent with the
ecological perspective.

Since a change in strategy would

be considered a core change, this study is at odds with the
strategic management perspective.

Haveman (1992) examined

the impact of changes in loan portfolios among 308
California thrifts on performance and mortality.

The study

found evidence to suggest that changes during a time of
environmental upheaval and those that build on existing
competencies have a positive impact on performance.

On the

other hand, unrelated changes (i.e., those that fail to
build on existing competencies) appear to have a negative
impact on performance. The relationship between change and
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survival is less pronounced, but certain related changes
were found to significantly reduce the risk of failure.
This paper is interesting in that it argues from an
ecological perspective the need to consider context and
type of change when predicting change outcomes.
Several studies have specifically examined strategic
change within the commercial banking industry.

Amel and

Rhoades (1988) examined strategic group stability among
banks in sixteen urban markets between 1978 and 1984.

The

percentage of banks remaining in the same groups ranged
from 29% to 100%, and averaged around 60%.

The authors

derived their groups by clustering 15 major portfolio and
deposit variables derived from balance sheets, and used a
six cluster solution.

This study is particularly relevant

because it uses similar variables and methods to derive
strategic groups as proposed in this study, and provides
evidence to suggest that a substantial number of banks
changed strategies during the proposed time frame.
Unfortunately, the authors provided no description of their
groups or whether any patterns of change occurred.
Guarino (1991) examined the entire population of
commercial banks from 1978 to 1987 to test certain
propositions concerning the propensity of banks to change
their strategies and the performance outcomes of such
changes.

The study showed that a statistically significant

number of banks changed the category to which they
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allocated the highest percentage of their earning assets
(80% of small banks and approximately 40% of medium and
large banks). Furthermore, these changes occurred in a
non-random manner in all three size categories; i.e., most
banks moved from commercial or retail lending to investing
in securities. Medium and large banks displayed no
performance differences. Some groups of small banks
experienced performance increases, and these firms are the
ones that tended to change in the same direction as the
majority.

This study also suggests that strategic change

among commercial banks was rather common following
deregulation, but uses a simple univariate measure of
strategy and strategic change, which by the author's own
admission is likely to significantly increase specification
error.
Reger, Duhaime, and Stimpert (1992), examined the
influence of rate and extent of geographic deregulation on
various strategic choice variables and performance.

The

authors found that change in deregulation (pace of change)
had a significantly negative relationship with risk taking
behavior and a positive relationship with performance.
Risk was positively related to performance, indicating that
although incentives to engage in risky behavior were
present, regulatory changes tend to provoke conservative
behavior.

Deregulation was found to have rather little

impact on strategic choice variables.

This study raises
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some interesting questions regarding the impact of
deregulation on strategy, but fails to address the ability
of firms to change strategic direction.
Another recent study (Rediker and Middleton, 1992)
examined the relationships among top management team
characteristics, prior financial performance, firm size,
changes in the pattern and growth of strategy, and
subsequent financial performance in a sample of bank
holding companies. Changes in strategy were measured by
changes in loan portfolio diversification and loan
portfolio growth.

The study found that changes in strategy

were negatively influenced by firm size, and age of the top
management team, and positively influenced by prior
performance of the firm.
Silverman and Castaldi (1992) examined the impact of a
number of contextual factors on the intentions of bank
CEO's to diversify into non-traditional business areas.
They found that perceived environmental changes such as
changes in competitive pressures and consumer preferences,
size, and variation in profitability, were positively
related to diversification intentions.
Because this study deals with environmental change,
and the influence of prior performance on change, another
relevant set of literature to consider is that dealing with
turnarounds.

Schendel and Patton (1976) examined 36 pairs

of firms in decline, comparing those who managed a
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turnaround to those that did not.

They concluded that

steadily poor performance was not enough to spur a major
turnaround effort.

Those firms that achieved turnarounds

were prompted by precipitous drops in performance that
generated a crisis.

Furthermore, they suggested that the

most effective responses were those that combined strategic
changes with improvements in operating efficiency.

Efforts

that were tentative, or geared only toward operating
improvements tended to be less effective.
Hofer (1988) built on this distinction between
operating and strategic turnarounds, and conceptualized a
link between the degree and type of downturn and the
appropriate response.

Specifically, he suggested that

moderate downturns in operating performance may be
corrected by operating turnarounds, whereas severe
downturns may require strategic and operating changes.
However, he also noted that if weak downturns were due to
strategic considerations, then strategic turnarounds may be
necessary.
Grinyer and McKiernan (1990) examined 25 organizations
that were identified as having experienced major
performance improvements relative to their industry rivals.
Among other things, they proposed that change would be
triggered by gaps between aspirations and realized
performance, and that changes would occur in stages,
beginning with operational and cost cutting programs, then
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proceeding to changes in scope (which they define as
strategic changes), and finally, changes in technology or
fundamental changes such as divestment of previous core
businesses and entry into unrelated businesses.

A decline

in performance was noted in the majority of changed firms,
however, a group of control firms that did not change were
also observed to experience similar performance downturns.
Events triggering the actual change were considered to
arise primarily from factors termed as "aspiration
induced."

These were mainly external events such as

intervention by bankers, threat of takeover, or change of
CEO (i.e., events that were theorized to widen the "gap" by
increasing aspirations). Most firms exhibited the three
categories of change, however, they typically occurred
simultaneously rather than sequentially as proposed.
Hambrick and D'Aveni (1988) compared a sample of 57
large bankruptcies with a matched sample of surviving
firms.

The failed firms were found to have experienced an

extended period of performance decline, accompanied by
extremes in strategic activities.

The bankrupt firms

experienced a downward spiral, characterized by declines in
slack and performance, that were followed by either
inaction, or extreme levels of strategic changes.

This

study suggests a curvilinear relationship between strategic
change and survival, with moderate levels of change
associated with survival.
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D'Aveni (1989) examined a matched set of 49 survivors
and bankrupt firms.

Among other things, he found that

firms in decline tend to exhibit a greater degree of
downsizing activity, but exhibited less strategic activity
(i.e., they liquidated and divested, but on the whole did
not change their lines of business). He concluded that
firms in decline tend to exhibit strategic paralysis.
Robbins and Pearce (1992) examined the turnaround
efforts of 38 firms in the textile industry.

They found

that retrenchment efforts, which include both cost cutting
efforts and asset reduction, were positively related to
subsequent performance, regardless of the reason for the
decline.

They also found that matching the severity of the

decline with degree of retrenchment resulted in better
outcomes.

That is, successful firms tended to concentrate

first on cost cutting efforts, and then moved to asset
reduction only when the downturn became more severe.
Another interesting finding of this study is that changes
of a strategic nature were only effective when accompanied
by retrenchment efforts.
Summary of Empirical Literature
Although the literature on strategic change remains
sparse, several inferences can be drawn form the studies
cited above.

First, strategic change appears to be a

relatively common occurrence. Studies that treat strategic
change as an event have consistently found that
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approximately half their sample changed strategies (40% to
60%).

The only exceptions to this are those studies that

conservatively compare change occurrence against all
possible changes, including the possibility that each firm
could change strategy in each year of the study.

The

consistency of these results, obtained across multiple
industries and using different methodologies, suggests
quite strongly that strategic change cannot be
characterized as a rare event.
Second, the evidence indicates that strategic change
is more common under conditions of environmental
turbulence.

Studies by Cool and Schendel (1987, 1988),

Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990), and Bogner and Pandian (1992)
consistently found that breaks in strategic group stability
coincided with major environmental discontinuities.

In

addition, Mascarenhas (1989) found that strategic change
was more common during periods of economic decline.

In

fact, all of the single industry studies showing high
levels of strategic change were performed during periods of
economic decline and industry disequilibrium.

This

supports the strategic management perspective which argues
that organizations should alter their strategies when
environmental changes render existing strategies obsolete.
It also suggests that the time frame chosen for this study
is particularly appropriate for examining change, since the
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decade of the 80's was an extremely turbulent period for
the banking industry.
Because a large proportion of firms also fail to
change strategies during periods of disequilibrium, it is
apparent that firm level factors play an important role in
determining strategic change.

A growing number of authors

have begun to explore these firm level factors.

For

example, there is limited evidence that certain contextual
factors such as age, size, prior performance, and slack
resources may influence the tendency to change (Fombrun and
Ginsberg, 1990; Ginsberg and Bucholtz, 1990).

The general

notion is that larger and older firms tend to have greater
levels of inertia, thus these factors tend to inhibit
change.

On the other hand, low or decreasing prior

performance and slack resources represent the need and
ability to change, respectively, and these factors tend to
promote change.

The influence of prior performance on

change has been further explored in the turnaround
literature, with general support found for the notion that
the degree and type of downturn should be appropriately
matched to the degree of change.

However, there is some

evidence to suggest that performance downturns may also
result in a sort of strategic paralysis (D'Aveni, 1989) .
In addition, some authors have found evidence that
characteristics of top management teams can influence the
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tendency to change (Redeleer and Middleton, 1992; Wiersema
and Bantel, 1992).
Finally, the evidence regarding change outcomes can
only be characterized as meager and contradictory.

Less

than one third (7) of the studies specifically examining
strategic change, examined outcomes following strategic
change.

Of these, one found evidence supporting a positive

relationship between strategic change and performance
(Smith and Grimm, 1987), two found no evidence relating
change to performance (Zajac and Shortell, 1989; Shortell,
Morrison, and Friedman, 1990), and four studies found that
specific firm level characteristics such as prior
performance (Goes, 1989), type of change (Singh, House, and
Tucker, 1986; Haveman, 1992), and size (Guarino, 1991;
Rediker and Middleton, 1992) moderated the relationship
between change and performance.

The turnaround literature

also suggests that choosing the appropriate degree of
change is an important factor determining outcomes. Too
much or too little change may both be detrimental (Hambrick
and D'Aveni, 1988).

Taken as a whole, this evidence

suggests that the relationship between change and
performance/survival may be moderated by certain firm level
factors such as prior performance, size, and degree of
change.
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Summary and Conclusions
Although the strategic management and population
ecology perspectives were presented in glaring contrast in
this chapter, there has been a tendency toward convergence
in recent years (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987; Boeker,
1989).

A number of researchers within the strategic

management camp have long recognized that managerial
discretion is limited (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987) and
that organizations may be slow to react to environmental
changes (Quinn, 1980; Miller and Friesen, 1984).

On the

other hand, selection theorists have increasingly begun to
acknowledge the possibility of organizational change
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Singh, House, and Tucker, 1986;
Haveman, 1992).

This convergence is apparent in the

empirical research, which has increasingly focused on firm
level factors that may inhibit or encourage change and also
influence change outcomes. Thus the debate has tended to
move away from the question of whether organizations adapt
and has moved towards understanding the situations in which
adaptation is most likely to occur.
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CHAPTER 4
THEORY AMD HYPOTHESES

The literature reviewed in the previous chapter
reveals a movement away from the basic question of whether
organziations adapt, and toward understanding the
circumstances under which adaptation is likely to occur.
Factors such as organizational size, age, prior
performance, slack resources, and degree of change have
been hypothesized to influence change and moderate
outcomes. A growing number of studies have explored the
relationship between firm level factors and the propensity
to change, but very few have examined the impact of these
factors on performance or survival outcomes.

In an attempt

to address this gap in the literature, this chapter will
introduce a basic conceptual model of strategic change and
develop a number of testable hypotheses concerning the
impact of firm level factors on change and change outcomes.
Conceptual Model
The literature suggests three broad categories of
variables that are likely to influence strategic change; 1)
adaptive forces, 2) inertial forces, and 3) degree of
change.

Adaptive forces are those factors thought to

facilitate strategic change.

Two firm level factors often
52
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discussed in this regard are prior performance and slack
resources.

Inertial forces are those factors thought to

hamper the initiation and implementation of strategic
change.

Two such factors often discussed in the literature

are organizational size and age.

Adaptive forces and

inertial forces can be conceived of as directly influencing
both initiation and consequences of strategic change.

That

is, the same adaptive forces that encourage strategic
change, may for reasons explained later have a positive
influence on change outcomes.

Furthermore, adaptive and

inertial forces may indirectly influence change outcomes by
impacting the degree of change, which in turn can directly
influence change outcomes.
Figure 3.

This model is demonstrated in

The specific hypotheses to be tested are

developed in the following sections.
Adaptive Forces
Although recognizing the existence of inertial forces,
strategic management proponents stress the dominance of
adaptive forces in driving and facilitating major
organizational transformations (Ginsberg and Bucholtz,
1990).

Pressure for change can come from internal changes

(such as changes in managerial skills or aspirations) or
the external environment (such as changes in competitive
forces), but is often conceptualized as deriving from a gap
between desired and actual (or projected) performance
(Hofer and Schendel, 1978).

Thus, while inertial forces
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can inhibit change, "inductive forces" (Ginsberg, 1988;
Ginsberg and Bucholtz, 1990) such as performance demands
may create even more compelling reasons for change to
occur.

Put simply, major organizational change may become

the best course of action when the cost of maintaining the
status quo exceeds the cost of change (Haveman, 1992).
Another point often argued by strategy theorists is
that organizations may opt to invest in resources that
enhance their ability to adapt (Chakravarthy, 1982).

The

maintenance of slack resources, although sometimes argued
to inhibit strategic change (Starbuck, Greve, and Hedberg,
1988), can be a major factor in implementing change once
the organization becomes committed (Chakravarthy, 1982;
Bourgeois, 1981).

As noted by Bourgeois (1981), "slack is

the resource that enables an organization both to adjust to
gross shifts in the external environment with minimal
trauma, and to experiment with new postures in relation
that environment" (p. 31).

The remainder of this section

is devoted to developing a set of hypotheses concerning two
factors that are thought to facilitate the change process;
prior performance and slack resources.
Prior Performance
Pressure for strategic change can emanate from either
internal or external changes, however performance is often
argued to be a key variable in instigating change (Oster,
1982; Goes and Meyer, 1990) . Theorists advocating a
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quantum or revolutionary view of strategic change point out
that decline, or even a crisis is necessary to prompt major
strategic changes (Miller and Friesen, 1984; Starbuck,
Greve, and Hedberg, 1988).

Implicit in this view is that

strategies are "sticky" (Oster, 1982), i.e., various
inertial forces make strategic change difficult.

Also, if

organizations are tightly linked configurations as
suggested by some theorists (Miller and Mintzberg, 1988) ,
it may make sense to delay making major changes until the
need for change becomes apparent. Low performance can
indicate an erosion in "fit", and can thus act as an
incentive for managers and other organizational
participants to overcome inertial barriers to change.
Although there is some empirical evidence to support
the above view (Oster, 1982; Goes and Meyer, 1990),
advocate different positions.

others

For example, the "planning"

approach to strategic management (Mintzberg, 1990; Goes,
1989), stresses the need for a proactive approach to
strategic change.

Arguing from a normative perspective,

advocates of this approach emphasize the importance of
responding to "weak signals" (Ansoff, 1975), so that change
is accomplished before performance declines.

Implicit in

this position is the notion that strategies are rather
facile in the hands of skillful managers (Goes, 1989).
Others have argued that extremely low and extremely high
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performance foster rigidity toward strategic change
(Fombrun and Ginsberg, 1990).
The conceptual model in Figure 3 proposes that prior
performance will be a significant antecedent for strategic
change.

Specifically, low or declining performance is

argued to act as a catalyst for change.

Thus, the

following hypothesis is offered.
HI: Prior performance will be negatively related to degree
of change.
An unstated assumption in much of the literature that
has examined the outcome of strategic change is that
environmental changes tend to equally impact firms within
an industry.

That is, following an environmental jolt, all

organizations within the affected industry will need to
change their strategies (Smith and Grimm, 1989; Shortell et
al., 1990).

However, the literature that examines

strategic group dynamics suggests that environmental
changes have a differential impact on firms within an
industry due to differences in beginning strategies and/or
individual firm resources and skills (Meyer, 1982; Bogner
and Pandian, 1992; Shortell et al., 1990; Cool and
Schendel, 1988; Bauerschmidt and Chrisman, 1993;
Mascarenhas, 1989).

Some firms will operate in niches that

are more severely impacted, and/or will find their
resources and skills less adequate than their competitors
for dealing with revised environmental threats.

These
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"mismatched" firms will experience poor performance due to
a general loss of effectiveness. Failure to change under
these circumstances will be associated with a continuous
decline in performance and increased risk of failure.

On

the other hand, some organizations are likely to find that
their existing resources and strategic orientation are
relatively well matched to the demands of their new
environment (Shortell et al., 1990).

Although some

adjustments may be necessary, in all probability these
firms will be able to maintain the status quo and
experience few adverse effects, i.e., they have little need
for major strategic changes.

Thus, within a given

industry, failure to change in response to environmental
changes will have different outcomes, depending on the
individual organizations need for change.
In addition, it can be argued that organizations
changing their strategies are likely to experience

different outcomes, based on their need for change.
Haveman (1992) notes that change will improve performance
and survival chances when the benefit from change (improved
effectiveness) exceeds the loss of operating efficiency due
to the change.

Firms exhibiting poor performance due to a

basic mismatch between organizational strategy and
environment are likely to experience substantial benefits
as they change to meet new environmental demands.

That is,

the greater the need for change, the greater the potential
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benefits from undertaking the change.

Also, it has been

argued that the efficiency of engaging in organizational
change increases when a clear threat is perceived; i.e.,
when need for change is high (Miller and Friesen, 1984) .
In the face of crisis, inertia tends to be reduced as
organizational participants become more motivated to
implement changes (Lawler, 1988; Tushman, Newman, and
Nadler, 1988).

Thus, organizations with low performance

due to a mismatch between strategy and the environment are
likely to benefit from changes in strategy because the
potential gains are high and the loss in efficiency is
reduced.

In contrast, it has been argued that major

organizational change is likely to be dysfunctional when
there is little need for change
Beer, 1988).

(Tushman et al., 1988;

Under these circumstances, the benefits

accrue in smaller increments, and change efforts tend to be
resisted more vigorously, resulting in higher overall
costs.
The above arguments imply that it is important to
control for performance in prior periods; i.e. need for
change, when attempting to evaluate the relative impact of
changes in strategy on short term performance and risk of
failure.

If need for change and change outcomes are

related as argued above, and firms within a given industry
undergoing discontinuous changes differ in their need for
change, then divergent change outcomes can be expected.

If
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these differences in need for change are quite significant,
then comparison of change outcomes between firms that
change and fail to change strategies is likely to find no
significant difference.

The large within-group variation

would overshadow the between-group variation; i.e., there
would be no main effect.

If this is the case, it offers

one explanation for why many of the studies performed to
date have found little relationship between strategic
change and performance (Zajac and Shortell, 1989; Shortell,
Morrison, and Friedman, 1990; Guarino, 1991).
The previous arguments suggests the following set of
hypotheses:
H2: Strategic change and prior performance covary
negatively with respect to subsequent performance and
survival.
H2a: For organizations that change strategies, prior
performance will be negatively related to subsequent
performance and chances of survival.
H2b: For organizations that do not change strategies, prior
performance will be positively related to subsequent
performance and chances of survival.
Slack Resources
Organizational slack is another prominent construct
suggested in the research on strategic change (Ginsberg and
Bucholtz, 1990; Bourgeois, 1981).

Defined broadly, slack

resources consist of "a cushion of actual or potential
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resources" (Bourgeois, 1981: 30) . More recently, theorists
have made the distinction between unabsorbed slack (excess
liquid resources) and absorbed slack (excess costs) (Singh,
1986).

In a related argument, Meyer (1982) noted that

slack can be accumulated in different forms; e.g. financial
slack, human resources and technology.

This dissertation

is concerned with the impact of excess or uncommited
financial resources on strategic change, thus unabsorbed
financial slack will be used in this analysis.
Slack resources can have a positive impact on both
initiating and implementing strategic change (Bourgeois,
1981).

Cyert and March (1963) suggested that slack

resources provide funds for experimentation and innovation.
In terms of strategic position, excess funds can encourage
managers to scan their relevant environments, and take a
more proactive approach to experimenting with new products,
technologies, and marketing approaches.

Others (Starbuck,

Greve, and Hedberg, 1988) argue that slack resources can
inhibit change by dulling the organization's sensitivity to
environmental circumstances and lowering the motivation to
change.

Thus, slack resources can be said to buffer the

organization from its environment.
The model in Figure 3 suggests that slack resources
will act as an adaptive rather than a buffering force.
That is, slack resources are anticipated to encourage
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change efforts.

Therefore, the following hypothesis is

offered.
H3: Slack resources will be positively related to degree
of change.
Once an organization becomes commited to change, there
seems to be general agreement that slack resources are
likely to aid in implementation (Ginsberg and Bucholtz,
19 90) . Implementing a strategic change typically requires
the accumulation of new resources and skills.

To the

extent that these resources are mobile; i.e., they can be
bought and sold in factor markets (Barney, 1991), excess
funds provide obvious benefits by allowing the firm to
purchase the necessary resources.

For example, a firm may

draw down on its slack resources to acquire the personnel,
technologies, and plant and equipment necessary to
implement moves into new product lines or markets.

Also,

as pointed out by selection theorists, major organizational
changes can be quite disruptive and result in loss of
organizational efficiencies.

Slack provides the

organization with a cushion of resources that can be
utilized during the reorganization process, thereby
increasing the chances of success.
The logic above suggests a relationship between slack
resources, strategic change, and change outcomes.

For

organizations choosing to change strategies, slack provides
the resources to implement change, as well as a cushion to
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protect the firm from shocks during the change period.

For

organizations that do not change strategies, slack may also
have some short term performance and survival implications,
however these resources are probably much more salient for
firms undergoing change.

Thus:

H4: Strategic change and slack resources covary positively
with respect to subsequent performance and survival.
H4a: Organizational slack will be more positively related
to performance for organizations that change
strategies than for organizations that do not change
strategies.
Inertial Forces
As noted above, selection theorists emphasize the role
of inertial forces in constraining organizations from
initiating and implementing changes of a strategic nature
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977; 1984).

High levels of inertia

tend to retard responsiveness to environmental changes, and
when change is attempted they tend to reduce the speed of
change and the degree to which it can be planned and
controlled.

When entering into reorganization

organizations give up the survival value of their previous
structure and begin the process of building a new structure
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984).

It is during this transition

phase that organizations are particularly inefficient and
vulnerable to failure (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) . Inertial
forces represent a drag on the change process, thereby
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increasing the duration of reorganization and lowering the
chance of a successful outcome.
Selection theorists have pointed out that the strength
of inertial forces are likely to vary among organizations
of different ages and sizes (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) .
The remainder of this section discusses the effects of
these two factors on strategic change and change outcomes.
Organizational Age
Standardized routines, organization specific skills,
and webs of internal and external relationships essential
for performance and organizational survival are generally
established over time.

The well known liability of newness

hypothesis (Stinchcombe, 1965), argues that death rates
decline with age as organizations develop these skills and
relationships.

As routines are worked out, skills are

learned, and internal and external relationships
established over time, the organization develops
reliability of performance that reduces the probability of
failure.

However, increases in the attributes that lead to

higher degrees of performance and increased survivability
also lead to increasing levels of organizational inertia.
Established routines become increasingly entrenched over
time as organizational participants find it easier to
continue existing habits than to invest in new routines and
skills (Nelson and Winter, 1982).

In addition,

organizations tend to become enmeshed in exchange
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relationships with customers and other organizations that,
either through resource dependency or institutional
processes, tend to constrain their actions (Ginsberg and
Bucholtz, 1990).

Thus, as organizations grow older

inertial forces increase and major changes become more
difficult to initiate.

Thus, the following hypothesis is

offered.
H5: Organizational age will be negatively related to
degree of change.
Although the liability of newness hypothesis asserts
that older organizations will outperform and outlast
younger organizations, the stronger inertial forces
associated with older organizations suggests that they will
have more difficulty implementing changes of a strategic
nature.

Therefore, when attempting changes to the core

aspects of the organization, younger organizations are
likely to find that their greater flexibility places them
at a relative advantage.

That is, their resources and

skills are less likely to have crystallized, and changes
will be attempted more readily and implemented more quickly
and with less disruption.

Thus, for organizations

changing strategies, it could be argued that organizational
age will be negatively related to performance and survival.
On the other hand, the inertial characteristics associated
with older organizations are likely to have survival value
when major changes are not undertaken.

In keeping with the
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liability of newness hypothesis, age is likely to be
positively related to performance and survival for those
firms that do not attempt major changes.
Therefore, the following hypotheses are offered:
H6: Organizational age and strategic change covary
negatively with respect to performance and survival.
H6a: For organizations that change strategies, age will be
negatively related to performance and survival.
H6b: For organizations that do not change strategies, age
will be positively related to performance and
survival.
Organizational Size
Large organizations tend to be more complex and are
characterized by greater degrees of formalization and
standardization than small organizations (Fombrum and
Ginsberg, 1990) . As the organization grows larger, and the
chain of command grows longer, strategic managers must
delegate responsibility and rely on more complex and
impersonal coordinating mechanisms.

Thus, the organization

becomes less amenable to the will of top managers (Hannan
and Freeman, 1984).

In effect, the organization takes on a

life of its own that becomes difficult to alter.

On the

other hand, smaller organizations are more flexible and
have quicker response times as they tend to be less
formalized and more an extension of the will of their top
managers (Hannan and Freeman, 1989).

In other words,

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

67

inertial forces are thought to increase as organizational
size increases.

Therefore, the following hypothesis is

offered.
H7: Organizational size will be negatively related to
degree of change.
The above argument also suggests a simple linear
relationship between organizational size and change
outcomes; i.e., the larger the organization, the greater
the inertia, and the less the chances of improving
performance and enhancing survivability.

That is, as

inertial forces increase implementation becomes more
difficult and positive outcomes become less likely.
However, two factors may serve to alter this relationship.
First, the ability to survive major organizational changes
may depend partly on the degree of resources available to
the firm (Hannan and Freeman, 1984).

Although large

organizations are more likely on average to experience
increased response times and endure longer periods of
reorganization, they typically have greater resources to
weather such extended downturns.

Small organizations

typically have smaller margins for error (Hannan and
Freeman, 1989) and are particularly vulnerable to
environmental shocks during reorganization efforts.
Second, large organizations tend to be more powerful and
are more likely to alter their environments in ways that
improve their chances of survival (Scott, 1987).

This line
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of reasoning has led some researchers to speculate that
selection arguments are more appropriate for small
organizations than large organizations (Scott, 1987;
Aldrich, 1979; Astley and Van de Ven, 1983).
The above arguments have several important
implications.

First, organizational size is likely to be

negatively related to performance outcomes for
organizations that change strategies. Larger organizations
must overcome greater obstacles, making the change effort
more expensive to implement.

On the other hand, it has

been demonstrated that larger banks tend to be more
profitable in general (Guarino, 1991), so one would expect
size to be positively related to performance for firms that
do not change strategies. The second important implication
is that large organizations may stand a better chance of
surviving strategic changes, despite the higher levels of
inertia that must be overcome.

This is likely to be

particularly true in the banking environment, where the
consequences of large bank failures have significant social
implications, and bank closures are controlled by
regulatory agencies.

Thus the following hypotheses are

offered.
H8: Strategic change and organizational size covary
negatively with respect to subsequent performance.
H8a: For organizations that change strategies, size will be
negatively related to performance.
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H8b: For organizations that do not change strategies, size
will be positively related to performance.
H9: Size will be positively related to survival,
regardless of strategic change.
Degree of Change
Another crucial aspect to consider when examining the
outcomes of strategic change is the type of change
experienced.

Population ecologists have made a distinction

between core and peripheral changes, noting that selection
arguments apply to changes in the core aspects of the
organization (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Singh, House, and
Tucker, 1986).

Core features include stated goals, forms

of authority, core technology, and marketing strategy.
These aspects of the organization are seen as providing a
basis for distinguishing organizational forms, and are
considered highly inert (Hannan and Freeman, 1984).

In

practice, however, most authors have focused on defining
organizational forms in terms of domain, that is the
customers served, products and services offered, and
technologies used (Abell, 1980; Haveman, 1992).

Changes

along these dimensions represents a change in
organizational form which, according to the selection
argument, typically results in decreased performance and
increased risk of failure.
Although recognizing that there are costs and risks
associated with domain changes, strategic management
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theorists have often argued that these costs tend to vary
depending on the degree or direction of the change.

The

costs of moving from one strategic position to another
involves capital outlays and/or relative operating cost
penalties commonly referred to as mobility barriers (Caves
and Porter, 1977; McGee and Thomas, 1986) . Typically, some
strategic positions are easier to assume than others due to
differences in the costs of entry; i.e., the height of
mobility barriers (Caves and Porter, 1977).

The lower the

barriers, the less the cost, and the greater the likelihood
of a successful entry.

Harrigan (1985) argues that the

relative height of mobility barriers separating strategic
groups can be measured directly in a cluster analysis by
the distance between clusters.

Presumably, the closer the

groups, the more similarities they share, and the lower the
mobility barriers (Mascarenhas, 1989).

Since changes to

more similar groups are less costly, one may argue that
these changes are less disruptive and most likely to
improve survival chances.
On the other hand, it could be argued that changes of
a more "quantum" nature may be more beneficial to
performance than changes of an incremental nature.
Organizations in groups that are relatively similar in
nature are more prone to experience similar problems when
faced with environmental changes. Incremental changes to
these more similar groups may be easier to implement, but
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may result in a similar set of problems.

Thus, the

organization experiences less risk, but also fewer benefits
from the change.

If this is true, it suggests a

risk/return tradeoff when changing strategies. Changes of
a large magnitude will be riskier, but may promise higher
returns for organizations that are ill suited to their
current environment.

Conversely, small changes will be

less risky, but result in smaller returns. Thus, the
following is hypothesized:
H10: Degree of change will be negatively related to
survival.
Hll: Among survivors of change, degree of change will be
positively related to performance.
Summary
This chapter developed a set of testable hypotheses,
primarily concerning the relationship between performance
demands, slack resources, size, and age on the strategic
change -outcome linkage.

The general notion, is that by

taking these variables into account a clearer picture of
the relationship between strategic change and
performance/survival outcomes will emerge.

In the next

chapter, a set of research methods will be proposed to test
these hypothesized relationships.
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CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

A comparative longitudinal design was used to examine
the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter.

An eight

year period, from 1980 to 1987 was chosen for the study.
This time frame allowed for the investigation of strategic
change and outcomes during the time immediately following
the DIDMCA act of 1980.
Because loan portfolio strategies are likely to change
relatively slowly, it was important to examine changes over
as long a period as possible to allow them to materialize
on the balance sheet.

Thus, a decision was made to examine

strategic change over a single four year time interval,
1982 to 1985, and assess performance over a three period
prior to and following this interval (see Figure 4).
Specifically, prior performance was assessed over a three
year period from 1980 to 1982, and subsequent performance
was assessed from 1985 to 1987.

Failures were assessed

over a two year period, 1986 and 1987.

This design had the

advantages of examining strategy over a relatively long
period of time, and thus increased the chances of detecting
change.

As noted above, it also captured the banking in

dustry at a time when strategic change was likely to occur.
72
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Data Sources
Data were obtained through the Federal Reserve Call
Report Data Base, which includes the population of insured
banks for the United States.

All insured banks are

required by the Federal Reserve Board to submit semi-annual
or quarterly call report data, depending on the size of the
organization, that are included in this data set.

The data

set includes approximately 3,000 variables, including
detailed balance sheet and income statements, as well as
information concerning main office locations, branch
locations, number of employees, and holding company
affiliations.
This data set has several advantages over other data
sets commonly used in strategic management research.
First, the data set is subjected to validity checks and
audits that verify the internal consistency and overall
quality of the data.

It is audited by representatives of

the regulatory agencies through periodic bank examinations.
Second, it is almost fully representative of the population
of commercial banks in the United States.

It is not

subject to problems of self selection common in data sets
such as PIMS.

Third, it contains much useful supplementary

information regarding such items as geographic locations
and ownership affiliations.

Finally, it allows the

researcher to choose large random samples or, even use the
entire population if desired.

The most obvious drawback to
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the database is that it includes information only at the
level of the individual bank rather than the holding
company.

Thus, research questions must be limited to the

level of analysis dealing with individual business units.
Sample Selection
A random sample of banks that were operating in 1980
was drawn from the population.

Generally speaking, the

larger the sample size, the better (Kerlinger, 1986);
however, the minimum size needed depends on factors such as
the level of significance desired, power of the test,
population error variance, and effect size (Hinkle,
Wiersma, and Jurs, 1988) . The specific formula for
determining sample size for a two sample case when the
population variance is known is as follows:

n_

2<72 (Zfl - Z„)2
(ES)2

where: Za = critical value of the test statistic in the
sampling distribution associated with the null
hypothesis at a given a.
ZB = standard score in the sampling distribution

associated with the alternate hypothesis
corresponding to Za for a given power.
a2 = population error variance.

ES = effect size
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The population variance for one of the key variables
in this study, ROA, can be derived from Goodman's (1988)
study that also made use of the FDIC tapes.

Level of

significance and power are set at conventional rates of .05
and .80, respectively.

Effect size is ultimately an

arbitrary decision, but Cohen offers rough guidelines of
small, medium, and large effect sizes.

This study will use

his guideline for detecting small effect sizes (.25 x a ).
Using these guidelines:
Za

= 1.645 (since a=.05)

Zjj = -.842 (since /3=.20)
a

= .01 (from previous study)

ES = .0025 (.25 x .01)
These parameters suggest a sample size of
approximately 400 banks will be sufficient to detect a
difference of .0025 in ROA between banks that change and
those that fail to change strategies.

This, however, is

based on the assumption that the sample will be
approximately equally divided between those banks that
change and those that fail to change.

Since there was no

way to tell a priori how the sample would be divided, and
because failed banks will need to be eliminated for a
portion of the analysis, an initial sample of 1,000 banks
operating in 1980 was drawn.
Banks that disappeared from the data base prior to
1985 were eliminated from the sample, resulting in a sample
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of 861.

This sample was the one used for clustering, and

for analyzing the change/failure relationships.

Sixty one

firms from this initial sample disappeared from the data
base in 1986 and 1987.

These firms were eliminated in

order to evaluate the change/performance relationships,
resulting in a sample of 800.

Of the 61 firms that

disappeared, 27 were on the list of failed institutions
maintained by the FDIC.

The remaining banks were assumed

to have merged with other financial institutions.

The 27

failed banks in the final sample represent nearly 8% of the
348 banks that failed during that time period, and slightly
more than 3% of the entire sample.

This is consistent with

the population failure rate of approximately 3V during this
same period.
Operationalization of Variables
Measuring Strategy
The use of scope or product/market domain to define
and classify organizational strategies has a great deal of
precedence in the strategic management literature in
general (e.g., Hatten, Schendel, and Cooper, 1978;
Mascarenhas, 1989), and in the banking literature in
particular (Guarino, 1991; Reger et al., 1992; Amel and
Rhoades, 1988; Passmore, 1985) . Also, population
ecologists have tended to use scope variables to identify
organizational forms (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Haveman,
1992).

In fact, Haveman (1992) argues that product,
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market, and technology decisions are the defining
characteristics of an organizational form.

Thus, although

other studies have used a broader array of components, the
use of scope is thought to represent an appropriate
measurement of strategy in this study.
To reflect the product/market choices made in the
commercial banking industry, a variety of financial ratios
were used.
in Table 2.

These ratios and their definitions are listed
Sixteen variables were chosen to reflect

asset/liability structures and geographic diversity.

A key

product/market choice in the banking industry is the extent
to which competitors participate in various traditional
lending/investment activities.

Six variables were chosen

to represent the depth of a bank's involvement in
activities.

these

Five variables represented the percentage of a

bank's lending/investment portfolio devoted to particular
categories of traditional activities: retail (RET),
commercial (COMM), agricultural (AG), and real estate (RE)
loans, and investments (INV). The sixth variable, loan
portfolio diversity (LPD) captured the degree to which a
bank chose to concentrate it's traditional
lending/investment activities.

LPD was measured as 1 -

Hirfendahl-Hirschman index of concentration (Rediker and
Middleton, 1992; Scherer, 1980) for the five portfolio
categories of retail loans, commercial loans, agricultural
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Table 2:

Definition of Strategy Variables___________

Variable Name

Variable Definition

Assets - Loan Portfolio and Investments
RET

Retail Loans_____
Total Loans & Investments

COMM

____ Commercial Loans
Total Loans & Investments

AG

Agricultural Loans
Total Loans & Investments

RE

Real Estate Loans
Total Loans & Investments

INV

Investments__
Total Loans & Investments

LPD

1- E Ret2 + Comm2 + Ag2 + Re2 + Inv2

Assets - Non-traditional products
LEASE

Dummy variable where:
0 = No lease financing
1 = Lease financing

FEDFUND

Dummy variable where:
0 = No Fed Fund Loans
1 = Fed Fund Loans

CCARD

Dummy variable where :
0 = No credit card acct.
1 = Credit card acct.

FEES

Service Charge Income
Total Income

Liabilities - Deposit Composition
DEP
LRGCD

Total Deposits
Total Assets
Time Deposits > $100.000
Total Deposit

(table con'd.)
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Variable Name

Variable Definition

Geographic Diversity
DOMDEP

Domestic Deposits
Total Deposits

DOMLOAN

Domestic Loans
Total Loans

FORBR

Foreign Branches
Total Branches

TOTBR

Total number of branches

loans, real estate loans, and investments.

The specific

formula for calculating LPD is:
LPD =

1 - £ (RET2 + COMM2 + AG2 + RE2 + INV2)

Using five categories of assets, the LPD can range from 0,
where the bank has concentrated all its resources in a
single area, to .80, where the bank has evenly distributed
its resources among all five areas.

The LPD represents a

gross measure of the scope of activities within the
traditional lending/investment areas; i.e., the degree to
which the bank chooses to focus its primary earning assets
in a particular area.

The individual category percentages

measure the specific areas in which the bank chooses to
focus.
To further capture product diversity, the extent to
which the banks participated in less traditional product
markets was assessed.

These products included lease
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financing, fed funds selling, credit cards, and fee based
products.

These activities are less commonly offered than

the more traditional lending products and typically do not
contribute a major portion of a bank's earnings.

They do,

however, provide an indication of the breadth of product
offerings and the extent to which the bank is diversifying
away from more traditional products and services.

These

variables were measured categorically, and were entered
into the cluster analysis as dummy variables.
Two deposit variables were included: the ratio of
total deposits to total assets (DEP) and the ratio of time
deposits over $100,000 to total deposits (LRGCD). DEP
represents the institutions dependence on total deposits,
the traditional source of commercial bank funds.

A low DEP

ratio, would indicate the use of non-traditional funding
sources and/or a greater reliance on equity capital.

LRGCD

measures the use of newer, more expensive, and relatively
risky source of funds.
Four variables were used to measure geographic
diversity.

Domestic deposits to total deposits (DOMDEP)

and domestic loans to total loans (DOMLOAN) highlight the
extent of the bank's involvement in international
activities.

Foreign branches to total branches provides

another measure of international activity, the extent to
which the bank has a physical presence in foreign
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countries. Total branches (TOTBR)1 represents a gross
approximation of geographic breadth, however, it is
recognized that this may also be a function of population
density as well as location.
Strategic Change
Strategic change was measured in this study as a shift
between strategic groups, with strategic groups represented
by clusters. The clustering procedure was performed with a
data set which combined strategic variables of the banks
taken at two different periods; i.e., each bank was entered
into the same data base twice.

Firms that fell into

different clusters at time one and time two were considered
to have changed strategies.

Smith and Grimm (1987) used a

similar technique for assessing strategic changes in the
railroad industry, and noted two advantages.

First, by

clustering the data from different time periods in one
analysis, it can be assured that the underlying structure
of each strategy remains the same for each time period.
Using separate clusters in different time periods can lead
to judgement errors as one must assess the equivalence of
the clusters from time one to time two.

Second, combining

the data provides a strong test for measuring changes in
strategy.

For a firm to change clusters, it must bear a

closer resemblance to other firms than itself at a
‘Other measures of geographic diversity such as number
of states or counties in which the bank competes, were not
available from the data set.
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different time period.

Thus, it could be argued that this

technique is likely to identify only very conspicuous
changes in strategy.
Decree of Change
Cluster analysis typically groups similar entities on
the basis of euclidian distance measures (Hair et al.,
1992) . The general notion is to group entities such that
the resulting clusters exhibit low within-group variance
and high between-group variance.

Harrigan (1985) argues

that the between group variance or distance measures
between groups of firms, can act as a surrogate for
mobility barrier heights.

That is, the greater the

distance between any two given groups, the greater the
mobility barrier heights, and the less the chance of
switching group membership.

Thus, in terms of this

analysis, degree of change was assessed by measuring the
relative distance a firm travels when switching clusters.
The actual measurement used was the distance between
cluster centroids provided in SAS output. Firms switching
between groups in close proximity, as measured by distance
between cluster centroids, were assumed to experience a
less radical change than firms switching between groups
whose cluster centroids were further apart. A failure to
change strategic groups by a bank between time period one
and two was coded as zero.
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Prior Performance
Strategy theorists often note the distinction between
two separate components of performance, effectiveness and
efficiency (Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Drucker, 1954).

Put

very simply, effectiveness is doing the right thing, while
efficiency is doing things right (Drucker, 1954) . Hofer
and Schendel (1978) equate effectiveness with the
relationship between the organization and its environment;
i.e., strategic performance, and efficiency with internal
structure and operating activities; i.e., technical
performance.

Financial performance at any point in time is

likely to be a function of each component; both are
necessary but neither is sufficient for the long term
survival of an organization.
Prior performance measures in this study represent an
attempt to capture effectiveness or strategic performance.
Poor performance is expected to indicate poor "fit" while
good performance is expected to indicate good "fit."
However, when using financial performance measures, the
results may be confounded by efficiency considerations.
For example, a firm may be very effective (i.e., have a
good strategic fit) but be performing poorly due to
inefficiencies.

In this case, a change in strategy may

have detrimental effects (Hofer, 1988).

On the other hand,

a firm may have a poor strategic fit following an
environmental change, but continue to perform well in the

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

85

short run due to efficiency improvements. In both of these
examples prior financial performance alone would be a poor
indicator of "need for change".
This dissertation utilized a multifaceted approach for
assessing prior performance that took into account each of
the above mentioned aspects. This method answers the call
by researchers for multidimensional measures of performance
that capture aspects of both operational and financial
performance (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986).

The

measurement framework, demonstrated in Figure 5, includes
three separate performance indicators intended to capture
different aspects of performance:

financial performance

(ROA), efficiency, and effectiveness.
Also, because strategic change may be triggered by low
or declining performance, it is important to capture each

of these aspects when measuring prior performance.

As

noted by Goes (1989), changes in performance, regardless of
relative standing to other firms, are likely to be
important antecedents to change.

Thus, prior financial

performance and efficiency were assessed in two ways, as a
change in performance over time and as average performance.
Prior performance was measured over a three year period
from 1980 to 1982.

As noted below, effectiveness is itself

a change measure, and therefore does not lend itself to
being measured in a static manner.

The following sections

specify the actual measures used.
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Effectiveness

Change
Measures

Absolute
Measures

Avg. Change
in Net Loans
to Assets

N/A

Efficiency

Avg. Change
in Efficiency
Ratio

Average
Efficiency
Ratio

ROA

Avg. Change
in ROA

Average
ROA

Figure 5.

Measurement of Prior Performance
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Effectiveness
One measure of effectiveness is that of sales growth
(Hofer, 1988).

However, since a major portion of a

commercial bank's revenues are from interest income and is
subject to uncontrollable changes in interest rates, a
better measure may be that of overall loan portfolio
growth.

For most banks, the loan portfolio represents the

vast majority of earning assets.

Since loan portfolio

growth can occur at the expense of loan quality, another
important aspect of effectiveness is the overall riskiness
associated with the loan portfolio.

One way of controlling

for this is to measure changes in net loans; i.e., gross
loans minus the allowance for possible loan losses. Since
loan loss provisions are regularly monitored by regulators
for adequacy, this should provide an acceptable estimate of
loan portfolio value.

To control for size, net loans were

expressed as a percentage of total assets, and changes were
measured by subtracting the ratio at time 1 from that at
time 2.

These changes were measured over two time periods

(1980-81, 1981-82) and averaged to arrive at a measure of
prior effectiveness.
Efficiency
Efficiency was measured using the operating efficiency
ratio (Chase Manhattan Bank, 1979):
_________ Total Non-Interest Expenses_________
Net Interest Margin + Total Non-Interest Income
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Where:
Total Non-Interest Expenses = Salaries and benefits + Net
occupancy expense + furniture and equipment expense +
provision for loan losses + other operating expenses.
Net Interest Margin = Total interest income minus total
interest expense.
Total Non-Interest Income = Income from fiduciary
activities + service charges on deposit accounts + other
charges, commissions, and fees + other operating income.
This ratio measures how efficient managers are in
allocating and controlling funds within their control such
as salaries and benefits, occupancy expenses, furniture and
equipment, and other operating expenses.
Financial Performance
ROA is, by far, the most commonly used measure of
performance by researchers examining the banking industry
(Reger et al., 1992; Goodman, 1988; Guarino, 1991;
Passmore, 1985).

In addition, it is the financial

indicator most closely scrutinized by bank analysts and by
industry participants (Reger et al., 1992).

Therefore, it

was used in this study to assess overall financial
performance.

The exact ratio used was Net Operating

Earnings/Total Assets.

Net operating earnings consist of

earnings after taxes but before securities gains or losses.
The use of this figure in the numerator eliminates windfall
profits or unusual losses from the securities portfolio
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which may have been out of control of management (Chase
Manhattan Bank, 1979).
Slack
Following Bourgeois (1981) slack was assessed using
financial data.

One commonly used measure of slack is the

current ratio, which measures the firms ability to cover
short-term obligations with liquid resources (Hambrick and
D'Aveni, 1988).

The banking equivalent, that was used in

this study, is the liquidity ratio (Chase Manhattan Bank,
1979).

This ratio is calculated as follows:

Cash + FFS - FFP + Invest. Portfolio - Pledged Securities
Total Senior Liabilities - (Mort. Debt + Secured Dep.+ FFP)
Where:
FFS = Fed Funds Sold and Securities Purchased under
Agreements to Resell.
FFP = Fed Funds Purchased and Securities Sold under
Agreements to Repurchase.
Investment Portfolio = U.S. Treasury Securities +
Obligations of U.S. Government Agencies + Obligations of
States and Political Subdivisions + Other Securities +
Trading Account Securities.
Secured Deposits = Deposits of U.S. Government + Deposits
of States and Political Subdivisions.
Pledged Securities = Same as Secured Deposits.
Total Senior Liabilities = Total Liabilities.
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This ratio measures the percentage decline in funding
sources which can be met by liquid assets, or the bank's
cushion for meeting immediate resource needs.
Another commonly used measure of slack is the equity
to debt ratio (Bourgeois, 1981; Singh, 1986; Hambrick and
D'Aveni, 1988).

Capital adequacy is an important

measurement of a commercial banks ultimate ability to
absorb losses and is monitored carefully by regulators.

As

such, the degree of available capital represents an
important cache of unused resources that is available to
buffer the firm during change.

Capital adequacy was

measured using the asset to capital ratio (total
assets/total capital) a commonly utilized measure in the
banking industry (Chase Manhattan Bank, 1979).
Ace and Size
Age was measured as the number of years from the
founding of a bank.

Most measures of firm size tend to be

highly correlated (Fombrun and Ginsberg, 1990), thus this
study used total assets, a commonly used measure of size in
the banking industry (Guarino, 1991; Goodman, 1988) .
Chance Outcomes
Two change outcomes are of interest in this study,
performance and organizational failure.

Performance

outcomes were measured using the three indicators described
above (net loan portfolio growth, the efficiency ratio, and
ROA). For ROA and efficiency, the outcome of interest was
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the difference between prior and post performance.

A

difference measure was thought to be more appropriate for
these variables since it is more sensitive to the
relationships being examined.

Because loan portfolio

growth is a change measure itself, average growth was used
as the dependent variable.
Failure is the second dependent variable.

The Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Annual Report was
consulted to identify failed institutions.

Banks that were

not closed or merged by orders of the FDIC, but disappeared
from the data base during the time frame of the study were
assumed to have voluntarily merged with another bank and
were eliminated from the sample.

Banks that disappeared

from the sample between 1984 and 1987 and were closed or
merged by orders of the FDIC will be coded as failed
institutions.
Control Variables
One important variable to control for is holding
company affiliation.

Holding companies have the potential

to significantly impact on a number of variables in this
study, including change, type of change, and performance.
That is, the parent may dictate change and direction of
change, and may also affect change outcomes by providing
resources that would not normally be available to the
organization.

This variable is available on the FDIC data

tapes and was used as a control variable in the analysis.
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Another factor to control for is general economic
conditions which can obviously influence the dependent
variables of concern.

For example, during the early

1980's, banks in oil producing and agricultural states
experienced more severe downturns than those in states with
more diversified economies.

Economic fluctuations were

controlled by introducing unemployment rate statistics in
the analysis for the state in which the bank is located.
Data Analysis
Data analysis proceeded in two stages.

First, cluster

analysis was used to identify banks that change strategies.
Banks were coded to indicate change and degree of change.
Second, multiple regression, hierarchical regression, and
logistic regression analyses were used to test three sets
of hypotheses: those examining change antecedents, those
examining the strategic change/performance relationship,
and those examining the strategic change/survival
relationship.
Cluster Analysis
Cluster analysis is a family of multivariate technique
designed to classify entities with respect to some
predetermined criteria, so that the resulting clusters
"exhibit high internal (within-cluster) homogeneity and
high external (between-cluster) heterogeneity" (Hair et
al., 1992: p. 4).

In the present study, cluster analysis

was used to separate firms into groups on the basis of
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their scope of activities in the banking industry.

The

purpose was to generate relatively stable and meaningful
strategic groups, and to detect changes in strategy by
identifying changes in group membership.

Cluster analysis

has been used widely in the strategic group literature
(Cool and Schendel, 1987; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990), and
more recently it has been utilized to detect changes in
group membership (Smith and Grimm, 1987; Goes, 1989,
Bauerschmidt and Chrisman, 1993) .
The use of cluster analysis involves a number of
choices that can lead to significantly different results,
but for which there are no clear cut answers.

Thus, use of

the technique is perhaps as much an art as a science (Hair,
et al., 1992).

Some of the important decisions to be made

concern dimension selection, scaling, the algorithm to be
used, and the number of clusters formed (Harrigan, 1985;
Hair et al., 1992).
The choice of dimensions to be measured and variables
used represents an important theoretical decision.

As

argued above, scope represents an important dimension of an
organization's competitive strategy, and the choice of
variables in this study was designed to capture important
elements of both breadth and depth of scope.

In general,

an attempt was made to follow Harrigan's (1985) advice to
"select a few dimensions which seem theoretically
appropriate for the greatest number of strategic groups"
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(p. 61).

Also, cluster analysis can be dramatically

affected by the inclusion of undifferentiated variables
(Hair et al., 1992); i.e., variables that do not differ
significantly across the sample.

It is important to

examine the results and eliminate such undifferentiated
variables to obtain well defined clusters.
The next question pertains to how inter-object
similarity should be measured.

Cluster analysis typically

relies on distance measures to assess similarity.

The most

commonly used measure of distance is Euclidean distance,
although other variants include the "city block" approach,
or Mahalanobis distance (Hair et al., 1992).

Generally

speaking, when using measurements based on different scales
it is necessary to convert the raw measures to Z scores
prior to calculating distances to eliminate bias introduced
by scale differences (Hair et al., 1992).

However, as

pointed out by Harrigan (1985), normalizing the data in
this fashion causes the mean and scatter information to be
lost when performing subsequent analysis of group
homogeneity.

One way to overcome this limitation is simply

to use standardized information for clustering purposes and
raw data for analyzing the clusters and testing for
homogeneity (Harrigan, 1985) . Also, since most techniques
for assessing distance are sensitive to outliers (Hair et
al., 1992), the strategy variables should be inspected for
extreme observations.
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A number of different clustering algorithms or
procedures for grouping similar objects exist.

The goal of

each approach is to minimize the within cluster variation
and maximize the between cluster variation, but differences
in procedures can result in different outcomes.

Most

clustering algorithms fall into one of two categories:
hierarchical or nonhierarchical. Hierarchical procedures
involve the construction of tree-like structures that
either start with each individual observation as a single
cluster and work toward building a single cluster
(agglomerative methods) or start with one large cluster
containing all observations and split the observations
until each is in a single cluster (divisive methods) (Hair
et al., 1992) . Five popular methods that fall under the
hierarchical approach include single linkage, complete
linkage, average linkage, Ward's method, and centroid.
Non-hierarchical procedures, frequently referred to as
K-means clustering, do not involve the tree-like
construction process.

Instead, clustering centers are

chosen and objects within a specified distance are included
in the cluster.

Three typical procedures include the

sequential threshold approach, the parallel approach, and
the optimizing approach.
Hierarchical procedures have been the most popular
algorithm's in the past (Hair et al., 1992).

They have the

advantage of being fast and are thought to produce more
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interpretable clusters, but they can be misleading because
early groupings tend to persist throughout the analysis
which can lead to undesirable results. Non-hierarchical
methods have gained in popularity and have the advantage of
allowing switching of cluster membership during analysis,
thus avoiding groups characterized by "chaining".

However,

some authors argue that this feature represents a
disadvantage (McKelvey, 1982).

Following the lead of

Bauerschmidt and Chrisman (1993) this study made use of the
FASTCLUS procedure provided by SAS. FASTCLUS is a nonhierarchical method that uses the nearest centroid sorting
method.

In the FASTCLUS procedure, the user specifies the

number of clusters.

The procedure begins by selecting a

set of cluster seeds, and observations are assigned to the
nearest seed to form temporary clusters.

The initial seeds

are then replaced by the means of the temporary clusters,
and the process is repeated until no further changes occur
in the clusters (SAS/STAT Users' Guide, 1988).

This

approach offers the advantage of emphasizing distinctions
among the strategic groups, rather than familial
relationships (Bauerschmidt and Chrisman, 1993) .
A prominent issue with clustering techniques concerns
how to select the number of clusters.

Harrigan (1985) made

use of ratios comparing within to between group variance,
while Hair et al. (1992) advocate looking for jumps in the
distances between groups as they are combined as objective
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guidelines to aid the analyst.

Although a number of such

guidelines exist, the final solution must be based on a
combination of common sense, practical judgement, and
theoretical foundations (Hair et al., 1992).

The approach

used for this study involved computing a number of cluster
solutions, then subjecting each solution to both subjective
and objective criteria.

They were first examined for

interpretability, and then subjected to three sets of
diagnostic statistics, the ratio of within-group to
between-group variance (Harrigan, 1985), the Pseudo F
statistic, and the Cubic Clustering Criterion (Goes, 1989;
Milligan and Cooper, 1985).
Following this, the reliability of the groups were
assessed using a series of univariate and multivariate
statistical techniques, and by comparing them to strategic
types found elsewhere in the banking literature.
Statistical techniques utilized included univariate Ftests, Bonferroni t-tests, and Discriminant analysis.
Testing Change Antecedents
The first set of hypotheses tested were those
suggesting a relationship between various antecedents and
degree of change.

Specifically, it was suggested that

degree of change will be impacted by prior performance,
slack resources, and organizational age and size.

These

hypotheses were tested using a single multiple regression
model as follows:
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DCHNG = a + bsROA + b2ROACH + b3EFF + b4EFFCH + b5CHLNAS +
b6LIQUID + b7ASCAP + bgLAGE + b,LASSET + bl0HOLDC + e
where:
DCHNG

= Degree of change.

ROA

= Average return on assets.

ROACH

= Average change in return on assets

EFF

= Average efficiency ratio.

EFFCH

= Average change in efficiency ratio

CHLNAS = Average change in loan to assets.
LIQUID = Average liquidity ratio.
AS CAP

= Average assets to capital ratio.

LAGE

= Log of age2.

LASSET = Log of assets.
HOLDC

=

Holding company affiliation.

Testing The Strategic Change Performance Relationship
Analysis of performance outcomes proceeded in several
steps.

First, hypotheses concerning the impact of prior

performance, slack resources, organizational age, and size,
were tested using separate multiple regression models for
organizations that change and those that do not change.
These regression models test the basic direction of the
relationships.

Second, moderated regression techniques

were applied to formally test for an interaction effect.

2Log transformations of age and assets were used as they
were found to significantly improve the distribution of the
data; i.e. log transformations resulted in an approximate
normal distribution.

R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

99

This indicated whether the hypothesized relationships were
statistically different for firms that change and do not
change strategies.

Third, the hypothesis concerning the

impact of degree of change on performance was assessed
using multiple regression analysis.
Performance, Slack, Age, and Size
The hypotheses concerning the impact of prior
performance, slack, age, and size were tested with the
following models.
DROA

= a + b,ROA + b,ROACH + b3LIQUID + b4ASCAP + b5LAGE
+ b6LASSET + b7HOLDC + BgUNEMP + e

DEFF

= a + b[EFF + biEFFCH + b3LIQUID + b4ASCAP + b5LAGE
+ b6LASSET + b7HOLDC + BgUNEMP + e

CHLNASAF = a + b,CHLNASBE + b:LIQUID + b3ASCAP + b4LAGE +
b5LASSET + bgHOLDC + b7UNEMP + e
where:
DROA

= Change in average return on assets.

ROA

= Average return on assets, before.

ROACH

= Average change in return on assets, before.

LIQUID

= Average liquidity ratio.

ASCAP

= Average assets to capital ratio.

LAGE

= Log of age.

LASSET

= Log of assets.

HOLDC

= Holding company affiliation.

UNEMP

= State unemployment figures.

DEFF

= Change in average efficiency ratio.
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EFF

= Average

EFFCH

= Averagechange inefficiency ratio, before.

CHLNASAF = Average

efficiency ratio, before.

change

CHLNASBE = Averagechange in

inloan to

assets,after.

loan to assets, before.

Because a fundamental question being asked is whether
the above variables moderate the relationship between
change and performance, a more rigorous set of moderated
regression equations were examined to test for interaction
effects.

The appropriate analytical technique to test for

moderating relationships depends largely on the type of
measurements employed (continuous or categorical) (Barron
and Kenny, 1986).

When the moderator and independent

variable are both categorical, the appropriate technique is
analysis of variance (Barron and Kenny, 1986).

The

technique often suggested when the moderator is a
continuous variable and the independent variable
dichotomous, is a dummy variable interactive model (Berry
and Feldman, 1985) . This involves running a series of
regression equations and testing for the equality of slopes
using the chow test or an equivalent hierarachical
regression model (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1976; Cohen and
Cohen, 1983; Pedhazur, 1982) . Another option under these
circumstances is to dichotomize the moderating variable and
employ analysis of variance or t-tests, however this
practice has been criticized vigorously (Pedhazur, 1982;
Stone, 1988).

When both the moderator and continuous
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variables are continuous a multiplicative model is
appropriate (Berry and Feldman, 1985; Baron and Kenny,
1986).
As noted, this study involves the examination of a
series of continuous moderators (prior performance, slack,
age, and size) and a dichotomous independent variable
(change or no change). Therefore, a series of hierarchical
regression models were utilized to test for an interaction
effect (Cohen and Cohen, 1983; Stone, 1988; Pedhazur,
1982).

More specifically, this involved running a main

effects model and a full model containing an interactive
term, and testing whether the model with the interactive
term significantly increases the explained variance of the
dependent variable.

A difference in predictability between

the full model and main effects model indicates
significantly different slopes in the regression lines
between firms that change and do not change strategies.
The test statistic for determining significance is:
(Rp* - Rm2) /

F=

- k M)

-------------------(1 - Rp2)/ (N - kF - 1)

where:
Rp2 = The squared multiple correlation coefficient for the
full model.
RM2 = The squared multiple correlation coefficient for the
main effects model.
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kF = The number of independent variables in the full
model.
kM

=The number of independent variables in the main
effects model.

N

=The total sample size.

The resulting F is distributed with kF - kM and N - kF - 1
degrees of freedom.

This test of significance was obtained

from the SAS output, by using a stepwise model found in the
REG procedure, and manipulating the data such that the
interaction term was entered last.

The basic question this

technique answers is whether the use of separate regression
coefficients for each group adds significantly to the
explanation of the dependent variable, performance outcomes
(Pedhazur, 1982).

In other words, this test tells us if

hypothesized moderators in fact have a different impact on
performance between firms that change and do not change
strategies.
Degree of Change
The next relationship to be considered is the impact
of degree of change on performance outcomes. This
hypothesis was tested by using regression models as
follows:
DROA

=

a+ b,DCHNG +

bjHOLDC + b3UNEMP + e

DEFF

=

a+ b,DCHNG +

b2HOLDC + b3UNEMP + e

CHLNAS =

a+ b,DCHNG +

bjHOLDC + b3UNEMP + e
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where:
DROA

= Change

DCHNG = Degree

in average ROA.
of change.

HOLDC

= Holding company affiliation.

UNEMP

= State unemployment figures.

DEFF

= Change

in average efficiency ratio.

CHLNAS = Average change in loan toassets.
Testing the Strategic Chance Survival Relationship
Estimating the impact of change on survival involves
the prediction of a dichotomous dependent variable,
survival vs. failure. When analyzing the occurrence of
events such as this, two possible analytical techniques are
available; discriminant analysis and logit analysis.

Logit

analysis has the advantage of requiring far fewer
assumptions than discriminant analysis, and it is very
similar to regression in terms of it's statistical tests
and diagnostics (Hair et al., 1992).

Therefore, a logit

model was fitted using the LOGISTIC procedure found in SAS.
To test the hypotheses, concerning performance, slack,
size, and age, a separate model was executed for firms that
change and fail to change.

The form of the logit model is

as follows:
P (FAIL) = a + b,R0A + b2ROACH + b3EFF + b4EFFCH + b5CHLNAS
+ b6LIQUID + b,ASCAP + b„LAGE + b,LASSET + bl0HOLDC
+ b,,UNEMP + e
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where:
P(FAIL) = Probability of failure.
ROA

= Average return

on assets.

ROACH

= Average change

in return on assets.

EFF

= Average efficiency ratio.

EFFCH

= Average change

in efficiency ratio.

CHLNAS

= Average change

in loan to assets.

LIQUID = Average liquidity ratio.
ASCAP

= Average assets to capital ratio.

LAGE

= Log of age.

LASSET = Log of assets.
HOLDC

= Holding company affiliation.

UNEMP

= State unemployment figures.
This model tests the basic direction of the

hypothesized relationships.

The statistical significance

of the differences can be assessed by using a hierarchical
procedure similar to that described above; i.e.,
calculating a main effects and full interactive model, and
determining the statistical significance of adding the
interactive term.

Logistic regression has an overall

measure of goodness of fit similar to R squared, referred
to as -2LL (-2 Log Likelihood). This likelihood value can
be used to compare fit between equations.

Once again, the

significance test is available in the SAS output, when
using a stepwise model found in the LOGISTIC procedure.
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The impact of degree of change on failure was
estimated by a straightforward logit model as follows:
P (FAIL) = a + b,DCHNG + b2H0LDC + b3UNEMP + e
where:
P(FAIL)

= Probability of failure.

DCHNG

= Degree of change.

HOLDC

= Holding company affiliation.

UNEMP

= State unemployment figures.
Summary
This chapter has attempted to lay out the design and

methodology of this study.

It has detailed the nature of

the study, presented the data and measures used, and
explained the data analyses used in testing the hypotheses
proposed in the previous chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS

This chapter reports the result of the statistical
tests in five major sections.

First, the results of the

classification efforts using cluster analysis is presented.
The second section reports the results of tests examining
change antecedents.

The third section presents the results

of those tests that examined the relationship between
strategic change and performance outcomes. The fourth
section describes the outcomes of the statistical tests
examining the relationship between strategic change and
survival.

The final section reviews the results and

summarizes the chapter.
Cluster Analysis
The main goal for the cluster analysis was to identify
a set of stable and interpretable strategic groups and to
detect changes in strategy by identifying changes in group
membership.

The following section details the procedures

and outcomes.
Clustering Procedure
As noted, the FASTCLUS procedure was used to perform
the cluster analysis.

The strategy variables from 1982 and

1985 were merged into the same data set as separate
106
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observations, resulting in 1,722 observations available for
clustering.

The variables were standardized prior to the

analysis.
Initial attempts at clustering yielded unexpected
results.

Regardless of the number of clusters derived,

approximately 98% of the sample remained grouped in a
single cluster.

Upon close examination of the strategy

variables, it was determined that the cause for this was
the inclusion of what Hair et al. (1992) refer to as
undifferentiated variables; i.e., those that differ little
across the sample.

Four of the variables3 included in the

original analysis fell into this category.

For example:

1. DomLoan - Only 10 instances of foreign loans reported
out of a possible 1722 occurrences.
2. DomDep - Eight firms reported foreign deposits.
3. ForBr

- Eleven firms reported foreign branches.

4. FedFund - All but eighty two firms sold fed funds.
The inclusion of such variables can obviously have a
dramatic and undesirable impact on the results of a cluster
analysis.

To obtain well defined and interpretable

clusters, Hair et al. recommend deleting undifferentiated
variables.

The deletion of such variables is also endorsed

by Harrigan (1985) who argues for the use of only those

3Prior to 1984 information on many foreign transactions
was unavailable, except for the largest banks. It is likely
that a larger number of banks were involved in foreign
transactions than is indicated by these variables.
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variables with the greatest discriminatory power.
Therefore, the four variables above were removed from the
analysis, resulting in the use of twelve strategic
variables for the cluster analysis.

Means and standard

deviations for these variables are provided in Table 3.

Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of all Strategy
Variables____________________________________________
1982
1985
Combined
Variable___________ Mean Std.
Mean Std.
Mean Std.
.6742 .0832
Loan portfolio
.6302 .0980
.6522 .0935
diversity (LPD)
% Retail Loans
(RET)

.2232 .1302

.1482 .0934

.1857 .1193

% Comm. Loans
(COMM)

.2236 .1413

.1601 .1116

.1918 .1312

% Agricultural
Loans (AG)

.1629 .2150

.0864 .1203

.1246 .1783

% Real Estate
Loans (RE)

.3114 .1743

.2435 .1318

.2774 .1582

% Investments
(INV)

.0789 .1637

.3618 .1659

.2203 .2172

Lease Financing
(LEASE)

.1347 .3416

.1951 .3965

.1649 .3712

Credit Card
Accts. (CCARD)

.3182 .4661

.3647 .4816

.3415 .4743

% Fee Income
(FEES)

.0416 .0312

.0555 .0349

.0485 .0338

Deposits/Assets
(DEP)

87.92 4 .426

88 .71 4 .436

88.31 4 .447

% Time Deposits
> $100M (LRGCD)

11.42 10 .146

11.26 10.018

11.34 10.080

Total Branches
(TOTBR)

3.49 10.938

4.12 13.494

3 .80 12.283

N==861

N==861

N=:1722
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Number of Clusters
Although a number of guidelines exist for determining
the "optimum" number of clusters, there is no truly
objective standard (Harrigan, 1985; Hair et al., 1992).
Milligan and Cooper (1985) investigated thirty stopping
rules for hierarchical cluster analysis using Monte Carlo
simulations and found that most did a poor job of
identifying a known cluster structure.

Thus, most

researchers agree that the best approach involves reliance
on judgement, theoretical expectations, and a few well
chosen diagnostic procedures (Goes, 1989; Hair et al.,
1992).
Based on previous empirical work using similar
clustering procedures (Dess and Davis, 1984; Goes, 1989;
Smith and Grimm, 1987; Bauerschmidt and Chrisman, 1993),
from theoretical generic strategies (Porter, 1980; Miles
and Snow, 1978) and from proposed banking typologies
(Goodman, 1988) the a priori expectation was for three to
seven strategic configurations to emerge from the data.
Also, from a practical standpoint, less than three
configurations would probably not be very meaningful and
more than seven would become cumbersome.

Therefore, a

decision was made to start with a series of five k-means
runs, analyzing from three to seven clusters.
These initial clusters were first examined from the
perspective of their interpretability and overall meaning
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fullness.

In general, it was found that the

interpretability improved as the clusters increased from
three to five.

That is, each successive cluster seemed to

be distinctive from the other clusters along one or more
dimensions.

However, when the clusters increased beyond

five, they seemed to become less distinct and more
difficult to interpret.

In other words, partitioning the

data set beyond five clusters did not seem to be
meaningful, and in fact made interpretation more awkward.
Following this initial inspection of the clusters,
three sets of diagnostic statistics were examined.

The

first was the ratio of within-group variance to betweengroup variance suggested by Harrigan (1985) . Low values of
this statistic are preferred, since this indicates a
greater degree of explained variance (variance between
clusters) than unexplained variance (variance within
clusters). Figure 6 presents a graph of this statistic for
the five cluster solutions.

Because this statistic will

always improve as the number of clusters increases, the key
to interpretation is to examine the degree of change
(Harrigan, 1985).

As can be seen, moving from three to

four and four to five clusters results in significant
improvements, but the incremental improvements are much
less when moving to six and seven clusters.

This would

seem to confirm the initial subjective judgement that a
five cluster solution is appropriate.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

111

C
O
k.

)
+0*
CO
3

Within/Between

Figure

6.

to

Within/Between

Ratio

CO

to

CO

o

CO

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112

Two additional diagnostic tools that are generated by
the FASTCLUS procedure are the Pseudo F statistic and the
Cubic Clustering Criterion (Goes, 1989).

Milligan and

Cooper (1985) found these two statistics to be among the
most reliable in detecting the optimum cluster solution.
The Pseudo F statistic is similar to Fisher's F, in that
higher values indicate a better cluster solution.
presents a graph of this statistic.

Figure 7

Once again, the five

cluster solution is confirmed.
The final diagnostic tool used is the Cubic Clustering
Criterion.

Higher values are preferred, and Figure 8

reveals that the five and seven cluster solutions stand out
as superior.

Taken as a whole, however, the subjective

interpretation, combined with the diagnostic statistics,
points rather convincingly to a five cluster solution as
being the most appropriate.
Results of the Five-Cluster Solution
Table 4 presents a summary of the five cluster
solution, including the unstandardized cluster means and
standard deviations for each strategy variable, and
univariate F ratios (ANOVA's). Cluster distances are
provided in Table 5.

In general the five cluster solution

appeared to do an adequate job of separating the groups
along the strategic variables.

The univariate F tests

revealed highly significant differences between the cluster
means across the five clusters for each strategy variable.
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Cluster 1
(n=515)
6518
LPD
0984
Std. Dev.
3
rank

Cluster 2
(n=157)
.5752
.1205
5

Cluster 3
(n=54)__
.7109
.0426
1

Cluster 4
(n-564)
.6495
.0866
4

Cluster 5
(n=432)
.6769
.0698

F Ratio
p value
F=43.39
p=.0001

2

Ret
Std. Dev.
rank

1173
0687
5

.1251
.0763
4

1957
.0739
3

2417
,1244
1

.2149
.1278

Comm
Std. Dev.
rank

1078
0681
5

.1458
.0785
4

.2330
,0987

1650
,0871
3

,3384
,1341
1

F=371.57
p=.0001

Ag
Std. Dev.
rank

1117
1159

5711
1293
1

0103
0183
3

0830
1083
4

0464
0818
5

F=805.63
p=.0001

Re
Std. Dev.
rank

1885
0982
4

,1306
0897
5

.2460
.0990

.4276
,1349
1

.2447
,1116
3

F=397.57
p=.0001

Inv
Std. Dev.
rank

.4746
.1308
1

0273
0854
5

.3148

1554
1512
3

F=770.39
p=.0001

2

,0827
1239
4

Lease
Std. Dev.
rank

1301
3367
3

1019
3034
4

.8148
.3921
1

.0887
.2845
5

.2477
.4322

2

(table con'd.)

2

2

.

1100

F=113.47
p=.0001

2

F=62.86
p=.0001

2
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Table 4. Summary of Cluster Analysis Results: Cluster Frequencies, Means,
_________ Standard Deviations, and F Statistics__________________________
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Cluster 1
(n=5l5)
.2058
CCard
Std. Dev. .4047
4
rank

Cluster 2
(n=l57)
.0510
.2206
5

Cluster 3
(n=54)__
.9260
.2643
1

.0661
.0376
1

F=75.46
p=.0001

2

.0424
.0280
4

77.86
8 .448
5

89.37
3.055
1

88.12
4.674
4

F=102.23
p=.0001

11.02

21.70
11.72
1

F=238.51
p=.0001

2

7.686
5.798
5

49.24
50 .21
1

2.651
3.081
3

2.656
2.909
2

F=343.53
p=.0001

.0639
.0284

Fees
Std. Dev.
rank

.0474
.0319
3

.0200

Dep
Std. Dev.
rank

88.36
3 .712
3

88.51
3 .538

LrgCd
Std. Dev.
rank

7.770
6 .601
4

7.802
7.321
3

8.114

TotBr
Std. Dev.
rank

2 .067
1.769
4

1.184
.4779
5

Cluster
Cluster
Cluster
Cluster
Cluster

1
2
3
4
5

-

.0194
5

2

Cluster 4
Cluster 5
F Ratio
(n=564 )_____ (n=432)_____P value
.3440
.5324
F=73.98
.4754
.4995
p=.0001
3
2

Focused Investors
Focused Agricultural Lenders
Generalists
Focused Retailers
Generalist Wholesaler

i*
o\
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Table 5. Distance Between Cluster Centroids
1

2

2

3.54

.

3

5.39

6.71

-

4

2.65

3.68

5.51

5

3.01

4.29

5.02

Cluster

3

4

1

2.49

To investigate these differences in more detail 1
individual means were subjected to multiple comparisons
using the Bonferroni t-test.

Although other authors have

used pairwise comparisons for this purpose (Harrigan, 1985;
Smith and Grimm, 1987), the Bonferroni statistic was felt
to be more appropriate since it does an effective job of
controllingfor experimentwise error rate (SAS/STAT Users
Guide, 1988) . The results (Table 6) revealed that the
clusters are statistically different from each other along
most of the strategic dimensions used.

It is notable that

DEP, LRGCD, and TOTBR, seemed to do a poorer job than the
other variables, as approximately half the comparisons were
insignificant for each of these variables.

Overall, the

five cluster solution explained 32.9% of the variance in
the strategy variables.
A multivariate technique that can be used for
assessing the overall validity of the cluster solution is
multiple discriminant analysis (DeCastro, Chrisman,
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Table 6. Bonferroni T-tests of the Differences in Cluster
Means for the Strategy Variables Used in the Cluster
Analysis_____________________________________________
Clusterl

Loan Portfolio Diversity
Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4

Clusterl

--

Cluster2

★

--

Cluster3

*

A

_

Cluster4

n.s

■k

*

Clusters

★

*

n.s

Clusterl

% Retail Loans
Cluster2 Cluster3

Clusterl

--

Cluster2

n.s

--

Cluster3

*

*

Cluster4

it

★

*

Cluster5

★

*

n.s

Clusterl
--

Cluster2

★

--

Cluster3

*

*

Cluster4

★

n.s

*

Clusters

★

*

*

*
n.s. -

_

*

Cluster4

--

Clusters

_

*

% Commercial Loans
Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4

Clusterl

Clusters

*

--

Cluster5

--

significant difference between groups at .05 level
no significant difference between groups

(table con'd.)
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Clusterl

% Agricultural Loans
Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4

Clusterl

--

Cluster2

*

--

Cluster3

*

*

_

Cluster4

*

+

*

-

Clusters

*

*

n.s

*

Clusterl

% Retail Loans
Cluster2 Cluster3

Clusterl

--

Cluster2

★

--

Cluster3

*

*

Cluster4
Clusters

*

Clusterl

Cluster4

*

*

--

*

n.s

*

% Investments
Cluster2 Cluster3

Cluster4

Clusterl

--

Cluster2

*

--

Cluster3

*

★

Cluster4

*

*

*

--

Clusters

★

*

★

•k

Clusters

--

Clusters

--

Clusters

--

*
- significant difference between groups at .05 level
n.s. - no significant difference between groups
(table con'd.)
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Clusterl

Lease Financing
Cluster2 Cluster3

Cluster4

Clusterl

--

Cluster2

n.s

--

Cluster3

*

*

Cluster4

n.s

n.s

*

--

Cluster5

*

*

*

*

Clusterl

Credit Card Accounts
Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4

Clusterl

--

Cluster2

*

--

Cluster3

★

*

Cluster4

*

★

*

--

Clusters

*

*

*

*

Clusterl

% Fee Income
Cluster2 Cluster3

Cluster4

Clusterl

--

Cluster2

★

--

Cluster3

★

*

Cluster4

n.s

*

*

--

Clusters

★

*

n.s

★

Clusters

--

Clusters

--

Clusters

--

*
- significant difference between groups at .05 level
n.s. - no significant difference between groups
(table con'd.)
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Clusterl

Deposits/Assets
Cluster2 Cluster3

Cluster4

Clusterl

--

Cluster2

n.s

--

Cluster3

*

*

Cluster4

*

n.s

*

--

Clusters

n.s

n.s

n.s

*

% Time Deposits > $100 ,000
Clusterl Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4
Clusterl

--

Cluster2

n.s

--

Cluster3

n.s

n.s

Cluster4

n.s

n.s

*

--

Clusters

*

*

*

★

Clusterl

Total Branches
Cluster2 Cluster3

Cluster4

Clusterl

--

Cluster2

n.s

--

Cluster3

*

★

Cluster4

n.s

n.s

*

--

Clusters

n.s

n.s

*

n.s

Clusters

--

Clusters

--

Clusters

— _

--

*
- significant difference between groups at .05 level
n.s. - no significant difference between groups
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Schweiger, and Sandberg, 1994) . Discriminant analysis is
an appropriate statistical technique for testing the
hypothesis that group means of multiple groups are equal
(Hair et al., 1992).

The results of a canonical

discriminant analysis using the SAS DISC procedure are
shown in Table 7.

A sample of 1290 banks, approximately

75% of the total sample, was used to calculate the
discriminant functions. The number of discriminant
functions necessary for a five group discriminant analysis
is four.

Each discriminant function is a linear composite

that attempts to explain the variations or differences in
the dependent categorical variables (Hair et al., 1992).
The highly significant F values associated with each
discriminant function in Table 7 allow us to reject the
null hypothesis that the canonical correlations equal zero.
In other words, each linear combination of strategy
variables explains a significant amount of the variance
between the clusters.

In addition, the discriminant

function accurately classified 91.4% of the 432 firms from
the holdout sample into the correct cluster.

Thus, taken

as a whole, the strategy variables do a good job of
explaining the variance in the clusters, confirming the
adequacy of the five cluster solution.
In summary, the statistical tests applied above all
point to an adequate cluster solution.

The strategy

variables exhibit significant differences across the five
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Table 7. Results of Multiple Discriminant Analysis
Function
1
2
3
4

Eigen
value
2.296
2.046
1.280
.994

Canonical
Correlation
.8346
.8196
.7493
.7060

Approximate
F

Pr > F

254.59
242.04
214.99
212.42

.0001
.0001
.0001
.0001

clusters when tested with both univariate and multivariate
techniques. Thus the cluster analysis was apparently
successful at separating the groups in a manner that
maximized between group and minimized within group
variance.
Interpreting the Clusters
Cluster interpretation involves an examination of the
nature of the clusters in order to assign names or labels
(Hair et al., 1992).

Ideally, the clusters should not only

differ from each other along the strategic dimensions, but
should exhibit patterns of differences that make sense from
a judgmental and/or theoretical perspective.

The

interpretation process is typically accomplished by
inspecting the rank order and absolute values of the
unstandardized cluster means used in the analysis
(Harrigan, 1985; Goes, 1989, Smith and Grimm, 1987) . This
information is found in Table 4.

To further aid in the

analysis, the standardized cluster means for each variable
were plotted by cluster in Figure 9 (standardized to a mean
of zero and a standard deviation of one) . This visual
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image represents an efficient means of communicating the
strategic patterns for each cluster simultaneously.
A description of each group is as follows:
Cluster 1 - Focused4 Security Investors
Banks in this cluster can be characterized as being
rather narrowly focused security investors. Security
investments on average make up nearly half of the
lending/investment portfolio (47.5%), which is considerably
higher than that found in the other clusters. An
inspection of Figure 9 reveals that these banks rank below
average on all the remaining strategy variables, indicating
a relatively low reliance on traditional lending areas, as
well as a low level of dependency on non-traditional
products and funding sources.

Also, with only two branches

on average, their level of geographic diversity is quite
low.

Because investment securities are typically limited

to those issued by the U.S. Treasury, and other federal,
state and local government agencies, this strategy is quite
conservative.

In his examination of success factors in the

banking industry from 1977 to 1984, Goodman (1988) found a
number of banks following this strategy.

Interestingly,

since it entails relatively low risk, this strategy was

4The term focused is used here to indicate a firm with
a relatively narrow scope. Focus was felt to appropriately
capture the notion of scope for the banking industry since
most banks participate in a wide variety of lending and
investment activities, but may emphasize one area over the
other.
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found to be the most consistently profitable in each year
and under every environmental circumstance examined.
Guarino (1991) also found a number of banks following this
strategy, with a move toward security investments
representing the most common strategic change between 1977
and 1987.
literature.

Thus, such a strategy has precedence in the
Also, given the results of these studies, it

is not surprising that this cluster is one of the largest.
Cluster 2 - Focused Agricultural Lenders
The banks in cluster 2 stand out for their strong
emphasis on agricultural lending.

On average, these banks

invested approximately 57% of their investment/loan
portfolio in agricultural loans.

By comparison, the

remainder of the sample averaged less than 8% of their
total portfolio in agricultural loans. As with the cluster
1 members, these banks were rather highly concentrated in a
single segment, and ranked below average in all other
strategic categories.

Thus they rely relatively little on

other lending activities, and are highly traditional when
it comes to new products and funding sources.

These banks

are geographically concentrated, and not surprisingly, are
the smallest in size (Average assets of $21.9 million).
Once again, Goodman (1988) found banks following this
strategy in his sample, although he concluded that the more
successful ones moved away from this strategy following a
decline in the agricultural economy in 1979.

This is
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consistent with the relatively small membership found in
this cluster.
Cluster 3 - Generalists
Cluster 3 banks stand out primarily for assuming a
broad based, diversified strategy, or what organization
theorists refer to as a generalist strategy (Aldrich, 1979;
Zammuto and Cameron, 1985).

The LPD index of .71 (maximum

is .80)5 indicates an equal balance within the
lending/investment portfolio.

Although no single portfolio

item stands out, these banks are involved in retail and
commercial lending, and investments to a greater extent
than the average banks in other clusters. The only
lending/investment category that they are not heavily
involved in is agricultural loans. These banks also invest
quite heavily in non-traditional products and funding
sources.

They are ranked first in the areas of leasing and

credit cards, with 81.5% and 92.6% of firms in the cluster
offering these services, respectively.

The relatively low

deposit to asset ratio, suggests a reliance on alternative
funding sources. One of the most striking features of this
cluster, is its high level of geographic diversity.

On

sLoan portfolio diversity, or LPD, is calculated as
follows:
LPD = 1 - E(RET2 + COMM2 + AG2 + RE2 + INV2) . In an equally
balanced portfolio, each portfolio category equals .20,
resulting in an LPD of .80.
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average, the banks following this strategy have over 49
branches.
Generalists appear to fit the description of
relatively large regional banks.

Regional banks are more

likely to have the resources necessary to compete
successfully in multiple markets simultaneously.

In fact,

some have argued the necessity of such banks to diversify
and move into non-traditional services (Crane and Eccles,
1987) . These banks are significantly larger than those in
the remaining clusters, with average assets of $2.1
billion.
Cluster 4 - Focused Retailers
Banks in this cluster rank first in the categories of
retail loans (loans to individuals) and real estate loans.
This pattern

is often characterized as a retail

orientation (Passmore, 1985).

On average, 43% of their

lending/investment portfolio is in real estate loans and
24% is in loans to individuals.

Banks in this cluster are

below average in other lending/investment categories, and
are not heavily involved in non-traditional products or
funding sources.

They rank first in deposits/assets,

indicating a somewhat stronger than average reliance on
traditional deposits.

Because deposits from individuals

are traditionally thought to be a more stable source of
funds than commercial deposits, these banks probably have
less need for non-traditional sources.

In keeping with
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this logic, they also rank last in large certificates of
deposit (over $100,000) as a percentage of deposits.

Thus

the patterns demonstrated by the strategic variables all
point consistently toward a retail orientation.
Classification of banks as either retail or wholesale
oriented is quite common in the literature (Reger, Duhaime
and Stimpert, 1992; Passmore, 1985).

Retail banks deal

predominantly with individuals and small businesses, while
wholesale banks borrow from and lend to, large corporate
accounts.

Passmore (1985) clustered a relatively small

number of regional and multinational banks on lending and
deposit categories, and found that they fell into retail
and wholesale clusters.
Cluster 5 - Generalist Wholesalers
Banks in this cluster were a little more difficult to
characterize.

The overall pattern suggested a wholesale

orientation; i.e., they ranked first in commercial loans,
first in fee income, and first in large C.D.'s as a
percentage of deposits.

A larger degree of fee income is

consistent with a wholesale orientation, as corporate
customers are more likely to purchase non-credit services
such as cash management accounts and wire transfers (Crane
and Eccles, 1987).

Also, corporate deposits are likely to

be less stable, so it is logical that there is a greater
reliance on "bought money"; i.e., large C.D.'s.

However,

it was also noted that these banks displayed a broader
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focus than the other focused clusters.

On average,

commercial loans made up 33.8% of the lending/investment
portfolio, but these banks also invested rather heavily in
real estate loans (24.5%) and loans to individuals (21.5%).
In addition, they participated heavily in other less
traditional products, such as credit cards (53.2%) and
leasing (24.8%).

In general, these banks seem to take on a

wholesale orientation; i.e., catering to businesses, but
remain rather heavily involved in a number of different
activities.

Thus, they are characterized as generalist

wholesalers.
Given the uncertain lending environment for wholesale
bankers in the early 1980's, high interest rates and an
increase in the number of alternate funding sources
available to businesses, it is perhaps not surprising that
these banks chose to diversify their risks.

This notion is

supported by Goodman's (1988) finding that banks following
a focused commercial lending strategy during the early
1980's were the least profitable.
Summary

The first goal of the cluster analysis was to develop
a limited set of differentiated and interpretable strategic
groups.

After deleting those strategic variables found to

be undifferentiated, the cluster analysis yielded five
distinct strategic configurations: focused security
investors, focused agricultural lenders, generalists,
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focused retailers, and generalist wholesalers.

The

patterns for these groups are fairly distinctive and were
easy to interpret.

Also, these strategic types are similar

to those described in the banking literature (Guarino,
1991; Goodman, 1988; Passmore, 1985).

Thus, the cluster

analysis appeared to accomplish its first goal.
The final step in the cluster analysis, was to use the
clusters to detect and code strategic change.

The next

section details the results of this process and examines
the patterns of strategic change that occur.
Patterns of Strategic Change
As noted, the above cluster analysis includes two
observations for each bank in the sample.

Banks that fail

to change strategies will occur twice in the same cluster.
Those that change strategies will fall into two clusters.
Table 8 gives a detailed breakdown of the changes that
occurred in group membership.

The columns represent group

membership in 1985, while the rows represent 1982
membership.

Thus, the diagonal elements in the table

depict the number of banks that remained in their groups,
while the off diagonal elements represent changes in group
membership.

Overall, 4 92 firms, or 57% of the sample

changed strategies, while 389 exhibited no change.

These

results are consistent with those found in previous studies
that examined change during periods of environmental
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Table 8. Changes in Group Membership and Distances Between Cluster Centroids

1982
Strategies
1
Focused
Investors
(distance)
O
Focused Ag.
Lenders
(distance)
j
Generalists
(distance)
•*
Focused
Retailers
(distance)
Generalist
Wholesalers
(distance)

1
Focused
Investors

2
Focused
Ag. Lenders

1985 Strategies
3
Generalists

4
Focused
Retailers

5
Generalist
Wholesalers

1982
Total

51
(--)

0
(3.54)

l
(5.39)

3
(2.65)

8
(3.01)

63

117
(3.54)

16
(--)

0
(6.71)

5
(3.68)

3
(4.29)

141

1
(5.39)

0
(6.71)

20
(--)

1
(5.51)

1
(5.02)

23

230
(2.65)

0
(3.68)

6
(5.51)

130
(--)

36
(2.49)

402

53
(3.01)

0
(4.29)

4
(5.02)

23
(2.49)

152
(--)

232
861

1985 Total

452

16

31

162

200

Total entered
Total exited

401
12

0
125

11
3

32
272

48
80

Total Number of Changes = 492

Total Number of Non-Changes = 369

H
W
to
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upheaval.

Thus, as expected, change was a rather common

occurrence in the banking industry during this time period.
As can be seen, there was a strong movement away from
the agricultural lending (cluster 2) and retail strategies
(cluster 4), toward securities investment (cluster 1).

In

fact over half the 1985 sample of banks (53.5%) followed an
investment strategy, compared to 7.3% that followed this
strategy in 1982.

In contrast, a meager 1.8% followed an

agricultural strategy and 18.8% followed a retail strategy
in 1985, compared to 16.4% and 46.7%, respectively, in
1982.

Generalists (cluster 3) and wholesaling generalists

(cluster 5) experienced less drastic changes in group
membership.
A total of 125 (88.6%) focused agricultural lenders
changed their strategies, with 117 of these changing to an
investment focus.

272 (67.6%) of the retailers

changedstrategies, 23 0 of which changed to an investment
focus.

Eighty banks (34.5%) in the generalist wholesaler

group changed strategies, with the majority switching to an
investment strategy.

However, 48 banks also switched to a

generalist wholesale strategy, mostly from the focused
retail strategy.
Two things are particularly interesting about the
patterns of change that occured.

First, the notion of

centroid distances acting as surrogate for mobility
barriers seems to be borne out by the changes noted.

Table
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9 presents a comparison of centroid distances and number of
changes.

As can be seen, the number of changes decreases

dramatically as the distance scores increase.

Table 9. Centroid Distances
and Strategic Change
Centroid
Distance

Number of
Changes

2.49

59

2.65

233

3 .01

61

3 .54

117

3.68

5

4.29

3

5.02

5

5.39

2

5.51

7

6.71

0

To test this, the firms were classified into three groups:
those making slight changes (centroid distance less than
3.0; n=292), those making moderate changes (centroid
distance greater than 3.0 but less than 4.0; n=183), and
those making extreme changes (centroid distance greater
than 4.0; n=17). A chi-square goodness of fit test
indicated that these frequencies were significantly
different from an even distribution (chi-square = 358.8,
p<.001).
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Second, it is interesting to note that strategic
change was quite common among the more focused groups,
apparently as their niches became less accommodating
following deregulation.

Goodman (1988) noted that retail

and agricultural lenders were among the least profitable in
1983, which he attributed to the recession occurring at
that time, combined with a particularly strong decline in
the agricultural economy.

The move toward an investment

strategy may reflect either a desire to adopt a more
conservative strategy during this turbulent time, or simply
a lack of suitable lending opportunities available in their
relevant markets.

On the other hand, the generalists in

clusters 3 and 5 were apparently in a better position to
deal with the changes, due to their diversity.

This is

consistent with the population ecology argument that
generalists tend to be better suited than specialists to
conditions of "coarse grained" environmental change.

In

general, the patterns of change noted seem to make sense
from both a theoretical and historical perspective.
The change patterns noted above are similar to those
found by Guarino (1991).

He examined changes in portfolio

patterns between 1978 and 1987 and found that there was a
general movement away from agricultural and retail loans,
toward investments.

Although he did not measure scope, per

se, he found that larger banks exhibited less change.
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Medium and large commercial lenders (wholesalers) exhibited
very little change.
Summary
An examination of the changes and change patterns
yielded some interesting insights.

First, it was noted

that strategic change was not an uncommon event, and the
frequency with which it occurred during the time of this
study is consistent with that found in other studies.
Second, the patterns of change were non-random and seemed
to make sense from both a theoretical and historical
perspective.

Finally, the patterns noted, are similar to

those found in the study by Guarino (1991).

Thus, the

results of the cluster analysis and the changes identified
seem to provide valid data for testing the hypotheses.
Testing Change Antecedents
This section examines the impact of certain variables
that are thought to inhibit or encourage change efforts.
Hypotheses one and three suggested that low or declining
performance and a lack of slack resources will prompt
organizations to change strategies.

Furthermore, it was

suggested that lower levels of performance and slack will
induce greater magnitudes of change. Hypotheses five and
seven argue that inertial forces associated with age and
size will inhibit change efforts.

That is, the greater the

size and the older the organization, the lower the
magnitude of change.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

137

The above hypotheses were tested with a multiple
regression model, using the SAS REG procedure.

Table 10

presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations
among the independent variables.

The results of the

regression are summarized in Table 11, which contains
standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients, as
well as the standard errors and t-statistics.
Discussion of the outcomes will proceed in three
steps.

First, the overall model will be evaluated for its

significance and appropriateness.

Second, the results of

the analyses will be discussed in terms of their
implications for the hypotheses.

Finally, the results will

be summarized and discussed.
Evaluating the Model
Before estimating the model, each of the variables
were assessed for normality.

Although normality of the

independent variables is not an assumption of regression
(Kerlinger and Pedhazur, 1973), Hair et al. (1992) suggest
that they be assessed and, if necessary, subjected to
transformations to improve normality.

The SAS Univariate

procedure was used to produce normal probability plots, box
plots, and the Shapiro-Wilkes statistic.

Only three of the

eleven variables passed the Shapiro-Wilkes test, although
many of the variables did not appear to depart drastically
from normality.

Log transformations significantly improved
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1.00000
0.0
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1.00000
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1.00000
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0.0
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0.4567

1.00000
0.0
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0.2939
-0.04643
0.1745
- .042
.411

0.00511
0.8813
.592
.328

-0.02888
0.3980

0.01190 -0.12440
0.0003
0 .7280
.023
-.958
.463
3.95

0.06424
0.0602
.143
.205

--0.00995 -0.00901
0.7712
0.7921
12.23
3.78
2.94
.944

1.00000
0.0

0.20234 -0.14301
0.0001
0.0001
10.41
.458
1.12
.498

1.00000
0.0
7.38
1.72
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Table 11. Results of Regression Analysis for Degree of
Change_________________________________________________
Unstandardized
Standard
Regression
Variable
Coefficient
Error
t-statistic
Beta
.021

.099

.208

.014

ROACH

-.051

.119

-.427

-.021

EFF

- .374

.435

-.859

-.123

EFFCH

- .218

.296

-.736

-.101

CHLNAS

-.031

.013

-2.371 **

-.122

LIQUID

-1.975

.247

-8.006 ***

- .406

-.050

.021

-2.404 **

- .148

.353

.055

6.424 ***

.333

-.151

.053

-2.873 ***

- .170

HOLDC

.058

.105

-.550

-.029

UNEMP

-.043

.029

-1.467

- .073

Intercept

3.36

.645

5 .208

R2 = .2060

F = 19.925

ROA

ASCAP
LAGE
LASSET

1.71

N = 857

*
p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01

the distribution of the size and age variables, and these
transformations were retained for the analysis.
The overall model was highly significant, with an F
value of 19.925, and it explained slightly over 20% of the
variance in the dependent variable (R2 = .206) . Four of
the prior performance measures and the control variables
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were not significant.

A separate regression model,

estimated without the control variables produced almost
identical results and is not reproduced here.

Four

observations were dropped from the analysis due tomissing
variables, resulting in a sample size of 857.
The major assumptions of regression are: 1) the
relationship between independent and dependent variables is
linear, 2) constant variance of the error terms
(homoscedasticity), 3) independence of error terms (auto
correlation) , and 4) normal distribution of error terms
(Hair, et al., 1992).

Other important items that can

distort results are multicollinearity and outlying
observations.
The most commonly used tool for detecting nonlinearity and unequal variances (heteroscedasticity) is the
analysis of residuals (Lewis-Beck, 1980; Hair et al.,
1992).

This technique involves the visual inspection of

partial residual plots.

A healthy plot will exhibit no

pattern; i.e., the points will be scattered randomly.
Nonlinear relationships can be indicated by a curvilinear
pattern to the residuals, and heteroscedasticity is
revealed by fan or diamond shaped patterns in the
residuals.
An inspection of the partial residual plots revealed
no curvilinear patterns nor the typical patterns associated
with unequal variance.

Therefore, it was concluded that
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the linearity and equal variance assumptions were
adequately met.
The independence of error terms was evaluated using
the Durbin-Watson d statistic.

This statistic is commonly

used to test for the existence of a first order
autoregressive process (Freund and Littell, 1986).
value of the d statistic was 1.705.

The

According to the table

for this statistic, a value less than 1.561 (for n=200maximum in the table, k=ll) indicates the existence of a
first order autocorrelation at a significance level of .01.
Since the value of d for the model exceeds this value, the
test suggests that the assumption of independent terms has
been met.
Normality of the error term was evaluated using a
normal probability plot, histogram, and Shapiro-Wilkes
statistic generated by the SAS Univariate procedure.

The

Shapiro-Wilkes test suggested a lack of normality among
residuals.

Examination of the histogram revealed a clear

bi-modal distribution, with the sample fairly evenly split.
This split was also observed in a visual examination of the
residual plots, where the observations were noted to
cluster in two groups.

Careful examination of the data

revealed that this split was quite clearly between the
banks that changed and failed to change strategies.

Thus,

although the data was measured on a continuous scale of
distance between clusters, the outcome was a fairly
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distinct grouping into two categories, change and no
change.

Cohen and Cohen (1983) note that the result of

this type of analysis, which is in effect a biserial
correlation, must be interpreted with caution.

The

relationships suggested by a regression analysis are
hypothetical correlations, that could be obtained if the
categorical variable were in fact continuous.

They suggest

that the significance of a bivariate biserial correlation
be confirmed by a t test on the difference between the
means.

The multivariate equivalent would be to perform a

discriminant or logit model.

Therefore, the observations

were coded as change or no change, and evaluated using a
logit model.

The results are very similar to the

regression model (see Appendix A). The variables that are
significant in the regression model remain significant in
the logit model, and the parameter estimates are all in the
same direction.

Thus, the validity of the model is

confirmed, despite this deviation from normality.
Two other problems that can distort regression results
are multicollinearity and outlying observations.

An

examination of the correlation matrix for the independent
variables (Table 10), reveals a potential collinearity
problem due to the high correlations between the efficiency
and change in efficiency variables (.85).

To further

assess multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor
(VIF), and its inverse, the tolerance value, were

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

143

calculated.

Although an exact threshold value of the VIF

is not available, values considerably larger than one
indicate serious multicollinearity problems (Neter,
Wasserman, and Kutner, 1989).

Hair et al. (1992) suggest a

cutoff value of 10 for the VIF value and a corresponding
value of .10 for the tolerance value.

Once again, the

efficiency and change in efficiency variables were
identified as potential problems, with VIF scores of 8.39
and 8.44, respectively.

To evaluate the impact of these

variables, two additional regression models were estimated,
one deleting the efficiency variable and the other deleting
the change in efficiency variable.

Each of these reduced

models produced almost identical results to the full model
(see Appendix B), therefore a decision was made to leave
the variables in the model.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the residual
plots, was a large number of obvious outlying observations.
Approximately 20 observations were identified as outliers,
based on their studentized residuals exceeding a value of
2.

Each of these observations was examined carefully for

coding or input errors but none were detected.

Although

outlying observations can significantly impact a regression
model, most authors suggest that their exclusion be based
on pressing practical (errors) or theoretical reasons
(Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 1989).

Since neither of

these reasons existed, the observations were retained.
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Summary of Model Evaluation
The initial regression model proved to be robust,
despite some potential problems identified with non
normality of the error terms, and multicollinearity.

The

bi-modal distribution apparently had little impact on the
regression results, as confirmed by the similar results
obtained with the logit model.

However, as noted by Cohen

and Cohen (1983), the limited distribution of the data
means that the results of the regression must be
interpreted with caution.

In effect the results may be

more indicative of a change/no change relationship, rather
than a degree of change relationship.

Also, the

collinearity associated with the two efficiency variables
proved to have no substantial impact on the model.
Although a number of outliers were identified, they were
retained in the model as there existed no practical or
theoretical reason for removing them.
Results
Hypothesis 1 predicts that organizational performance
will be negatively related to degree of change.

That is,

organizations experiencing low or declining performance
will be more motivated to make large scale changes.

The

model contained five measures of performance intended to
correspond with overall financial performance (ROA and
change in ROA), efficiency (efficiency ratio and change in
efficiency ratio), and effectiveness (Change in loans to
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assets) . Table 11, demonstrates mixed support for the
first hypothesis.

One of the performance variables, change

in loans to assets (Chinas), was significantly related to
degree of change.

The negative relationship suggests that

organizations experiencing declining loan portfolios were
more likely to make strategic changes. Most of the
remaining performance variables were negatively related to
change, but were not significant.

The overall evidence

suggests that a decline in effectiveness, or strategic
performance, is a strong force for change, but efficiency
and overall financial performance are not.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that slack resources will be
positively related to degree of change.

In other words,

higher levels of slack resources will tend to encourage
major changes.

Two measures of slack resources were used,

the liquidity ratio (LIQUID) and assets to capital (ASCAP).
When interpreting the regression coefficients, it is
important to note that Ascap is inversely related to
liquidity.

That is, high levels of ASCAP indicate

relatively low levels of capital.

As can be seen in Table

11, the regression model provided mixed support for
hypothesis 3.

The liquidity ratio, which is the banking

equivalent to a current ratio, was strongly and negatively
related to degree of change.

Banks with low levels of

liquid assets, (cash, readily converted investments, and
net fed funds loans), were more likely to make major
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changes in strategy than those with high levels of liquid
assets.

On the other hand, banks with relatively high

levels of capital (low ASCAP) were significantly more
likely to make major strategic changes than those with low
levels of capital.
The negative relationship between liquid resources and
change fails to support hypothesis 3 and on the surface
seems to lend credence to the buffering arguments of
Starbuck and others (1988).

That is, high levels slack may

serve to dull the organization's senses and discourage
change efforts.

On the other hand, the positive

relationship between capital resources and change, supports
hypothesis 3, and indicates that slack resources in the
form of capital, encourage change and experimentation
(Bourgeois, 1981).

Apparently, those banks with a larger

capital base were more likely to take risks and incur the
expenses associated with change.

On the other hand, banks

with higher levels of liquid resources were less willing to
make changes.

These finding are interesting and suggest

the need to delve further into the relationship between
slack and change, and perhaps to further explore the
definitional and measurement issues surrounding the slack
construct itself.
Hypothesis 5 predicts that organizational age will be
negatively related to degree of change.

Table 11 reveals

that age and degree of change were significantly related,
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but in the opposite direction from that predicted. Contrary
to predictions, older organizations were significantly more
likely to make changes in their strategy than younger
organizations.

Because this finding was both unexpected

and difficult to explain, additional analysis was performed
to rule out alternate explanations.

First, since the

argument concerning age was based on the concept of
inertia, it was reasoned that inertia and age are not
likely to be related in a continuous manner.

If inertial

forces increase with age, there may be some point
relatively early in the life of an organization when
inertia becomes a relatively fixed feature.

To test this

notion, age was dichotomized at five years, and the
regression model was re-estimated with age as a dummy
variable.

This analysis produced very similar results,

i.e., age remained positively related to change.
It was also reasoned that an organization's original
strategy may be highly correlated with age, and that the
observed relationship could be spurious.

That is, change

may be dictated primarily by the original strategy, with
age being indirectly related by its correlation to cluster
membership.

To test for this, a separate regression model

was estimated and original cluster membership was
introduced as a control variable.

This analysis produced
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even stronger results for age6. These results confirmed
the original outcome, and suggested a particularly strong
relationship between age and degree of change.

The

implications of these findings will be explored more
thoroughly in the discussion section.
Hypothesis 7 predicts that organizational size will be
negatively related to degree of change.

Table 11 reveals

that assets (LASSET) are significantly related to degree of
change in the predicted direction.

Thus, large

organizations were found to be less likely to change
strategies than small organizations.

This is consistent

with the notion that smaller organizations tend to be more
flexible and less subject to inertial forces than larger
organizations.

However, it is important to note that this

relationship could be spurious.

When original strategies

(clusters) are entered into the equation, size becomes
insignificant.

Because the patterns of change noted in the

cluster analysis were strongly suggestive of a relationship
between strategy and change, and since size was noted to be
related to strategy, it is assumed that the changes were
driven by strategy, and that the size-change relationship
is spurious.

6Since this explanation could apply to any of these
results, it is worth noting that controlling for group
membership produced very similar results for most of the
variables. The only exception was size. The implication of
this outcome will be further discussed in the following
section.
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Discussion
In summary, the evidence supporting the relationships
between performance, slack, size, and age on degree of
change is mixed.

A decline in effectiveness, as measured

by a drop in loans, was found to be a significant predictor
of change.

The two measures of slack were also found to

significantly predict change, but in opposite directions.
High levels of liquidity apparently serve to buffer the
organization, while high levels of capital seemed to
encourage change.

Organizational age was also a

significant predictor, but in the opposite direction than
predicted, and size was not a significant predictor, when
original strategies were controlled.
The findings concerning slack resources and age were
both interesting.

When measured in terms of liquidity,

slack exhibited a negative relationship to change.

This

can be explained using the notion of environmental
buffering, however, alternative explanations may be even
more plausible.

For example, high levels of liquidity may

also be indicative of an organization's overall disposition
toward risk.

This is particularly true in the banking

industry, where liquid assets offer clearly lower returns,
but lower risk.

Thus, the findings concerning liquidity

and change may be tapping the related construct of risk
disposition.

High levels of liquid resources indicate risk
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aversion, which also is consistent with an unwillingness to
make changes.
On the other hand, when measured as capital, slack
resources were positively related to change.

Excess

capital and loan loss reserves serve as a primary lines of
defense against loan losses.

Moving into less familiar

lending markets or niches is apparently made much easier
when there is a cushion available to absorb possible
mistakes.

This is consistent with the notion that slack

resources encourage change and experimentation (Bourgeois,
1981; Cyert and March, 1963).
The robust findings concerning the relationship
between age and change, suggest that the inertial arguments
proposed by the selection theorists may need revision.
Rather than becoming more inert, older organizations, at
least in the banking industry, apparently become more
flexible and willing to make changes.

The population

ecologists note that certain routines and skills become
embedded in organizations over time (Hannan and Freeman,
1984).

This notion of organizations continuing in a set of

established routines is part of the reasoning behind the
inertia argument.

Established routines are said to

increase the organizations' level of accountability and
reliability, and thus have survival value.

Supposedly, the

price to pay for this, is a reduction in flexibility.
However, something that this position fails to consider is
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that flexibility and the ability to learn are also
organizational skills that can enhance survival.

It also

makes sense that these abilities are acquired over time, as
the organization experiences and overcomes environmental or
internal upheavals.

Thus, one argument consistent with the

above findings, is that organizations learn, and become
more adept at reacting to their environments over time.
Therefore, it perhaps should not be as surprising as theory
would lead us to believe, that age is positively correlated
with change.
Another interesting finding was that size became
insignificant when the original strategies were entered
into the regression equation.

Since certain patterns of

change were noted to occur relative to the scope of the
organization, this suggests that strategy rather than size
may be the driving force behind strategic change.

Given

the amount of attention and research that has been placed
on the size/inertia argument, this finding could be quite
meaningful and certainly suggests the need for further
research.
The picture that emerges from these findings is that
certain adaptive forces, such as slack resources and a
decline in effectiveness encourage strategic change.

Age,

which was thought to represent an inertial force, instead
was positively related to change.

The only factor found to

inhibit strategic change was excess liquidity.

Although
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this may be explained with the buffering argument, an
equally plausible explanation is that it represents an
overall bias toward risk aversion.

Finally, an interesting

finding was that strategy also seemed to be a significant
predictor of change.
Testing the Strategic Change/Performance Relationship
This section tests those hypotheses regarding factors
that are thought to moderate the relationship between
organizational change and performance.

Hypothesis 2

contends that performance prior to the change will
significantly impact change outcomes. Specifically,
organizations exhibiting low or declining performance prior
to the change are argued to benefit more from the change
than those exhibiting higher or increasing performance.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that slack resources will have a
positive impact on performance for all firms, but they will
be significantly more important for firms that choose to
change strategies.

Hypotheses 5 and 8 predict that

inertial forces associated with size and age will have a
negative impact on performance for firms that change
strategies, but have certain benefits that are likely to
have a positive relationship to performance for firms that
fail to change strategies.

Finally, hypothesis 10 proposes

that degree of change will be positively related to
performance.
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All hypotheses except degree of change were tested
with a series of multiple regression and hierarchical
regression models. Tables 12 and 13 present separate
means, standard deviations, and correlations among the
independent variables for the change and no-change samples.
The multiple regression results are summarized in Tables
14, 15, and 16, which contain standardized and
unstandardized regression coefficients, as well as the
standard errors and t-statistics for the three different
performance outcomes.

Hierarchical regression results are

presented in Tables 17, 18, and 19.

The hierarchical

regression models were estimated for each moderator to test
for an interaction effect.

The significance of an

interaction is that the regression lines determined
separately in the change and no-change groups have
significantly different slopes, hence performance outcomes
depend on the level of those variables.

The multiple

regression models tested the basic direction of the
hypothesized relationships.

It is important to note that

it is not necessary for the main effects (those in the
multiple regression model) to achieve significance in order
to interpret the interaction term (Baron and Kenny, 1986;
Bedeian and Mossholder, 1994) . Thus, the main test for
moderation will consist of the significance of the
interaction term, with the multiple regression results
providing evidence as to the direction of the relationship.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ZJ
CD

■o

—i
C
o

Q.

o

CD

Q.

■o
CD

C
C/
/)
)

Table 12, Correlations Among Independent Variables - Firms that Changed Strategies
____________ROABEF
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ROACHBEF

EFFBEF
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1.00000
0.0

0.02406
0.6025

1.00000
0.0

0.23084 -0.09085 -0.10846 -0.20900 -0.21904 -0.13247 -0.05749
0.0001
0.0001
0.0040
0.2130
0.0488
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0.0001
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0.04264
0.3558

0.00760 -0.11330
0.8693
0.0139

0.12283 -0.05007 -0.02371
0.2782
0.6078
0.0076

0.03910
0.3972

0.04258
0.3566

0.23728

0.32628

0.0001

0.0001

0.10533 -0.07756
0.0927

0.0222

0.07477 -0.14400
0.0017
0.1051

0.19047
0.0001

1.00000
0.0

0.04206
0.3625

1.00000
0 .0

0.03141
0.4965

0.12678
0.0059

0.00434 -0.07037 -0.03161
0.9252
0.1272
0.4937

1.00000
0.0

0.23149 -0.24705
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0.0

0.0001

$

l-H
3"
O
c

■o
CD

C
C/
/)
)

Mean
St. Dev.

1.158
.626

- .056
.406

.577
.170

.013
.195

-1.532
3.634

.076
.191

11.785
2.798

3.983
.731

10.169
.889

.397
.489

7.346
1.699

U1

ROABEF
ROABEF

1.00000
0.0

ROACHBEF

0.05247
0.3450

EFFBEF

ROACHBEF

EFFBEF

EFCHBEF

CHLNASBE

SLACKBEF

ASCAP B E F

LAGE82

n=326
LASSET82

HOLDC

1.00000
0.0

-0.52336 -0.12037
0.0298
0.0001

1.00000
0.0

-0.00446 -0.47511
0.9360
0.0001

EFCHBEF

0.07773
0.1614

CHLNASBE

0.09117
0.1003

0.26683
0.0001

SLACKBEF

0.10164
0.0668

0.01846 -0.00966
0.7398
0.8621

ASCAPBEF -0.41056 -0.05965
0.0001
0.2829

-0.20334
0.0002

0.15200
0.0060

1.00000
0.0
0.07989
0.1501

1.00000
0.0

-0.08932 -0.14741
0.0077
0.1075

1.00000
0.0

-0.06316 -0.01603
0.7731
0.2554

-0.04503
0.4177

1.00000
0.0

LAGE82

0.12572 -0.17460 -0.17958
0.0232
0.0016
0.0011

0.10265
0.0641

-0.17258
0.0018

0.15296
0.0056

0.20114
0.0003

1.00000
0.0

LASSET82

0.00352
0.9495

0.01162 -0.06428
0.2471
0.8344

0.28875
0.0001

0.39069
0.0001

0.23774
0.0001

1.00000
0.0

HOLDC

0.10169
0.0667

0.16989 -0.04404
0.0021
0.4281

0.28085
0.0001

0.01200
0.8291

0.33036
0.0001

1.00000
0.0

0.09082
0.1027

0.05901
0.2896

0.03140
0.5734

0.20994
0.0001

-0.01716
0.7584

UNEMP85

Mean
St. Dev.

-0.03286
0.5544

-0.06727
0.2258

0.04780 -0.07581 -0.01183
0.3896
0.1721
0.8315

-0.09566 -0.06322
0.0856
0.2565
1.021
.554

UNEMP85

-.037
.382

0.02162
0.6982
.633
.238

-0.00501 -0.12119
0.0292
0.9284
.000
.187

- .469
4.014

.229
.196

12.753
2.938

3.568
1.078

10.713
1.262

.512
.501

1.00000
0.0
7.483
1.759
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Table 13. Correlations Among Independent Variables - No-Change Sample.
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Table 14. Results of Regression Analysis for Change in
ROA (PROA)_____________________
Unstandardi zed
Regression
Standard
Coefficient
Error
Variable
t-statistic
Beta

Chancre in Stratecrv
-.646

.082

_ __M«««
-7.907

-.401

.227

.104

2.178”

.091

LIQUID

- .299

.233

-1.282

- .056

ASCAP

- .012

.019

-.624

- .033

LAGE

.127

.060

2.111”

.092

LASSET

.118

.055

2.155”

.170

HOLDC

- .222

.092

-2.423“

-.104

UNEMP

.045

.027

1.660’

.045

-1.471

.555

-2.648***

-.241

ROA
ROACH

Intercept

= 471
R2 = .2087 F = 15.233*'* N ;
No-Chancre in Stratecrv
-.940

.141

-6.643“*

-.408

ROACH

.465

.174

2.670***

.139

LIQUID

.575

.359

1.601

.088

-.044

.029

-1.508

- .100

LAGE

.213

.066

3 .220*”

.180

LASSET

.060

.064

.935

.060

HOLDC

- .196

.146

-1.341

- .154

UNEMP

.001

.038

.969

.001

- .499

.649

-.768

.001

ROA

ASCAP

Intercept

R2 = .1782 F=8.536*** N=323
*
p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01
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Table 15. Results of Regression Analysis for Change in
Efficiency_______________________________________________
Unstandardized
Regression
Standard
Coefficient
Variable
Error
t-statistic
Beta
Chancre in Stratecrv

-.272

.174

EFCH

.448

.144

3 .105’*’

.934

LIQUID

.019

.119

.160

.008

-.001

.009

-.156

-.008

.014

.031

.458

.022

- .016

.028

-.570

-.030

HOLDC

.076

.047

1.597

.159

UNEMP

.002

.013

.206

.006

Intercept

.198

.307

.646

.209

-2.503**

-.232

EFF

ASCAP
LAGE
LASSET

R2 = .0717 F = 4.462'**
No-Chance in Stratecrv

-1.561

-.567

N = 471

-.453

1.812

.404

.166

2.433’**

-.027

.129

- .213

-.012

ASCAP

.000

.009

.032

.002

LAGE

- .068

.023

-2 .979

- .160

LASSET

-.001

.023

- .037

-.002

HOLDC

-.013

.051

- .248

-.027

UNEMP

.001

.013

.080

-.002

Intercept

.592

.253

2.336"

EFF
EFCH
LIQUID

R2 = .1177 F = 5.252***
*
p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01

__ _•••

.163

.007

N = 324
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Table 15. Results of Regression Analysis for Change in
Loans/Assets_____________________________________________
Uns tandardi zed
Regression
Standard
Coefficient
Error
t-statistic
Variable
Beta
Chancre in Stratecrv

-.055

.053

-1.040

-.014

LIQUID

.370

1.030

.359

.017

ASCAP

.029

.072

.404

.020

-.357

.266

-1.345

-.064

.647

.243

2.661”'

.141

HOLDC

-1.129

.406

-2.776'"

.001

UNEMP

.002

.120

.019

-5.650

2.387

CHLNASBE

LAGE
LASSET

Intercept

R2 = .0423 F = 2.924"'
No-Chancre in Stratecrv

- .276

-2.367”

.085

N = 471

CHLNASBE

-.076

.065

-1.162

-.067

LIQUID

1.949

1.368

1.425

.083

ASCAP

.145

.095

1.526

.092

LAGE

.024

.245

.100

.005

LASSET

.319

.243

1.312

.087

HOLDC

-2.212

.549

-4.027

UNEMP

.015

.145

.109

.003

-5.094

2.345

-2.173”

.216

Intercept
R2 = .0795

F* 3.900'”

.

_ _ _

•••

- .479

N=323

P < .10
< .05
***
< .01

*

**

p
P
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Table 17. Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis with
Chance in ROA as the Dependent Variable n=797
Variables
Cumulative
Unstandardi zed
F-ratio for
Regression
Included
R-squared
Individual
Coefficients
Variables
.0035
Change
.1361
2.82’
Change
ROA

.1362

.2303
-.6873

9.17’’’
121.96"*

Change
ROA
Change x ROA

.1371

.1964
-.7659
.1211

.40
53.17*”
.86

Change
ROACH

.0140

.1416
.2909

Change
ROACH
Change x ROACH

.0140

.1413
.2953
-.0069

3.02’
3.29*
.00

Change
LIQUID

.0037

.1491
.0852

2.93*
.17

Change
LIQUID
Change x Liquid

.0108

.3131
.6620
-.9977

7.99*"
4.33"
5.68’"

Change
ASCAP

.0209

.1864
.0520

5.23"
14.08’”

Change
ASCAP
Change x ASCAP

.0216

-.0712
.0402
.0209

.04
3.63”
.56

Change
LAGE

.0075

.1031
.0794

1.54
3.14*

Change
LAGE
Change x LAGE

.0102

.6183
.1333
-.1349

Change
LASSET

.0112

.1871
.0937

Change
LASSET
Change x LASSET
•• pp << .10
.05
p < .01

.0128

-.7003
.0580
.0853

3 .07
8 .44

2.97*
5.32"
2 .18
••
5 .04
6.20"*
_

_

.

.77
1.39
1.25

_ _
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Table 18. Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis with
Change in Efficiency (EFF) as the Dependent Variable n=797
Variables
Cumulative
Unstandardized
F-ratio for
Included
R-squared
Regression
Individual
Coefficients
Variables
-.0682
Change
.0050
Change
EFF

.0954

-.1083
-.7118

10.84’’*
79.34’’*

Change
EFF
Change x EFF

.0970

-.2237
-.7934
.1919

4.76’*
56.70”’
1.41

Change
EFCH

.0645

-.0759
.6052

5.24"
50.50’’’

Change
EFCH
Change x EFCH

.0646

-.0756
.6352
- .0492

5.20“
21.59’*’
.08

Change
LIQUID

.0052

-.0734
- .0340

4.02**
.15

Change
LIQUID
Change x Liquid

.0063

-.1005
-.1291
.1643

4.61“
.92
.86

Change
ASCAP

.0097

-.0793
-.0113

5 .26”
3.73"

Change
ASCAP
Change x ASCAP

.0097

-.1185
-.0131
.0032

.62
2 .16
.07

Change
LAGE

.0070

-.0585
-.0236

2 .79*
1.56

Change
LAGE
Change x LAGE

.0102

-.1867
-.0370
.0336

1.52
2 .30
.76

Change
LASSET

.0056

-.0743
-.0111

4 .45“
.49

Change
LASSET
Change x LASSET
•• p < .10
p < .05
•** p < .01
•

.0056

-.0908
.0118
.0016

.07
.32
.00

_ _
A
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Table 19. Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis with
Change in Loans/Assets (CHLNASAF) as the Dependent
Variable n=797__________________________________________
Variables
Cumulative
Unstandardized
F-ratio for
Regression
Individual
Included
R-squared
Coefficients
Variables
Change
.0006
-.2243
.52

Change
CHLNASBE

.0073

- .3226
-.0924

1.06
5.29“

Change
.0092
ROA
Change x CHLNASBE

-.2270
-.1467
.1000

.50
6.10*“
1.54

Change
LIQUID

.0097

.1010
2 .1349

.09
7.29*“

Change
LIQUID
Change x Liquid

.0111

.3756
3 .1001
-1.6711

.79
4.33"
1.09

Change
AS CAP

.0031

-.1519
.0749

.23
1.96

Change
AS CAP
Change x ASCAP

.0032

.2745
.0945
- .0345

.04
1.35
.10

Change
LAGE

.0008

-.2502
.0622

.61
.13

Change
LAGE
Change x LAGE

.0047

2.0974
.3076
-.6149

2.32
1.92
3.07*

Change
LASSET

.0117

.0095
.4297

Change
LASSET
Chance x LASSET
*
P < .10
P < .05
•••
P < .01

.0106

-2.9630
.3102
.2859

.00
8.92*“
.94
2.70*
.96
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Since degree of change pertains to organizations that
change strategies, this hypothesis will be assessed with a
separate regression equation.
The discussion below will proceed in three stages.
First the overall adequacy of the models will be assessed.
Second, the

results of the analyses will be examined in

light of their implications for the hypotheses.

Finally,

the implications of the results will be discussed and
summarized.
Multiple Regression Models
Tables 14, 15, and 16, present the results of the
multiple regression analyses for the three different
performance outcomes.

Separate regression equations were

estimated for banks that changed and did not change,
resulting in a total of six different equations.

Log

transformations of age and size were used because they
resulted in a distribution that more closely resembled
normality.

Each model was statistically significant,

although the R-squared values indicate that the moderators
did a better job of explaining changes in ROA (R2 = .208
and .178) than they did for efficiency (R2 = .071 and .118)
or loans to assets (R2 = .042 and .079).

It is worth

noting, once again, that the significance of main effects
is irrelevant when testing for moderation (Cohen and Cohen,
1983; Bedeian and Mossholder, 1994).

Thus, the

significance or lack of significance in the multiple
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regression equations is not a factor in testing the
hypotheses.

However, the directions of the relationships

are important, since they were specifically predicted.
The pattern of residuals from the partial regression
plots suggested no significant problems with
heteroscedasticity or non-linearity.

The Durbin-Watson d

values all indicated no significant problems with auto
correlation.

Normal probability plots, histograms, and the

Shapiro Wilkes statistic all revealed departure from
normality for residuals when using change in ROA (DROA) and
change in efficiency (DEFF). Various transformations
suggested by Hair et al. (1992) failed to correct this
problem.

A number of researchers have suggested that the

violation of normality is the least serious of the
assumption violations, particularly when the sample size is
large (Lewis-Beck, 1980; Kerlinger and Pedhazur, 1973).
Nevertheless, it may suggest caution when interpreting the
results.
The correlation matrices for the change and no-change
groups (Tables 12 and 13) revealed similar patterns to
those observed for the full sample.

Despite relatively

high correlations between efficiency and change in
efficiency, the VIF and Tol values indicated no problem
with multicollinearity.

As with the previous analysis,

there appeared to be a significant number of outliers.
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Inspection of the data revealed no coding errors, so the
outlying observations were retained.
Hierarchical Regression Models
Table 17, 18, and 19 present the results of three sets
of hierarchical regression models, one for each dependent
variable.

To maximize the chance of detecting a

significant interaction effect, separate models were used
for each moderator.

A forward selection, model building

approach found in the SAS REG procedure was used to fit
three models for each moderator, one containing the change
variable, one containing the change variable and a
moderator, and one containing the change variable, the
moderator, and an interaction term.

The test for

moderation involved testing the significance of the
increase in variance explained when adding the interaction
term to the model (indicated by the significance of the F
ratio in the table).
Each of the hierarchical equations was significant,
although many researchers do not consider the significance
of the overall equation to be a requirement to detect
significant moderation (Bedeian and Mossholder, 1994) . As
with any model containing an interaction term, the
hierarchical models appear to suffer from
levels of multicollinearity.

relatively high

This suggests that the

individual regression coefficients should be interpreted
with caution, however, the F tests of concern in this
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analysis are not affected (Evans, 1991; Hair et al., 1992).
Tables 17, 18, and 19 reveal few significant results for
the interaction terms, suggesting that the hypotheses were
generally not supported.
Results
Though not hypothesized, it is notable that a
significant main effect was observed between change and two
performance variables, ROA and efficiency.

Change

demonstrated a weak, but positive relationship with ROA.
Because the efficiency measure actually represents an
inverse measurement (higher levels of the efficiency
measure indicate lower efficiency), efficiency was also
noted to demonstrate a strongly positive relationship with
change.

That is, banks that changed strategies increased

both their return on assets and efficiency.

Since few

studies have found significant main effects between change
and performance, this result is quite interesting.

The

positive relationship between efficiency and change is
particularly interesting, since it seems counter intuitive.
These results will be further explored in the next section.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that prior performance will
covary negatively with regard to subsequent performance.
For firms that change strategies, prior performance was
expected to be negatively related to subsequent
performance, while the opposite was expected for firms that
failed to change.

The underlying notion is that
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performance outcomes can be expected to vary, depending on
the need for change.
Although prior performance in the form of ROA and
efficiency are both significantly related to subsequent
performance in the multiple regression equations,

the

direction of the relationship is the same for both groups.
ROA is negatively related and change in ROA is positively
related to subsequent RCA for both the change and no-change
groups.

The direction of the relationships is similar for

the efficiency variables.

Prior change in loans/assets was

not a significant predictor for either the change or no
change groups.

Furthermore, the hierarchical regression

results indicate no significant difference in the slopes of
these relationships.

Thus hypothesis 2 is not supported.

Hypothesis 3 predicts that slack resources will be
significantly related to subsequent performance for both
firms that change and fail to change, but that it will be
more important for firms that change.

Hierarchical

regression results indicated that slack resources in the
form of liquidity did moderate the change/ROA relationship,
but the direction of the relationship is different than
predicted for banks that changed strategies. Thus
hypothesis 3 is not supported.
Table 14 shows that slack resources were negatively
related to ROA for firms that changed strategies and
positively related for firms that failed to change.

In
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other words, slack resources seem to have a detrimental
impact on performance for firms that change strategies, but
a positive impact for those that fail to change.

This

result is surprising, given that slack resources are
generally thought to ease the implementation of change
efforts (Ginsberg and Bucholtz, 1990; Bourgeois, 1981).
Possible explanations will be explored in the discussion
section.
Hypothesis 5 predicts that organizational age will be
negatively related to performance for firms that change
strategies and positively related for those that fail to
change.

That is, age is likely to be an advantage under

conditions of relative stability, but a disadvantage when
attempting to change due to higher levels of inertia.
hypothesis was partially supported.

This

Table 19 revealed that

age (LAGE) was a marginally significant moderator for
predicting change in loans/assets.

Furthermore, the

multiple regression results indicate that the relationships
occurred as predicted.

Thus, the results support the

notion that age can serve to moderate certain performance
outcomes between the change and no-change banks.
Hypothesis 8 predicts that organizational size will be
negatively related to performance for banks that change
strategies and positively related for banks that fail to
change.

The general idea is that inertial forces

associated with size make change more difficult.

However,
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size has certain advantages that accrue to firms that fail
to change.
hypothesis.

There is no evidence to support this
The results suggest that size has equally

positive benefits for ROA and efficiency, and equal
drawbacks for change in loans to assets.

That is, there is

no moderating effect.
Discussion
Several results of the analysis are interesting and
call for further exploration.

First, an interesting

finding from the hierarchical regressions, is that change
alone had a significant main effect on performance.

Change

was positively related to subsequent ROA and efficiency.
These results were unanticipated and quite suggestive.

Few

studies have found any significant relationships between
strategic change and financial performance, and the
relationship between efficiency runs counter to the inertia
arguments proposed by selection theorists and many
strategic management proponents.

However, several studies

from the turnaround literature have found that
organizations often attempt strategic and operating
turnarounds simultaneously, and there is some evidence to
suggest that both types of actions are necessary to effect
succesful turnarounds (Schendel and Patton, 1976; Grinyer
and McKiernan, 1990; Robbins and Pearce, 1992).

Thus, the

notion that organizations may seek efficiency and strategic
improvements at the same time is not unprecedented.

This
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finding seems to place some of the basic tenants of
selection theory in doubt.
Another result that was both surprising and counter
intuitive was the negative relationship between slack
resources and prior performance that moderated performance
outcomes for organizations that changed strategies.

Though

surprising, this outcome may be consistent with the
previous finding concerning slack resources and propensity
to change.

As noted above, liquidity was found to be

negatively related to degree of change.

This could be due

to a buffering effect, that dulls the organization and
makes it less reactive to its environment, or may reflect
an over-all aversion to risk.

The buffering argument

suggests that these organizations may delay change,
resulting in a general decline in performance prior to the
change, and/or resulting in lost opportunities that are
associated with a first-mover advantage.

Since this study

fails to detect the precise timing of the change, either of
these explanations could explain the negative relationship
between slack and subsequent performance.

The risk

aversion argument suggests that high levels of slack may be
associated with an incremental or evolutionary approach to
change.

This approach may be less risky, but it also may

mean lower levels of performance when environmental changes
dictate organizational changes of a more quantum nature.
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Whatever the reason, this finding is interesting and
suggests the need for further research.
Summary
Overall, the analysis provided little support for the
hypotheses concerning performance outcomes. Prior
performance and size had no moderating impact on subsequent
performance. Age was found to moderate the relationship in
the expected direction for loan portfolio growth, but not
for overall financial performance or efficiency.

Slack

resources also were significant moderators of ROA outcomes,
but in a different direction than hypothesized.
Decree of Chance
Hypothesis 11 predicts that among survivors of change,
degree of change will be positively related to performance.
This is based on the notion of there being a risk/return
tradeoff involved in making major changes.

Although large

scale changes are likely to be riskier, the returns
associated with such changes are assumed to be larger.
This hypothesis was tested with three regression models,
one for each performance measure.

Table 20 presents the

results of the regression analysis for the three different
performance outcomes.7 The regression models were first
estimated using only those firms that changed strategies.
Given the bi-modal distribution of the data, it was felt
’Models were also estimated using all the independent
variables from the previous analysis. The results were
consistent with those reported in Table 20.
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that a clearer picture of degree of change would emerge by
eliminating those firms that did not change.

The following

sections evaluate the adequacy of the models, report the
results, and discuss the implications.
Adequacy of the Models
The model with efficiency as the dependent variable
failed to achieve overall significance and thus is excluded
from the following analysis. Neither of the remaining
models explained a great deal of variance, but degree of
change did a better job of explaining changes in ROA (R2 =
.062) than changes in loans/assets (R2 = .020).
Residual plots suggested no problems with
heteroscedasticity and no deviations from linearity.

The

Durbin Watson d values indicated no problems with auto
correlation.

The Shapiro Wilkes test suggested some

deviation from normality for the residual plots for the ROA
model; however, the histogram and normal probability plots
indicated that the problem was not severe.

The Tol and VIF

values indicated no problems with multicollinearity.
Once again, outliers were retained in the analysis.
Results
Degree of change was predicted to be positively
related to change for firms that changed strategies and
survived.

Table 20 reveals that degree of change was

significantly related to ROA outcomes, but in the opposite
direction from that predicted.

In other words radical
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Table 20. Results of Regression Analyses for Performance
with Decree of Change as the Independent Variable
(n=47l)
Regression
Standard
Variable
Error
t-statistic
Coefficient
Difference in ROA as the dependent variable
DCHNG

- .283

.079

-3.550’**

HOLDC

-.157

.096

-1.637

UNEMP

.073

.028

R2 = .0623

2.630***

F = 10.348’**

Difference in efficiency as the dependent variable
DCHNG

.024

.039

.621

HOLDC

.089

.047

1.900*

UNEMP

.007

.014

.568

R2 = .0091

F = 1.423

Change in loans/assets as the dependent variable
DCHNG

-.406

.329

-1.232

HOLDC

-.876

.397

-2.207"

UNEMP

.093

.115

R2 = .0203

.810

F = 3.218"

*
p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01

changes tended to have a detrimental effect on overall
financial performance.
it is not surprising.

This result was not predicted, but
This supports the notion advocated

by many strategic management theorists concerning the
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difficulty of overcoming mobility barriers (Porter, 1980).
To the extent that cluster distance represents height of
mobility barriers (Harrigan, 1985), one would anticipate
changes between distant groups to be more difficult to
successfully implement than those between more similar
groups.

Degree of change was also negatively related to

change in loans/assets; however, this relationship was not
significant.
Discussion
The finding that degree of change negatively impacts
financial performance, combined with the previous finding
that change alone is positively related to performance
present an interesting set of results, even if not
predicted.

The implication of these findings is that

change can have a positive impact on performance, but too
much change can become detrimental to performance; i.e.,
there is a curvilinear relationship between change and
performance.

To directly test this observation, the sample

was split into three different groups; no change, moderate
change (distance < 3.0), and extreme change (distance >
3.0).

A three-way ANOVA was run to test whether these

three groups differed in terms of their performance.

The

results, shown in Table 21, support the notion of a
curvilinear relationship.

Each of the three performance

measures was significant, and the performance for the
moderate group was superior

(recall that a negative change
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Table 21. ANOVA Results. Three Levels of Change by
Performance____________________________________________
Performance
Variable

Moderate
Chance

Extreme
Chance

F

p

Difference in
ROA
-.5855

-.2688

-.8987

17.11

.0001

Difference in
Efficiency

.0447

-.0376

.0113

2.51

.0817

- .2441

-.0270

-1.5672

6.49

.0016

326

336

Change in
Loan/Asset
N

No
Chancre

135

in efficiency represents an improvement). This finding has
important research implications as it may serve to explain
the lack of significant findings that a number of
researchers have experienced when examining the
change/performance relationship.

For example, this study

detected no main effect difference in Loan/Asset growth,
but controlling for degree of change revealed that those
firms experiencing a moderate change achieved significantly
better performance than those that failed to change or
those that changed too much.

Also, the weak main effect

noted for ROA became highly signicant when taking into
account degree of change.
Testing the Strategic Change/Survival Relationship
This section tests those hypotheses regarding factors
that are thought to moderate the relationship between
organizational change and survival.

Hypotheses 2, 4, and 6

predict the identical relationships between change and
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survival that were predicted between change and
performance.

Hypothesis 2 contends that organizations

exhibiting low or declining performance prior to changing
will be more likely to benefit from the change, and will
therefore, be more likely to survive.

Hypothesis 4

predicts that slack resources will moderate the
relationship between change and survival by improving the
chances of survival for firms that change strategies.
Hypothesis 6 predicts that inertial forces associated with
age will reduce the chances of survival for organizations
that change strategies.

Hypotheses 9 and 10 predict

different outcomes for survival than were predicted for
performance.

Hypothesis 9 predicts that organizational

size will be positively related to survival for firms that
change strategy.

Finally, hypothesis 10 predicts that

degree of change will be negatively related to survival;
i.e., the greater the change, the lower the odds of
survival.
Testing of these hypotheses proceeded in much the same
manner as that used to test the change/performance
moderators.

A series of multiple and hierarchical logistic

regression models were estimated to test for direction and
interaction effects, respectively.

A significant

interaction term indicates that the variable in question
moderates the change/survival relationship.

The direction

of that relationship will be determined by the multiple
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logistic regression models performed on the change and no
change groups.

Once again, the significance of main

effects in the logistic regression models is not a factor
when testing for an interaction (Cohen and Cohen, 1983) .
Table 22 presents the results of the logit analysis for the
change and no-change groups.

Table 23 presents the results

of the hierarchical logistic regression analysis.
Adequacy of the Models
The models were fitted using the LOGISTIC procedure
found in SAS.

The overall test for goodness of fit for

logit equations is given by the likelihood value, or more
correctly -2 log likelihood (-2LL). Although there is no
true R-squared value in logit analysis, certain authors
advocate the use of "pseudo" R-squares to aid in the
interpretation.

These values were computed as suggested by

Aldrich and Nelson (1984), and are included in the tables.
The overall test for goodness of fit for the no-change
group was not significant.

Bedeian and Mossholder (1994)

argue that such significance is not crucial when testing
for moderation.

The crucial point of interest in this

table is the direction of the results, not significance.
The pseudo R-squared value for the change group was .1274
and for the no-change group was .0100.
The results of the hierarchical analysis are shown in
Table 23.

A forward selection, model building approach

found in SAS's LOGISTIC procedure was used to fit three
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Table 22. Results of Logistic Regression Analyses
Unstandardized
Regression
Standard
Wald
Variable
Coefficient
Error
Chi-Sauare
.457
.969
4.506"
ROA

Beta
.377

4.567"

.245

2.204

2.187

.789

2.359

1.455

2.629

.877

CHLNAS

- .277

.064

18.628*”

- .647

LIQUID

- .788

1.657

.226

-.083

ASCAP

- .091

.116

.603

- .151

LAGE

.129

.268

.231

.079

LASSET

.077

.261

.086

.055

UNEMP

.181

.188

.925

.176

.352
.696
Dseudo R2 = .1274
-.776
.929

.256

.097

.698

- .272

- .484

1.047

.214

- .107

EFF

-5.121

4.339

1.393

- .475

EFFCH

-1.055

3.699

.081

- .111

CHLNAS

- .054

.101

.281

- .106

LIQUID

- .215

1.955

.012

- .023

ASCAP

-.098

.161

.372

- .152

LAGE

-.229

.527

.190

- .094

LASSET

.523

.479

1.190

.258

UNEMP

.039

.257

.024

.037

-.507
.793
Dseudo R2 = .0100

.409

-.138

ROACH

1.053

.493

EFF

3 .260

EFFCH

HOLDC
-2LL = 53.30
ROA
ROACH

HOLDC
-2LL =4.98
*
p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01
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Table 23. Results of Logistic Hierarchical Regression
(n=859)___________________________________________
Unstandardized
Cumulative
Wald Chi-Square
Variables
Regression
for Individual
Included
Pseudo-R2
Coefficients
Variables
7.82***
Change
.0100
1.1949
Change
ROA

.0264

1.0853
.6101

6.31“’
8.69’”

Change
ROA
Change x ROA

.0419

1.7402
.8088
- .7154

Change
ROACH

.0101

1.1920
-.1228

5.06”
7.38”’
1.34
_ __
7.78
.07

Change
.0102
ROACH
Change x ROACH

1.1873
-.0003
- .3804

Change
EFF

.0100

1.1963
.0605

Change
EFF
Change x EFF

.0108

2.9146
.1337
-2.8379

Change
EFCH

.0104

1.1903
.0934

3 .45*
.13
1.41
_ __*•«
7.75
.17

.0104
Change
EFCH
Change x EFCH

1.1867
- .0972
.3000

7.67”*
.19
.01

.0359

.9035
-.1751

4.21"
19.53’”

.0523
Change
CHLNAS
Change x CHLNASBE

.7869
-.2045
.1340

2.86’
19. 50’”
1.67

.0103

1.2738
.5177

7.78*"
.24

.0104
Change
LIQUID
Chance x Liouid

1.2967
.5848
-.2067

6.23”
.21
.01

Change
CHLNASBE

Change
LIQUID

7.70’”
.00
.16
_ -_•••
7.83
.02

(table con'd.)
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Variables
Cumulative
Unstandardized Wald Chi-Square
Included
Pseudo-R2
Regression
for Individual
__________________________Coefficients_____ Variables
.0106
1.1458
7.01'"
Change
- .0478
.53
ASCAP
.0108
Change
ASCAP
Change X ASCAP

1.1083
-.0486
.0030

.35
.39
.00

.0147

1.0221
.3142

5.35”
3.32*

.0176
Change
LAGE
Change X LAGE

2.4668
.3770
-.3852

1.44
3.93"
.54

.0137

1.3368
.3098

9.50
2.75*

.0138
Change
LASSET
Change X LASSET

-1.5903
.2527
.2941

.11
1.53
.38

Change
LAGE

Change
LASSET

_ _ „•••

*
p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01

models for each moderator.

One contained the change

variable, one contained the change variable and a
moderator, and the final one contained the change variable,
the moderator, and an interaction term.

A significant

improvement in overall fit when adding the interaction
term, as calculated by the logistic procedure, indicates a
significant moderating effect.
Important assumptions for the logit model are
linearity of the relationships, the absence of auto
correlation, and no exact or near linear dependencies among
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the independent variables; i.e., severe multicollinearity
(Aldrich and Nelson, 1984).

Unfortunately, there are few

diagnostics available to detectthese problems, and even
when detected, there is little guidance in the literature
as to how they can be remedied.

The regression diagnostics

and correlation tables from the previous analysis suggest
that severe multicollinearity is not a problem in the
straight logit models.

Multicollinearity is typically a

problem with hierarchical analysis; however, the overall
test of fit is not affected by this problem.

Also, it has

been shown that auto-correlation is not a problem as long
as sample sizes are large (Robinson, 1982).

Thus, we can

assume that the models provided unbiased estimates.
Results
An examination of Table 23 reveals that no significant
interactions were observed.

In addition, Table 22 shows

that none of the relationships were in the hypothesized
direction.

In fact, the only significant predictors were

ROA, change in ROA, and change in loans to assets. Each of
these performance indicators were positively related to
survival for firms that changed strategies.

This is

counter to the hypothesis that suggested a negative
relationship between performance and survival for firms
that change strategies. Thus, no support was provided for
any of the hypotheses concerning the moderating variables
and survival outcomes.
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Once again, it was interesting to note that change
alone had a highly significant and positive effect on
survival (see Table 23).

Approximately 58% of the

surviving firms changed strategy, compared to 29% of those
that failed.

In other words, changing strategies appeared

to have survival value, rather than increase chances of
failure.

A chi-square test of homogeneity was performed to

shed more light on this relationship, and the results are
shown in Table 24.

Table 24. Chi-Square Test - Change and Survival Data
__________________ No Change______________Chance________
Failed
Observed
Estimated
Residuals
Survived
Observed
Estimated
Residuals

19
11
2.41

326
334
.437

8
16
2.00

471
463
.372

Chi-Square = 9.317
Probability = .002

The chi-square value is significant (p=.002), and the
residuals for the failed firms indicate that those two
cells contributed to the significant chi-square value.

As

can be seen, there were significantly fewer failures than
expected in the change group, and significantly more
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failures than expected in the no change group.

This

strongly supports the strategic management perspective and
seems to run counter to the selection arguments proposed by
the population ecologists.
Degree of Chance and Survival
Hypothesis 10 predicts that degree of change will be
negatively related to survival.
groups,

Change to less similar

presumably entails greater investment in

resources; i.e., the greater the change, the higher the
mobility barriers.

Furthermore, many of the resources

necessary to compete in new markets may not be readily
available in factor markets (Barney, 1991).

The failure to

acquire necessary resources for competing in new groups
places an organization at a disadvantage to its
competitors, thus decreasing its chances of survival.
Results of the logit model used to test this
hypothesis are displayed in Table 25.

The first logit

model used only firms that changed strategies; however,
this model failed to achieve significance (pseudo-R2 =
.0018).
firms.

A second model was analyzed that included all
This model revealed a significant and positive

relationship between degree of change and survival, however
these results must be interpreted with caution.

It has

been demonstrated that degree of change is distributed in a
bi-modal fashion between firms that changed and those that
did not.

Also, very few firms that changed strategies
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Table 25. Results of Logistic Regression Analyses with
Degree of Change as the Independent Variable______________
Unstandardized
Regression
Standard
Wald
Variable
Coefficient
Error
Chi-Souare
Beta

Change in Strategy
DCHNG

-.079

.590

.018

-.025

HOLDC

-.210

.735

.082

-.057

UNEMP

.189

.248

.586

.176

-2LL = .900

pseudo-R2 = .0018

n=492

Full SamDle
DCHNG

.392

.143

7.518'**

HOLDC

.052

.396

.017

.014

UNEMP

.189

.128

2.157

.179

-2LL = 10.054

pseudo-R2 = .0116

.332

n=857

*
p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01

failed (8 out of 492).

The limited sample, combined with

the distribution of the data, suggest that the results be
interpreted as a change/no change relationship rather than
a degree of change relationship.

Thus, these findings

probably just reinforce the finding that change is
positively related to survival.

The results concerning

degree of change and survival can only be said to be
inconclusive.
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Discussion of the Change/Survival Findings

Analysis of the change/survival relationships revealed
no support for the hypothesized relationships.

None of the

proposed moderators were significant, and the results
concerning degree of change were inconclusive at best.

An

important issue in this analysis, however, is the
relatively small sample of failed banks.

Although logit

analysis does not require an even sample (Aldrich and
Nelson, 1984), recent research suggests that detection of
moderating effects of dichotomous variables can be
seriouslyundermined by uneven sample sizes.

Stone-Romero,

Alliger, and Aguinis (1994) used a Monte Carlo simulation
to show that the power to detect moderating effects
diminishes significantly as the proportion of cases in each
group becomes greater, even when sample size is large.
These findings indicate that the inference of no moderating
effect in this study may be erroneous.

The results may be

due to low statistical power rather than the absence of a
moderating effect.
One interesting outcome of the logit analysis, was the
finding that the failure rates were significantly higher
for banks that failed to change than for banks that changed
strategies.

This would appear to provide rather strong

evidence in support of the strategic management
perspective.

For this particular sample, it could be

argued that strategic change served to enhance, rather than
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reduce survival rates. At least during the time frame of
this study, the selection arguments are not supported.
Summary
This chapter reported the results of the
classification efforts and statistical tests of the
hypotheses.

The cluster analysis was successful at

identifying five strategic groups that were distinct and
easy to interpret.

The groups were used to measure

strategic change.

Distinct patterns of change were

detected.

Both the strategic groups, and the patterns of

change made sense and were consistent with previous studies
that have examined these issues.

The results of the

cluster analysis were used to test hypotheses concerning
the antecedents and outcomes of strategic change.

A

summary of the hypotheses and results of the analysis are
provided in Table 26.

In addition, since a number of the

more interesting findings in this study were not
hypothesized, Table 27 includes a summary of some of the
more interesting results.
Summary of Chance Antecedents
Prior performance, slack resources, and organizational
age were all found to be significant predictors of
strategic change, but not always in the direction
predicted.

A decline in loans as a percentage of assets

was found to be significantly related to change.

Other

performance measures such as ROA and efficiency were not
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Hypothesis

_____________________________Support______________ Comments

Performance

HI

Prior performance is negatively
related to change.

Mixed

Supported for effectiveness
measures, but not efficiency of
financial performance measures.

H2

Strategic change and prior perf
ormance covary negatively with
respect to subsequent performance
and survival.

Not
Supported

No significance

Supported for asset to capital
measure, but not liquidity
measure.

Slack

H3

Slack resources are positively
related to change.

Mixed

H4

Strategic change and slack res
ources covary positively with
respect to performance and
survival.

Not
Supported

Liquidity and change covaried
negatively with respect to ROA.

H5

Organizational age is negatively
related to change.

Not
Supported

Relationship was significant,
in the opposite direction.

H6

Age and strategic change covary
negatively with respect to per
formance and survival.

Mixed

Age and change covaried neg
atively with respect to
effectiveness.

Age

(table con1d .)

but
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Table 26. Summary of Hypotheses and Results______________________________
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Hypothesis______________________________

Support

Comments

Size

H7

Size is negatively related to
change.

Not
Supported

Relationship was insignificant
when original strategies were
entered into the equation.

H8

Size and strategic change covary
negatively with respect to sub
sequent performance.

Not
Supported

No significance

H9

Size is positively related to
survival.

Not

No significance

Supported

Degree of Change

H10 Degree of change is negatively
related to survival.

Not
Supported

Change alone was found to be
positively related to survival.

Hll Degree of change is positively
related to performance for
survivors.

Mixed

Change and performance were
found to have a curvilinear
relationship.

188
Table 27. Important Findings Not Hypothesized______________

1) Change was not uncommon and patterns of change observed
sue- .ast a relationship between scope and change.
2) Liquid resources and age were both significantly related
to change, but in the opposite direction from that
predicted.
3) Size became an insignificant predictor of change when
original strategy was entered into the equation.
4) Change was positively related to both performance and
survival.
5) Change was found to be related to performance in a
curvilinear manner.

significant predictors of change.

Given that loans/assets

is an indicator of strategic effectiveness for banks, this
finding seems appropriate.

Strategic management theorists

have advocated that strategic change is necessary in
response to a loss of effectiveness; i.e., a lack of fit
with the environment.
Slack resources had mixed effects on strategic change.
Liquid assets were found to have a negative influence on
strategic change, while capital was positively related to
change.

One explanation may be that liquidity measures are

tapping into another construct, risk posture.

High levels

of liquidity also indicate a tendency toward risk aversion
in the banking industry.

Thus, it is not too surprising

that high levels liquidity are negatively related to
change.

High levels of capital, apparently encourage banks

to change strategies due to the cushion provided.
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Age was a particularly strong and robust predictor of
change, but the direction of the influence was in the
opposite direction from that predicted.

Older

organizations, contrary to the propositions of selection
theorists, demonstrated a higher propensity to change.

It

was suggested that this finding may reflect a learning
effect.

As organizations grow older and experience

environmental changes, they may learn how to become
flexible and responsive.
As predicted, size was found to be negatively related
to change.

However, when controlling for original

strategy, this effect became insignificant.

Thus, the size

effect was assumed to be spurious.
Summary of Performance Outcomes
This section tested the notion that certain factors
may moderate the relationship between change and
performance outcomes.

Age, slack resources, and degree of

change were all found to have a significant influence on
performance outcomes. Age was a weak moderator for changes
in loan portfolio growth, but not for ROA or efficiency.
Furthermore, the direction of the relationship supported
the hypothesis.

Age was negatively related to performance

(effectiveness) for firms that changed strategies, but was
positively related for organizations that failed to change
strategies.

Though hypothesized, this relationship is

surprising, given the findings that age was positively
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related to change.

Apparently older organizations are more

prone to attempt change, but have more difficulty in the
implementation.
Slack resources in the form of liquidity were also
found to moderate performance outcomes. Surprisingly,
slack was negatively related to performance for
organizations that changed strategies.

It was suggested

that either a buffering or risk aversion may explain this
relationship.

Since liquidity was found to deter change,

it is possible that when change is attempted, the timing or
degree of change may affect subsequent performance.

In

other words, the change may be "too little" or "too late"
or a combination of the two.
Degree of change was found to be negatively related to
ROA outcomes.’ For organizations that changed strategies,
more radical changes were associated with lower performance
outcomes.

On the other hand, change itself was found to be

positively related to performance, particularly when the
more radical changers were eliminated from the sample.
This finding strongly suggests that change can positively
impact performance, but that too much change can have a
detrimental result.
Summary of Survival Outcomes
This section tested the hypotheses predicting survival
outcomes.

None of the hypotheses were supported.

This was

assumed to be partially due to the small number of failed
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firms in the sample, and the resulting lack of statistical
power.

One finding of note was that survival was found to

be positively related to change.

Over 58% of the surviving

firms changed strategies, while only 29% of the failed
firms changed.

Thus, changing strategies appeared to

decrease rather than increase chances of survival.
In conclusion, although the hypotheses received mixed
support, many of the findings were interesting.

The

outcomes provided support for many of the basic strategic
management tenets.

Change was found to be a rather common

occurrence, and in general the results point to positive
change outcomes.
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CHAPTER 7
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter reviews the findings and conclusions of
the study.

The first section contains an overview of the

study and findings.

The ensuing discussion will include an

examination of the contributions and limitations of the
study, as well as its implications for theory, management
practice, and future research.
Overview of the Study
This study started out by proposing three questions
that are fundamental to the strategic management
perspective, but have received relatively little attention
by researchers.

The first two questions were:

1. Do organizations engage in strategic change following
environmental discontinuities?
2. Do those organizations that change strategies following
major environmental discontinuities improve their
performance and survival chances?
Based on the theoretical and empirical research to date, it
was anticipated that the answer to these questions is, "it
all depends."

Therefore, the focus of this study was

placed on exploring a third question:
192
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3. To what extent is the relationship between change in
strategy, performance, and survival influenced by firm
and situation specific factors?
Based on a review of the literature, a conceptual
model was developed that predicted change would be
influenced by two factors, adaptive forces and inertial
forces. Adaptive forces include two factors that have been
hypothesized to encourage change, prior performance and
slack resources.

Inertial forces include two factors

sometimes thought to hamper change, organizational size and
age.

Change outcome was predicted to be influenced by

degree of change and moderated by the adaptive and inertial
forces. Guided by previous theoretical and empirical
research, cluster analysis was used to measure strategy and
degree of change.

The conceptual model was tested within

the context of the commercial banking industry from 1980 to
1987.
Data analysis suggested a number of interesting
conclusions.

First, the cluster analysis revealed that

over half (57%) of the banks in the sample changed
strategies during the time of the study.

This finding is

roughly consistent with percentages observed in previous
studies that have examined strategic change in industries
undergoing discontinuous change.
change also emerged.

Certain patterns of

For example, there was a strong

movement away from the agricultural lending and retail
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segments, and a strong movement toward investments.

Firms

following strategies that were broader in scope
demonstrated relatively less change than those following
more focused strategies. These results are consistent with
the ecological arguments that generalists are better suited
to withstand major environmental discontinuities (Freeman
and Hannan, 1983).

However, the fact that the narrower

scope firms were able to shift to a different strategy
obviously supports the strategic management perspective.
In general, this study joins a growing number of
studies that suggest strategic change is a rather common
event following major environmental discontinuities.

Thus,

as expected, this study offers an affirmative answer to the
first research question posed.

Organizations do tend to

engage in strategic change following major environmental
changes.

Furthermore, the pattern of changes noted suggest

that the initial strategy seems to be an important
determinant of change.

Narrower scope firms in particular

seem to be in a more precarious position following
environmental changes, as evidenced by the larger number of
changes noted among these groups.

This observation

suggests an area for further research.
Second, the conceptual model proved to be useful in
understanding the relationship between certain firm level
factors and the propensity of organizations to change
strategies. Some evidence was found to support the notion
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that prior performance, slack resources, and age are all
important antecedents to change.

Effectiveness, as

measured by loan portfolio growth, was found to be
negatively related to change.

That is, banks experiencing

a decline in their loan portfolios, relative to overall
assets, experienced a greater degree of strategic change.
On the other hand, efficiency and overall financial
performance were not significantly related to change.

This

finding rather strongly supports the strategic management
framework, particularly the position that stresses the
inertial characteristics of organizations.
Slack resources in the form of excess capital, were
found to have a positive influence on degree of change.
This supports the notion that an excess cushion of
resources can act as an adaptive force, encouraging change
and experimentation.

On the other hand, liquidity was

negatively associated with change; however, this
relationship may be indicative of an overall aversion to
risk.

One particularly interesting and unexpected result

was the finding that age was positively related to change.
A learning effect was offered as an explanation, but this
result suggests the need for further research.
The overall picture that emerges from these findings
is that declining effectiveness and slack resources act as
adaptive forces; i.e., they encourage strategic change as
predicted.

However age and size failed to inhibit change
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as predicted.

In fact, age was found to be a positive

force for change.

In addition, though not a part of the

model, the results suggest that risk aversion and group
membership may be important factors that influence change.
Third, this study suggests that change is positively
related to performance and survival, regardless of firm
level factors suggested in the model. Change was noted to
be positively related to ROA, efficiency, and survival.
Significance was weak for ROA, moderate for efficiency, and
strong for survival.

This finding was unexpected, given

that few studies have found a significant main effect
relationship between change and performance.

The

improvement in efficiency was particularly interesting, in
light of the liability of newness arguments proposed by
population ecologists.

Apparently a number of banks were

able to successfully implement strategic changes, while
simultaneously improving efficiency.

Also, it was

interesting to note that change appeared to have survival
value.

This set of findings is interpreted as offering

rather strong support for the strategic management
perspective.
Fourth, the relationship between change and
performance becomes even more clear when degree of change
is considered.

Specifically, the evidence suggests a

curvilinear relationship between performance and change.
Firms that underwent moderate levels of change outperformed
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those that did not change as well as those that underwent a
more drastic degree of change.

Interestingly, this finding

is similar to that of Hambrick and D'Aveni (1988), who
found that too little or too much change was associated
with organizational failure.

Although change can have

positive outcomes, organizations must find the right
balance when attempting strategic change.

Changing too

much may be just as detrimental as not changing, even when
environmental circumstances dictate the need for change.
Finally, a few firm level factors, age and slack
resources (liquidity) were found to moderate the
relationship between change and performance.

Specifically,

high levels of liquidity were negatively related to
performance (ROA) for firms that changed strategies and
positively related for firms that failed to change.

Since

liquidity is generally thought to aid in the implementation
of new strategies, this finding may reflect an indirect
relationship.

For example, high levels of liquidity may

reflect a risk averse posture, resulting in a conservative
or tenuous approach to change. Either through the timing
of the change or the degree of change, such an approach may
have a negative impact on performance.

Age was a weakly

significant moderator of the change-effectiveness
relationship. 'Older organizations apparently have a more
difficult time implementing changes, despite being more
prone to attempt change.
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In summary, the findings provided some support for the
conceptual model, although revisions are apparently in
order.

For example, factors such as group membership and

risk posture may be important change antecedents to
consider.

Also, a quite important finding was that degree

of change seems to be related to performance in a
curvilinear fashion.

Overall, these findings lend credence

to the major assumptions of the strategic management
perspective and have some important implications for
practicing managers as well.

These issues will be

addressed in the following sections.
Conclusions and Contributions of the Study
The conclusions and contributions of this study will
be examined by reviewing the individual components of the
model and evaluating the outcomes in light of the theory
used to develop the hypotheses.
Performance and Strategic Change
The literature suggested that there would be a
relationship between performance and strategic change.
First, a number of theorists advocate an inertial view of
strategic change (Oster, 1982; Miller and Friesen, 1984) .
The implication of this view is that change will tend to be
delayed until an obvious gap develops between desired and
actual performance.

Low or declining performance will tend

to provide an incentive for change to occur.

The evidence

from this study lends credence to this view, but also
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suggests that managers may be more sensitive to certain
types of performance.

In this study, banks tended to

change strategies in response to a decline in loans to
assets, a measure intended to capture overall
effectiveness. Since effectiveness is more closely
associated with strategic "fit", this finding seems
appropriate.

A drop in loans, which are typically the

primary earning assets for a bank, is likely to be the
first internal indication of the need to seek out new
markets.

On the other hand, a decline in overall financial

performance may be a function of efficiency problems, or
perhaps, uncontrollable but temporary economic conditions
such as changes in interest rates.

Thus, the banks in this

study seemed to respond to specific performance signals.
Also, none of the static measures of performance were
significant, indicating that managers are more sensitive to
changes in their own performance, rather than performance
relative to competitors.
Second, given the difficulties associated with changes
of a strategic nature asserted by the population ecologists
as well as many strategic management theorists, it was
reasoned that such changes will be beneficial only for
those organizations demonstrating a strong need for change.
Theoretically, these organizations will be more motivated
to implement the change, and
the change.

will stand to gain more from

In essence, the gains for these organizations
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are expected to outweigh the costs.

However, change is

likely to be detrimental for those demonstrating little
need for change.
the gains.

Here, the costs are likely to outweigh

Need for change was assumed to be closely

related to performance; therefore, it was reasoned that
prior performance would moderate change outcomes.
Unfortunately, none of the prior performance measures
significantly moderated performance or survival outcomes;
therefore, this study provides no evidence to support this
view.
Obviously, this lack of evidence could indicate that
need for change and change outcomes are unrelated; however,
there are other explanations as well.

For example, these

findings may simply reflect an imperfect correlation
between performance and need for change.

Although a

decline in loans to assets was related to change above,
this explains only a small percentage of the variance in
change. Changes may also be triggered by external events
that increase aspiration levels (Grinyer and McKiernan,
1990), such as threat of a takeover or change in the
competitive environment or by internal events such as
change in management.

Under such circumstances,

organizations may recognize the need for change, prior to
experiencing a decline in performance.
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Slack Resources and Strategic Change
Researchers disagree as to how slack resources will
impact organizational change.

Some argue that excess

resources will encourage organizations to experiment and
take a more proactive approach to change (Bourgeois, 1981;
Cyert and March, 1963).

Others argue that slack resources

will discourage change by buffering the organization from
its environment (Starbuck, Greve, and Hedberg, 1988).

At

first glance, the results of this study appear to support
both views, since two different measures of slack were
signicant in opposite directions.

Liquidity was found to

be negatively related to change, supporting the buffering
argument.

On the other hand, capital was positively

related to change, supporting the experimentation argument.
One explanation offered in this study is that
liquidity may be tapping into a related construct, risk
posture.

Liquid resources, consisting of cash and

investments that can be quickly converted to cash,

are a

first line of defense for banks in case of a deposit "run
off."

In the event of a large decline in deposits, liquid

resources can be depleted rather quickly.

However, most

banks have a number of options, including loans from other
banks (fed funds), loans from the government agencies, or
simply "bought money" (i.e., high interest rate, large
denomination C.D.'s).

Investments in cash or liquid

resources offer clearly lower returns for banks, but they
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also lower the risk of having to rely on more expensive
funds in the event of a decline in deposits.

Thus,

substantial investment in liquid resources can be
interpreted as a tendency toward risk aversion.
In retrospect, liquid resources are perhaps not a very
crucial source of slack for banks.

For one thing, banks

have a number of available funding alternatives designed to
protect them from short term cash shortfalls, since such
shortfalls can have disastrous consequences.

Also,

considering that they offer little protection against loan
losses, the notion that high levels of liquidity discourage
banks from monitoring and reacting to their environment
does not seem to be an extremely plausible explanation.
Thus, the most reasonable explanation for these results is
that liquid resources represent a measure of risk posture.
High levels of liquid resources represent an aversion to
risk, and thus reduce the likelihood of change.
On the other hand, capital reserves represent a
primary line of defense against unanticipated loan losses.
Unanticipated loan losses, those that exceed loan loss
reserves, go directly to the "bottom line", thereby
reducing capital.

Marginal capital reserves can be

depleted rather quickly in the event of large investment or
loan losses, forcing a bank into insolvency.

It is

apparent that excess capital represents an important
cushion for banks moving into less familiar lending
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territory where unexpected losses may occur.

Therefore,

the finding that capital reserves are positively related to
change supports the view that slack resources encourage
change and experimentation.
It was also anticipated that slack resources would
moderate change outcomes by positively impacting
performance and survival.

The reasoning is that slack

resources provide a cushion of resources that could be
utilized during the reorganization process following
change.

Liquidity was found to moderate the change

process, but in the opposite direction from that predicted.
For organizations that changed strategies, liquidity was
found to be negatively related to performance.

However, if

liquidity is an indicator of risk posture as suggested
above, these results do not seem surprising.

Conservative

organizations, when they do make changes, may go about it
in more tenuous fashion.

Attempting to change in a

"piecemeal" fashion or delaying change and entering new
markets after the competition may hamper performance, even
when change is called for.
Organizational Ace and Strategic Change
Hannan and Freeman (1984) make a strong argument for a
correlation between age and inertia.

As organizations age,

certain routines and skills become embedded.

Having an

established set of routines is said to increase
accountability and reliability, and thus improve an
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organization's chances of survival.

Supposedly, the price

paid for accountability and reliability is loss of
flexibility.

This notion suggests a negative relationship

between age and change.
indicate that

However, the results of this study

this line of reasoning may be erroneous.

Age was found to positively related to change.

That is,

older banks in this study were more likely to change
strategies than younger banks.

It was suggested that this

result may be due to a learning effect.

As organizations

age and survive environmental upheavals, it is likely that
one of the skills they master is the ability to adapt.
The population ecology arguments also suggest that
organizational age may moderate the relationship between
change and performance outcomes. Since younger
organizations are supposedly more flexible, they should
have an advantage over older organizations when changing
strategies.

On the other hand, the liability of newness

argument suggests that older organizations may have an
advantage under conditions of stability.

This study

provides some evidence to support this line of reasoning.
Age weakly moderated the relationship between change and
loan portfolio growth in the direction expected.

That is,

age was negatively related to portfolio growth for banks
that changed strategies, but was positively related for
firms that did not change.

Though hypothesized, this

result was surprising since age was found to be positively
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related to change.

This finding suggests a more complex

relationship than a straight-forward learning argument.
Apparently, the experience gained by older banks translates
into superior environmental scanning skills, allowing them
to recognize the need for change.
more likely to initiate change.

Thus, older banks are
However, this does not

translate into superior implementation skills.

Inertial

forces apparently serve to slow down or hamper change
efforts in these organizations, resulting in a failure to
achieve the full benefits of the change.

Thus, older banks

were more prone to change strategies, but were less able to
implement certain aspects of the change.
The findings concerning age were surprising.

In fact,

a fair amount of additional analysis was performed to rule
out alternate explanations, but the relationship proved to
be quite robust.

The only other study to directly examine

the influence of age on change found that age was
positively related to the length of time taken to implement
changes (Ginsberg and Bucholtz, 1990).

That finding agrees

with the result in this study that age may negatively
impact certain performance outcomes.

However, neither of

these seem consistent with the finding that age is
positively related to change.

Our post-hoc explanation

that relates age to learning seems plausible, but there is
obviously a need for further theoretical and empirical
exploration of this phenomenon.
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Organizational Size and Strategic Change
Larger organizations are frequently argued to have
greater inertial qualities than small organizations (Hannan
and Freeman, 1984; 1989; Fombrum and Ginsberg, 1990).

The

arguments suggest that the standardization and
formalization associated with large, complex organizations
make them less amenable to the will of managers and less
flexible.

This study provides no support for this

position.

Size was found to be negatively related to

change; however, when controlling for original group
membership this effect became insignificant. Size also
failed to moderate performance and survival outcomes.

When

controlling for original group membership, large banks in
this study were just as likely to change strategy andwere
able to implement strategies as effectively as smaller
ones.
This finding contradicts a number of studies that have
found size to be a significant inhibitor of change (Fombrun
and Ginsberg, 1990; Guarino, 1991; Rediker and Middleton,
1992; Silverman and Castaldi, 1992).

It is interesting to

note, however, that all but one of these studies have
occurred in the banking industry, and none controlled for
original group membership.

This study suggests an

alternate explanation to the size/inertia argument
typically offered.

The patterns of change noted in this

study suggested a relationship between scope and strategic

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

207

change.

Organizations with narrower scopes tended to

exhibit a greater degree of change than those with a wide
scope.

Because scope is generally related to size, it may

be argued that relationships between size and change,
actually represent a relationship between scope and change.
Larger, broad scope, firms are likely to have less need for
change during times of environmental discontinuities
(Zammuto and Cameron, 1985).

Therefore, the relationship

noted by previous researchers between size and change may
be spurious.
Degree of Chance and Change Outcomes
Both population ecologists and strategic management
theorists have argued that the type, or degree, of change
is an important consideration when hypothesizing change
outcomes.

The population ecologists are obviously much

more restrictive, arguing that organizational core
features, including domain and technology, are highly inert
and can rarely be successfully changed.

Strategic

management theorists, on the other hand, stress that
mobility barriers may restrict certain types of changes.
Generally speaking, the more similar the groups, the lower
the mobility barriers, and the easier the change.

As

suggested by Harrigan (1985), this study used distance
between groups, to measure degree of change.

The greater

the distance or degree of change, the higher the mobility
barriers.

The results suggest that change is related to
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performance outcomes in a curvilinear fashion.
Organizations that engaged in moderate levels of change
experienced superior performance compared to those that
experienced no change, or extreme levels of change.

This

outcome provides more support for the strategic management
perspective than for population ecology.
Limitations of the Study
One important limitation to any study focusing on a
single industry is that of generalizability.

This study

focused on a single industry, at a particularly turbulent
time in its history.

Different findings may be obtained by

examining different industries under different
environmental circumstances, or even by examining the same
industry at a different time in its history.

Therefore,

caution must be exercised when generalizing these results
to other industry sectors.

Nevertheless, the loss of

generalizability was offset by a greater depth of
understanding associated with examining changes occurring
within a single industry.

As more researchers take this

approach, generalizability can be assessed by comparing
results obtained in numerous industries over different
points in time.
A second limitation of this study lies in its design.
Care was taken to choose an appropriate time frame, one
that would capture changes in the industry following
deregulation, and one that would be long enough for the
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changes to materialize.

However, as with any study of this

type, the exact times for measuring strategy and
performance were somewhat arbitrary.

It is likely that

some of the firms in the sample changed strategies prior to
1982 or after 1985, thus distorting the results.

Also, the

design did not allow for determining the exact timing of
the change.

Therefore, prior and post performance measures

can only be said to be approximate.
Another limitation related to the time frame issue,
was the failure to include a large enough sample of failed
banks to adequately test the hypotheses related to
survival. Two ways to increase the sample of failed banks
would be to extend the time frame of the study or to
develop a matched set of failed and surviving banks. The
most methodologically desirable approach would be to extend
the time frame of the study, using the same randomly drawn
sample.

However, there is no guarantee that this approach

would sufficiently increase the sample of failed banks.
Also, the further removed the failure from the measurement
of change, the weaker the linkage becomes.

Therefore,

future studies to examine this issue may need to used
matched sets of failed and surviving organizations.
Another time frame limitation concerns the overall
length of the study.

Although the study is longitudinal,

covering an eight year time frame, it still may be argued
to be relatively short from the perspective of population
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ecologists.

For example, Hannan and Freeman (1977) go back

literally hundreds of years in their attempt to argue that
even the largest organizations eventually fail.

While one

could certainly argue the merits of taking such a long term
perspective, it does point out that the time frame for this
study may be considered too short to be meaningful from the
selection perspective.
A fourth limitation is the choice of strategy
variables.

Choices pertaining to scope (i.e., products

offered and markets served) represents an important
strategic consideration.

A number of studies, both in the

population ecology and strategic management literature have
relied on similar variables to measure strategy.
Nevertheless, this definition of strategy may result in
specification error.

For example, this study fails to

consider other important strategic components such as
competitive weapons and segmentation (Chrisman, Hofer, and
Boulton, 1988) . In addition, the measures used may fail to
capture more subtle changes in scope.

For example, an

organization switching its focus from large commercial
lending to small business loans, would still be classified
as a wholesale lender in this study.

Failure to capture

such changes represents specification error, which could
distort the results.
A final limitation of this study results from the
assumptions and judgement calls associated with doing a
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cluster analysis.

Cluster analysis may be seriously

impacted by the variables included in the analysis and the
clustering algorithm used.

As noted, an attempt was made

to choose appropriate variables, and the non-hierarchical
algorithm associated with the FASTCLUS procedure had quite
a bit of precedence in the literature.

Nevertheless, the

inclusion or deletion of certain variables or the use of a
different clustering method may have resulted in
significantly different results.

Also, though the five

cluster solution seemed to be superior, the number of
clusters chosen is ultimately a subjective decision that
can impact the results.
Implications for Theory
This study drew on the theories of population ecology
and strategic management to investigate strategic change in
the banking industry.

Population ecologists argue that

inertial forces largely preclude change to the core
features of an organization (Hannan and Freeman, 1977;
1984).

Furthermore, when changes are attempted, they will

tend to be disruptive and maladaptive resulting in an
increased risk of failure.

On the other hand, the

strategic management approach suggests that managers have
considerable latitude in altering competitive strategies,
and that such alterations are sometimes necessary to ensure
continued survival.

The literature suggested that taking a

middle-ground approach to investigating strategic change
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would result in a better understanding of the phenomenon.
That is, the degree to which strategic choice and selection
arguments are salient may depend on certain firm level
factors.
Overall, this study provides little evidence to
support the natural selection view of strategic change.
First, changes between strategic groups was not an uncommon
occurrence for banks during the time of this study.
Approximately 57% of the banks in this study changed group
membership.

Second, banks that changed strategies improved

their performance relative to those that did not.

The

curvilinear relationship noted between degree of change and
performance suggests limitations to change.

Such

limitations could be argued to contradict the extreme views
of strategic choice assumed by some schools of thought
within the strategic management paradigm; however, this
view is consistent with the main stream view that assumes
choice to be limited by mobility barriers.

The extreme

selection view argues that any change to core features will
have a detrimental impact on performance.

Third, failure

rates were significantly higher for banks that did not
change strategies than for those that changed strategies.
Contrary to the selection arguments, change seemed to
associated with survival.

Fourth, although age and size

have been hypothesized to be positively related to inertia,
neither seemed to significantly hamper change efforts.

In
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fact, older banks were more prone to engage in strategic
change than younger banks.

Size was found to have no

impact on change, when group membership was controlled.
These findings indicate that the natural selection
arguments need some revision.
In general, this study suggests that managers have
quite a bit of discretion in altering their strategies in
response to environmental changes.

However, the evidence

that certain aspects of prior performance were signicant
antecedents to change supports the notion that strategies
tend to be "sticky" (Oster, 1982).

Banks in this study

appeared to need a performance downturn to stimulate
change.

Also, there appear to be limitations to change.

At some point, the costs of changing apparently outweigh
the benefits, resulting in performance downturns.

Thus,

although managers have strategic choice, not all changes
are easy to implement, or are they likely to have positive
outcomes.
In some ways, the results of this study are in keeping
with a growing body of literature suggesting that the
natural selection view and strategic management perspective
be reconciled by considering the type or degree of change
considered (House, Singh, and Tucker, 1986; Haveman, 199 ;
Bauerschmidt and Chrisman, 1993).

Selection theorists have

made the distinction between core and peripheral changes,
however this study suggest that a finer distinction be
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considered.

Within the core features, which include stated

goals, forms of authority, core technology, and marketing
strategy, it may be necessary to consider degree of change.
Perhaps as changes become more unrelated, requiring old
competencies to be discarded and new ones developed, the
selection view becomes more salient.
Implications for Management Practice
As noted above, this study indicates that managers
have a great deal of discretion in changing strategies, but
this does not mean that all types of changes work, or that
change is an easy process. When environmental upheavals
change the face of competition, and make certain niches
more or less desirable, managers should seek to respond by
changing strategies.

On average, organizations that

changed strategies outperformed those that did not in this
study.
The role of degree of change in this study suggests
that managers carefully weigh the various mobility barriers
prior to undergoing changes.

Changes that are highly

dissimilar to existing strategies may require the
development of new competencies that are not readily
available, or that are quite costly.

In all probability,

this explains the popularity of the change to a focused
investor orientation during the time of this study, as an
investment strategy may be argued to require less
specialized skills than other strategies.

Organizations
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attempting to overcome high mobility barriers are likely to
find themselves at a disadvantage relative to their
competitors.

This study suggests that mobility barriers

play an important role in the outcome of strategic change.
Changes to relatively similar positions are more likely to
result in positive outcomes.
Contrary to the findings of previous studies, this
research suggests that age and size have relatively little
impact on change outcomes. There is some evidence to
suggest that older organizations were more prone to change
strategies, but that they experienced somewhat lower
performance.

However, overall the results seem to indicate

that older and larger banks experienced little more
difficulty in changing strategies than smaller, younger
banks.

Managers of large or older organizations should not

consider these factors as barriers when attempting to
change strategies.
Implications for Future Research
The results of this study indicate a number of
directions for future research.

First, the results suggest

that future studies should examine the impact of scope on
change and change outcomes.

Though not hypothesized, an

interesting outcome from this study was that size became
insignificant when original group membership was entered
into the equation.

This finding challenges a number of

studies that have found size to be a significant inhibitor
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of change (Fombrun and Ginsberg, 1990; Guarino, 1991;
Rediker and Middleton, 1992; Silverman and Castaldi, 1992).
Specifically, it implies that organizational strategy, as
measured by scope, is a more important change antecedent
than size.

The patterns of change noted in this study

suggest that banks following focused strategies (narrow
scopes) tended to change more frequently than banks
following generalist strategies (broad scopes). This
finding is consistent with the notion that broad scoped
firms are better suited to weather environmental
discontinuities due to their diversity (Zammuto and
Cameron, 1985) . It also suggests an alternate hypothesis
to the size/inertia argument typically offered.

A related

issue that deserves exploration concerns the impact of
scope on change outcomes.

In general, this study indicates

that scope could be an important variable for understanding
strategic change, which in turn suggests the need for
further theoretical development and empirical research in
this area.
A more obvious, but seldom considered factor that is
likely to impact change and change outcomes is a firm's
overall disposition toward risk.

This study found that

liquid resources were negatively related to change and
performance.

Since larger levels of liquid resources are

seen as an indicator of risk aversion, these findings
suggest that risk posture may be an important variable for
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predicting both change and change outcomes. Further
research is needed to explore this issue.
An unexpected finding in this study that deserves
further exploration is the positive relationship found
between age and change, and subsequent negative
relationship between age and change outcomes.

Post-hoc

reflection suggested that this may be due to learning
effects, or scanning experience in the industry, but this
explanation needs to be further developed and tested.
Another interesting relationship that could bear
further exploration is that between degree of change and
performance.

Although the findings relating cluster

distance to performance outcomes are interesting in their
own right, further studies may want to explore this
relationship in more depth.

For example, can the concept

of "relatedness" be used to better understand this
phenomenon?

Also, the concept of asymmetric mobility

barriers may be an interesting phenomenon to explore
(Harrigan, 1985).

That is, the success in moving between

groups may depend not only on the degree of change, but the
direction of change.

For example, in this study 53 firms

moved from a generalist wholesale strategy to a focused
investment strategy, while only eight firms changed from
focused investors to generalist wholesalers.

Although the

distance traveled remains the same, intuitively moving
toward an investment strategy would seem to be much easier
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than the reverse.

The notion of assymetric mobility

barriers seems to be borne out by the patterns of change
noted in this study, but further research may want to
explicitely test this notion by accounting for direction of
change when testing change outcomes.
In addition to the above, a number of suggestions for
future research can be made to overcome the limitations of
this study.

For example, replications using different

industries, different strategy variables, and different
methods would be useful.

As evidence accumulates in this

manner, a core group of generalizable conclusions can be
amassed.
It would also be useful to extend this study,
measuring strategic change over multiple time periods.
Several interesting questions could be explored by such an
extension.

For example, did firms that switched to an

investment strategy switch again as the industry settled
down and became more predictable?

More specifically, did a

change to an investment strategy represent a stepping stone
to more drastic change, or perhaps a safe port to ride out
the turbulence in the industry?

In general, this pertains

to the whole issue of incremental versus quantum change.
Although this study suggests that quantum changes are less
likely to be succesful, perhaps organizations achieve such
change incrementally, making a series of smaller changes
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over time, or changing to a "safe" strategy while they
accumulate the skills necessary to make major changes.
Another important area for future research is the
focus on strategic change and failure.

As noted, this

study failed to capture a large enough sample of failed
banks to test the hypotheses related to survival. This
could be dealt with in several ways.

First, the time frame

of the study could be extended to increase the number of
failures.

Another approach would be to develop a matched

set of failed and surviving banks for comparison.

A final

approach would involve utilizing a failure or bankruptcy
scale similar to Altman's Z score, to obtain a measure of
risk of failure.
Another important but neglected research topic
concerns the methodology for measuring change.

Although a

number of studies have relied on similar techniques to
those utilized in this study, others have used more narrow
definitions of strategy and/or relied on continuous
measures of change.

Validation studies using multiple

measures and multiple methods as suggested by Cook and
Campbell (1979) would be a valuable contribution to the
field.
Finally, it is important that future research consider
the moderating impact of different environmental
circumstances on change and change outcomes. The banking
industry was undergoing several different types of
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environmental change during the time of this study,
including regulatory changes, temporary economic
fluctuations, and technological changes to name a few.
Future studies should consider examining strategic change
and change outcomes during times of relative stability, or
even during times of industry growth.

It is quite likely

that the outcomes observed in this study, and others that
have concentrated on industries undergoing periods of
disequilibrium, may be different under different
environmental circumstances.
Conclusions
This study represented an attempt to examine some
basic but seldom tested assumptions underlying the
strategic management perspective.

The focus of the study

was on exploring some of the firm level factors that the
literature suggested would influence change and change
outcomes.

It was anticipated that the outcomes would

provide a "middle-ground" approach for understanding
strategic change.

That is, it would identify certain key

factors that serve to instigate change and moderate
outcomes.
The results were mixed, sometimes providing support
for the hypothesized relationships, sometimes providing
unexpected but understandable outcomes, and sometimes
providing ambiguous and confusing outcomes.

Overall, the

results strongly supported the strategic management
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perspective of strategic change, and provided little
evidence to support the natural selection view underlying
the population ecology perspective.

However, it is

apparent that much more research is needed to understand
this phenomenon.

Strategic change is both an important and

interesting research topic.

It is hoped that this study

will add to this growing research stream and provide a
framework upon which future researchers can continue to
build.
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APPENDIX A
LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS

Table 28. Results of Logistic Regression Analyses for
Change Antecedents________________________________
Uns tandardi zed
Regression
Standard
Wald
Coefficient
Error
Chi-Souare
Beta
Variable
ROA

.107

.167

.409

.040

ROACH

.028

.195

.021

.006

EFF

- .779

.703

1.229

-.141

EFFCH

- .442

.481

.844

-.113

CHLNAS

-.065

.022

8.776 **

-.141

LIQUID

-3.815

.458

69.336 ***

-.432

-.057

.036

2.593 *

-.093

.473

.091

27.326 ***

.246

LASSET

- .269

.087

9.668 ***

- .167

HOLDC

- .248

.171

2 .107

- .068

Intercept

3.03

-2LL = 217 .39

Dseudo R2 = .1854

AS CAP
LAGE

1.063

8.088 **

-

*
p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01
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APPENDIX B
REGRESSION ANALYSIS - EFF OMITTED

Table 29. Results of Regression Analysis for Degree of
Change - EFF Omitted from Analysis__________________
Unstandardized
Regression
Standard
Variable
Coefficient
Error
t-statistic
Beta
.065

.085

.775

.044

ROACH

-.034

.118

-.295

-.014

EFFCH

.019

.107

.181

.009

CHLNAS

-.031

.013

-2.430 **

-.124

LIQUID

-1.993

.245

-8.107 ***

-.409

-.051

.021

-2.470 **

-.151

.359

.054

6.592 ***

.339

LASSET

-.145

.052

-2.793 ***

-.164

HOLDC

-.053

.104

-.512

-.027

UNEMP

- .043

.029

-1.458

- .073

Intercept

3 .02

.512

R2 = .2053
variables)

F = 21.850

ROA

AS CAP
LAGE

5.906 ***

1.71

N = 857 (4 obs. had missing

*
P < .10
** P < .05
*** P < .01
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APPENDIX C
REGRESSION ANALYSIS - EFFCH OMITTED

Table 30. Results of Regression Analysis for Degree of
Change - EFFCH Omitted from Analysis________________
Unstandardized
Regression
Standard
Variable
Coefficient
Error
t-statistic
Beta
ROA

.061

.083

.735

.041

ROACH

-.039

.118

-.330

-.016

EFF

- .075

.158

- .480

- .025

CHLNAS

-.031

.013

-2.467 **

-.125

LIQUID

-1.989

.246

-8.085 ***

-.408

-.050

.021

-2.398 **

-.147

.359

.054

6.584 ***

.339

LASSET

- .147

.052

-2.821 ***

- .166

HOLDC

-.054

.104

-.522

- .027

UNEMP

- .043

.029

-1.458

- .073

Intercept

3 .07

.517

R2 = .2054
variables)

F = 21.875

AS CAP
LAGE

5.941 ***

1.71

N = 857 (4 obs. had missing

*
p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01
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